Ledger v. Brodeur

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: July 15, 1994
• Docket: CV-94-188-B
• Status: Published

Opinion

Ledger v . Brodeur CV-94-188-B 07/15/94

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

William Ledger

v. Civil N o . 94-188-B

Paul Brodeur, Commissioner Department of Corrections

O R D E R

William Ledger brings this petition for habeas corpus relief

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his conviction for

being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 159:3 (1991), claiming that his right to due

process was violated because the State presented insufficient

evidence at trial to support his conviction. In response, Paul

Brodeur moves for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

56. Finding sufficient evidence in the trial transcript to allow

a rational trier of fact to convict Ledger, I grant Brodeur's

motion for summary judgement. FACTS1 On November 1 7 , 1991, New Hampshire State Police Trooper

Harry Nedeau and Barnstead Police Officer Todd Palmer met with

Ledger while conducting an investigation at his residence. After

waiving his Miranda rights, Ledger informed the officers that he

did not have any firearms in the house because he understood

that, as a convicted felon, he could not possess a firearm.2

Thereafter, Trooper Nedeau and Ledger went together to the

police station where Nedeau asked Ledger for permission to search

his vehicle. When Ledger asked Nedeau to justify the search,

Nedeau informed him that he had reason to believe that Ledger's

vehicle contained a firearm. Ledger had previously been observed

driving a Chevrolet Blazer that was parked adjacent to his

residence when he left with Nedeau to go to the police station.

Further investigation established that the vehicle was registered

to Ledger.

1 In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence in a habeas corpus proceeding, I review the facts drawn from the trial transcript in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See Jackson v . Virginia, 443 U.S. 3 0 7 , 318-20 (1979); Ortiz v . Dubois, 19 F.3d 7 0 8 , 717 (1st Cir. 1994). 2 Ledger was convicted of Grand Larceny, a Class E Felony under New York law, on December 1 1 , 1980.

2 3 Ledger asked if he was "going to get in trouble for it."

Trooper Nedeau replied that if "in fact there were firearms or a

firearm in the vehicle he would be charged." At that point,

Ledger admitted that there was a .20 gauge shotgun in his

vehicle, but he claimed the shotgun did not belong to him. In

addition, Ledger stated that when he earlier told the officers

that he did not have any firearms in his possession, he was

referring to firearms that were actually his.

After obtaining a search warrant, the officers made a

thorough search of Ledger's vehicle. The search revealed a .20

gauge shotgun on the rear seat, underneath some cloth material

and stereo components. A box of .20 gauge shotgun ammunition was

also discovered in a zippered compartment in the vehicle's

armrest. The firearm was not visible from outside of the

vehicle. The Belknap County Grand Jury indicted Ledger on February

2 0 , 1992 for knowingly possessing or having under his control a

firearm after being convicted of a felony. He was convicted

after a jury trial, and sentenced to two-to-five years in the New

Hampshire State Prison. The New Hampshire Supreme Court

summarily affirmed the conviction on October 1 2 , 1993.

4 DISCUSSION3

Jackson sets forth the standard for determining the

sufficiency of evidence in habeas corpus proceedings. See 443

U.S. at 318-20; Ortiz, 19 F.3d at 717. Accordingly, I must

determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

find that the State had proved the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-20.

See also United States v . Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1395 (1st Cir.

1992).

In this case, Ledger was charged with a violation of N.H.

Rev. Stat. Ann. 159:3 (1991), which states that "no person who

has been convicted in this or any state of a felony against the

person or property of another, or who has been convicted of a filing under RSA 318-B, shall own or have in his possession

or under his control a pistol, revolver or any other firearm

. . . ." In order to prove a felon in possession charge under

3 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no "genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v . Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 1 7 , 322-23 (1986). It is appropriate to dispose of this case on a motion for summary judgment because petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence raises only a question of law.

5 New Hampshire law, the State must prove the following: (1) the

object seized was in fact a firearm; (2) the defendant knew that

the object was a firearm; (3) the defendant knowingly owned,

possessed, or exercised control over the firearm; and (4) the

defendant had been convicted of a controlled drug felony or a

felony against a person or property. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

159:3 (1991); State v . Stratton, 132 N.H. 4 5 1 , 4 5 7 , 567 A.2d 986,

990 (1989). The only element in dispute here is whether

sufficient evidence was produced to allow a rational jury to

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ledger actually exercised

control over a firearm on November 1 7 , 1991.

A person has control of a firearm if he has the ability to

determine the use and disposition of the firearm. State v . Pike,

128 N.H. 4 4 7 , 449-50, 514 A.2d 1279, 1280-81 (1986). The ability

to exercise control over a firearm thus does not require ownership or exclusive access. See id. If the evidence

demonstrates that a firearm was found in a place over which the

defendant exercised control and the defendant was aware of the

firearm's location, the evidence is sufficient to establish the

defendant's control over the weapon. See id.; see also State v .

Comeau, 114 N.H. 4 3 1 , 434-36, 321 A.2d 5 9 0 , 592-93 (1974)

(defendant's control over the location and his knowledge of the

6 presence of drugs at that location could prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that defendant had custody of the drugs).

The evidence presented in this case was sufficient to allow

a rational juror to reach the following conclusions: (1) Ledger

knew that, as a convicted felon, he could not possess or have

control over a firearm; (2) the shotgun and ammunition were found

in his vehicle; (3) the vehicle was parked adjacent to his

residence; (4) Ledger had recently been seen driving the vehicle;

(5) the shotgun and the ammunition were concealed; and (6) Ledger

knew that the shotgun was in the vehicle. From these facts, a

rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the

shotgun was under Ledger's control as that term is used in N.H.

Rev. Stat. Ann. 159:3. 4 Accordingly, Ledger's petition is

without merit and the State's motion for summary judgment must be

granted.

4 Ledger argues that "mere access to a firearm does not prove control." State v . Haycock, 136 N.H. 3 6 1 , 363, 616 A.2d 4 8 1 , 482 (1992). While this is a correct statement of New Hampshire law, it is not dispositive because the State did not rely on mere access to support Ledger's conviction.

7 CONCLUSION

For the reasons described in this order, Brodeur's motion

for summary judgment (document n o . 12) is granted.

The clerk is instructed to issue judgment for the defendant

in accordance with this order.

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

July 1 5 , 1994

cc: William Ledger, pro se Patrick E . Donovan, Esq.