Lee Alexander Harris v. Commissioner of Social Security

E.D. California

Lee Alexander Harris v. Commissioner of Social Security

DecidedNovember 12, 2025

Docket2:21-cv-01882

StatusUnknown

This text of Lee Alexander Harris v. Commissioner of Social Security (Lee Alexander Harris v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lee Alexander Harris v. Commissioner of Social Security, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LEE ALEXANDER HARRIS, No. 2:21-cv-1882-SCR 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 16 Defendant. 17 18 Plaintiff sought judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner”) denying her application for benefits under the Social Security Act. On July 20 20, 2022, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes remanded this 21 action to the Commissioner for further proceedings. ECF Nos. 8-9. On remand, Plaintiff was 22 awarded past benefits of $133,661.90.1 ECF No. 15-1 at 1-2. 23 Now pending before the court is Plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees 24 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 15. Pursuant to the Court’s minute order, Plaintiff’s 25 counsel subsequently submitted additional information relevant to determining a reasonable rate. 26 ECF Nos. 20-21. The Commissioner has filed a statement that he “neither supports nor opposes 27 1 The Notice of Award states that $33,415.48 of the past-due benefits was being withheld “to pay 28 your representative.” ECF No. 15-1 at 2. 1 Counsel’s request for attorney’s fees.” ECF No. 18 at 3. The Commissioner requests that the 2 order direct Plaintiff’s counsel to reimburse Plaintiff any fees previously received under the Equal 3 Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Id. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be granted, as 4 will the Commissioner’s request. 5 I. REASONABLENESS OF FEE REQUEST 6 At the outset of the representation, Plaintiff and her counsel entered into a contingent-fee 7 agreement for 25% of past due benefits awarded. ECF No. 15-3. Pursuant to that agreement, 8 Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,250, which represents less than 9 25% of the $133,661.90 in retroactive disability benefits awarded to Plaintiff on remand. ECF 10 No. 15 at 4; ECF Nos. 15-1, 15-3. 11 Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social 12 security claimants: 13 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, 14 the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of 15 the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security 16 may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 17 18 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 19 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing 20 party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) 21 (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The goal of fee awards under 22 § 406(b) is “‘to protect claimants against “inordinately large fees” and also to ensure that 23 attorneys representing successful claimants would not risk “nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.”’” 24 Parrish v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gisbrecht, 25 535 U.S. at 805). 26 The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must 27 ensure that the fee requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“406(b) does not 28 displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts 1 to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). “Within the 25 percent 2 boundary…the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable 3 for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable 4 fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 5 arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” 6 Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). 7 In determining whether the requested fee is reasonable, the court considers “‘the character 8 of the representation and the results achieved by the representative.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d 9 at 1151 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). In determining whether a reduction in the fee is 10 warranted, the court considers whether the attorney provided “substandard representation or 11 delayed the case,” or obtained “benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” 12 Id. Finally, the court considers the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular 13 hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing 14 Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808); see also, E.D. Cal. R. 293(c)(1) (in fixing attorney’s fees the court 15 considers “the time and labor required”). Below, the court considers these factors in assessing 16 whether the fee requested by counsel in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is reasonable. 17 Here, Plaintiff’s counsel secured a successful result for Plaintiff. Counsel has billed for a 18 total of 5.5 hours through the fall of 2022. ECF No. 15-2. There is no indication that a reduction 19 of fees is warranted due to any substandard performance by counsel. There is also no evidence 20 that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any dilatory conduct resulting in excessive delay. The court 21 finds that the $8,250 fee, which does not exceed 25% of the amount paid in past-due benefits to 22 Plaintiff, is not excessive in relation to the benefits awarded. In making this determination, the 23 court recognizes the contingent fee nature of this case and counsel’s assumption of the risk of 24 going uncompensated in agreeing to represent Plaintiff on such terms. See Crawford, 586 F.3d 25 at 1152 (“[t]he attorneys assumed significant risk in accepting these cases, including the risk that 26 no benefits would be awarded or that there would be a long court or administrative delay in 27 resolving the cases”). 28 //// 1 Counsel has submitted a billing statement in support of the requested fee. ECF No. 15-2. 2 The Court finds that the amount of time expended (5.5 hours) is reasonable. Counsel for Plaintiff 3 correctly notes that the requested $8,250 fee reflects an hourly rate of $1,500. ECF No. 15 at 4. 4 This rate is significant and is approaching what could be categorized as a windfall amount, 5 particularly when compared to a sampling of recent rates approved in this District. See Garcia v. 6 O’Malley, 2024 WL 4121872 (E.D. Cal. September 9, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $685); 7 Guzman Paz v. Commissioner, 2024 WL 4029592 (E.D. Cal. September 3, 2024) (effective 8 hourly rate of $883); Garcia v. Commissioner, 2024 WL 3968083 (E.D. Cal. August 28, 2024) 9 (effective hourly rate of $864). However, Plaintiff’s counsel served as a Social Security 10 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for twelve years, ten of which he also spent as a Chief ALJ 11 for various regions. ECF No. 21 at 1-2. His experience does support the requested rate, 12 particularly when courts have approved higher effective rates. See Timothy M. v.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LEE ALEXANDER HARRIS, No. 2:21-cv-1882-SCR 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 16 Defendant. 17 18 Plaintiff sought judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner”) denying her application for benefits under the Social Security Act. On July 20 20, 2022, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes remanded this 21 action to the Commissioner for further proceedings. ECF Nos. 8-9. On remand, Plaintiff was 22 awarded past benefits of $133,661.90.1 ECF No. 15-1 at 1-2. 23 Now pending before the court is Plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees 24 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 15. Pursuant to the Court’s minute order, Plaintiff’s 25 counsel subsequently submitted additional information relevant to determining a reasonable rate. 26 ECF Nos. 20-21. The Commissioner has filed a statement that he “neither supports nor opposes 27 1 The Notice of Award states that $33,415.48 of the past-due benefits was being withheld “to pay 28 your representative.” ECF No. 15-1 at 2. 1 Counsel’s request for attorney’s fees.” ECF No. 18 at 3. The Commissioner requests that the 2 order direct Plaintiff’s counsel to reimburse Plaintiff any fees previously received under the Equal 3 Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Id. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be granted, as 4 will the Commissioner’s request. 5 I. REASONABLENESS OF FEE REQUEST 6 At the outset of the representation, Plaintiff and her counsel entered into a contingent-fee 7 agreement for 25% of past due benefits awarded. ECF No. 15-3. Pursuant to that agreement, 8 Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,250, which represents less than 9 25% of the $133,661.90 in retroactive disability benefits awarded to Plaintiff on remand. ECF 10 No. 15 at 4; ECF Nos. 15-1, 15-3. 11 Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social 12 security claimants: 13 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, 14 the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of 15 the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security 16 may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 17 18 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 19 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing 20 party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) 21 (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The goal of fee awards under 22 § 406(b) is “‘to protect claimants against “inordinately large fees” and also to ensure that 23 attorneys representing successful claimants would not risk “nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.”’” 24 Parrish v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gisbrecht, 25 535 U.S. at 805). 26 The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must 27 ensure that the fee requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“406(b) does not 28 displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts 1 to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). “Within the 25 percent 2 boundary…the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable 3 for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable 4 fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 5 arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” 6 Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). 7 In determining whether the requested fee is reasonable, the court considers “‘the character 8 of the representation and the results achieved by the representative.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d 9 at 1151 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). In determining whether a reduction in the fee is 10 warranted, the court considers whether the attorney provided “substandard representation or 11 delayed the case,” or obtained “benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” 12 Id. Finally, the court considers the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular 13 hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing 14 Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808); see also, E.D. Cal. R. 293(c)(1) (in fixing attorney’s fees the court 15 considers “the time and labor required”). Below, the court considers these factors in assessing 16 whether the fee requested by counsel in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is reasonable. 17 Here, Plaintiff’s counsel secured a successful result for Plaintiff. Counsel has billed for a 18 total of 5.5 hours through the fall of 2022. ECF No. 15-2. There is no indication that a reduction 19 of fees is warranted due to any substandard performance by counsel. There is also no evidence 20 that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any dilatory conduct resulting in excessive delay. The court 21 finds that the $8,250 fee, which does not exceed 25% of the amount paid in past-due benefits to 22 Plaintiff, is not excessive in relation to the benefits awarded. In making this determination, the 23 court recognizes the contingent fee nature of this case and counsel’s assumption of the risk of 24 going uncompensated in agreeing to represent Plaintiff on such terms. See Crawford, 586 F.3d 25 at 1152 (“[t]he attorneys assumed significant risk in accepting these cases, including the risk that 26 no benefits would be awarded or that there would be a long court or administrative delay in 27 resolving the cases”). 28 //// 1 Counsel has submitted a billing statement in support of the requested fee. ECF No. 15-2. 2 The Court finds that the amount of time expended (5.5 hours) is reasonable. Counsel for Plaintiff 3 correctly notes that the requested $8,250 fee reflects an hourly rate of $1,500. ECF No. 15 at 4. 4 This rate is significant and is approaching what could be categorized as a windfall amount, 5 particularly when compared to a sampling of recent rates approved in this District. See Garcia v. 6 O’Malley, 2024 WL 4121872 (E.D. Cal. September 9, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $685); 7 Guzman Paz v. Commissioner, 2024 WL 4029592 (E.D. Cal. September 3, 2024) (effective 8 hourly rate of $883); Garcia v. Commissioner, 2024 WL 3968083 (E.D. Cal. August 28, 2024) 9 (effective hourly rate of $864). However, Plaintiff’s counsel served as a Social Security 10 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for twelve years, ten of which he also spent as a Chief ALJ 11 for various regions. ECF No. 21 at 1-2. His experience does support the requested rate, 12 particularly when courts have approved higher effective rates. See Timothy M. v. Commissioner, 13 2023 WL 1071604 (D. Oregon Jan. 27, 2023) (effective rate of $1,863); Tristan v. Commissioner, 14 2023 WL 6129832 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2023) (effective rate of $1,580). 15 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the fees sought by 16 counsel pursuant to § 406(b) are reasonable. 17 II. OFFSET FOR EAJA FEES 18 An award of § 406(b) fees must be offset by any prior award of attorney’s fees granted 19 under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. Here, Plaintiff’s attorney was 20 previously awarded $1,100.00 in EAJA fees pursuant to parties’ stipulation. See ECF Nos. 12-13. 21 Counsel therefore must remit that amount to Plaintiff. 22 III. CONCLUSION 23 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 24 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (ECF No. 15), is 25 GRANTED; 26 2. Counsel for Plaintiff is awarded $8,250 in attorney’s fees under § 406(b); the 27 Commissioner shall certify that amount to be paid to counsel from the funds previously withheld 28 for the payment of such fees; and 1 3. Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to remit to Plaintiff the amount of $1,100 for EAJA 2 || fees previously paid to counsel by the Commissioner. 3 SO ORDERED: 4 || DATE: November 10, 2025

6 SEAN C. RIORDAN 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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