Leduc v. Bisignano

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DENNIS J. LEDUC, No. 24-6962 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-06188-GJL v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Grady J. Leupold, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 5, 2026** Portland, Oregon

Before: BEA, CHRISTEN, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellant Dennis J. LeDuc appeals the district court’s order

affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of his application for benefits.

Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s

decision affirming the denial of benefits de novo, and the denial of benefits for

substantial evidence or legal error. Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th Cir.

2022). We affirm.

1. LeDuc challenges the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) evaluation of

three medical opinions. We conclude that the ALJ’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence because he assigned more weight to those opinions that were

well-supported and consistent with the objective medical evidence. See Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998).

a. The ALJ reasonably gave little weight to the post hoc written reports of

LeDuc’s primary care provider, Dr. Thomas R. Cooke, DO. “[I]f the treating

doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may not reject this

opinion without providing ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by

substantial evidence in the record,” which “can be done by setting out a detailed

and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 (citation

modified). The ALJ provided specific, legitimate reasons that were supported by

substantial evidence for assigning little weight to Dr. Cooke’s later written reports

because they were contradicted by his contemporaneous treatment notes and the

other medical evidence in the record.

2 24-6962 b. The ALJ reasonably gave substantial weight to the medical expert

testimony of Dr. Michael Buckwalter, MD.1 The ALJ articulated his reasons for

finding this testimony was entitled to substantial weight when considering LeDuc’s

functional limitations because Dr. Buckwalter’s opinion was well-supported and

generally consistent with the medical record. The ALJ also modified Dr.

Buckwalter’s opinion to reflect his weighing of LeDuc’s ability to engage in

postural activities, which reflects that the ALJ reasonably weighed the testimony.

c. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that the medical expert

testimony of Dr. Steven Golub, MD was entitled to substantial weight because it

was supported and consistent with the medical record from LeDuc’s 2011

emergency room visit. The ALJ also reasonably gave Dr. Golub’s opinion less

weight than he gave to Dr. Buckwalter’s opinion because it did not relate to

LeDuc’s functional capacity during the time at issue.

2. LeDuc argues the ALJ erred by rejecting his testimony about the

severity of his symptoms. We disagree. The ALJ was allowed to discount LeDuc’s

“testimony about the severity of [his] symptoms only by offering specific, clear

and convincing reasons for doing so.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15

1 LeDuc argues that Social Security Ruling 18-1p is relevant to this analysis. We agree with the Commissioner that the ruling is inapplicable here because the ALJ concluded that LeDuc was not disabled. SSR 18-1p applies to the agency’s determination of the established onset date of a disability once a claimant is found to be disabled.

3 24-6962 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). “Contradiction with the medical record is a

sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.” Carmickle v.

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008).

First, as explained, the ALJ did not err in his assessment of the medical

opinions in the record. Second, the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing

reasons for discounting LeDuc’s testimony, which conflicted with the objective

medical evidence in the record, including his primary care provider’s

contemporaneous visit notes. This contradiction between the medical evidence and

LeDuc’s testimony was “a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective

testimony.” Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161.

3. The ALJ also permissibly discounted lay witness testimony of

LeDuc’s friend. An ALJ “must give reasons that are germane to each witness” in

order to disregard competent lay witness testimony. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d

1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation modified); see also 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(f)(2).

Here, the ALJ satisfied that requirement. He “carefully considered” LeDuc’s

friend’s report, but because its description of LeDuc’s extreme abdominal pain

conflicted with the contemporaneous records of LeDuc’s visits with his primary

care provider, the ALJ provided a germane reason to discount the lay witness

testimony.

4. LeDuc’s arguments concerning the ALJ’s assessment of his residual

4 24-6962 functional capacity are derivative of those we have already rejected. We reject

them for the same reasons. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175–76

(9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting claimant’s step five challenge where she “simply

restate[d] her argument that the ALJ’s RFC finding did not account for all her

limitations”).

AFFIRMED.

5 24-6962