Ledet, Desmond

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided February 24, 2015·No. WR-82,778-01·Published

Opinion

32,778101

coURT oF cRIMINAL APPEALS wRIT No. wR-82,778-01 E:X PARTE § y § IN THE coURT oF cRIMINAL APP©EEQ§M§DW § TEXAS, IN AUSTIN, TX COURTOFCR|M|NALAPPEALS DESMOND LEDET §

FEB 24 2015

OBJECTION #4& THE TRIAL COURT'S FACT FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLU~ SIONS CONCERNING GROUNDS #5-19, & #22- 23 ARE:~(l) MISL@MN§Q@O H@lwc THIS COURT; (2)1INACCURATE: (3) INCOMPLETE; (4) IN CONFLICT WITH COURT'OF`CRIMINAL`APPEALSHAND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING THE PREJUDICE PRONG OF STRICKLAND; (5) AND BASED IN RELIANCE ON DEFENSE COUNSEL' S NON- CREDIBLE APFIDAVIT ASSERTION OF STRATEGY, WHEN THAT ALLEGED STRATEGY IS IN FACT OUTRAGEOUS AND UNREASONABLE.

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES CF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:

The Applicant, Desmond Ledet, respectfully objects to the ha- beas trial court's adoption of the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law presented to this honorable Court as stated above in the heading. This objection has 2 exhibits at- tached to it that are now incorporated into this objection that were objections filed in the trial court to defense counselis affidavit concerning the above said grounds. Though the Appli: has previously filed objections to this Court, prison mail rec- ords will show that he did not obtain the Customary notice from your Court that his ll.O7 was received in this Court until Feb. lO, 2015. This objection is being filed(Prison Mailbox Rule) on Feb._ig!ZOlS. This objection is brief and the majority of it is the exhibits that are already part of the habeas record, incorpv orated nov herein. Im support the Applicant presents:

l: The trial court's factual findings MISLEAD this Court to believe that the Second District Court appeals opinion on direct appeal was the product of a prejudice analysis un- der Strickland that took into account all of the unfairly prejudicial evidence contained in the inadmissible part

(p.8-20 are two seperate p-l of 20 attachments

of State's Exhibit 27 now raised in the writ of habeas corpus that Hon. Fortinberry failed to object to being presented to the jury because it caused the Applicant un- fair prejudice as defined by Old Chief v- United States; 519 U.S. l72, 180(1997); Tex.R.Evid. 403; Hardie v. State, 807 S.W. 26 319, 322(Tex.Crim.App.l991). See "Stater. Proposed...Findings...Conclusions" at p.5, IlG-p. 6, UlQ.

2: The opinion handed down on direct appeal NEVER ANALYZED ALL OF THE EVIDENCE THAT REPEATEDLY CAUSED THE APPLICANT UNFAIR PREJUDICE RAISED IN GROUNDS #5~19, &22 UNDER THE PREJUDICE PRONG OF ”STRICKLAND'. Compare present above said grounds never raised on direct appeal or addressed by Court of Appeals with the opinion on direct appeal.

3: The opinion handed down on direct appeal also NEVER en- gaged in a harm analysis under "Strickland"tto determine whether the Applicant was prejudiced by the numerous in- dividual parts of State‘s Exhibit 27 raised in Ground # 23 of the present writ that violated Applicant's MIRANDA RIGHTS, DUE PROCESS OF LAW(l4th Amend.), & THE FUNDAMEN- TAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.

4: In fact the opinion from the Second District Court of Ap- peals did not consider any harm arising from unfair pre- judice and only made mention of ONE invocation made by the Applicant to terminate the interview. See Ledet v. §tate, No.OZ-lO-OOZBl-CR, 2013{WL,1830801,*4~6(Tex.App.- Fortworth .May 2, 2013, pet.ref'd)(not designated for publication).

5: The opinion on direct appeal NEVER ANALYZED OR CONSIDERH ED THE SECOND PRONG OF STRICKLAND BASED ON THE COLLECTIVE UNFAIR PREJUDICE AND PREJUDICE THE APPLICANT SUFFERED DUE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT BEING ENFLUENCED WITH THE EWIDENCE IN THE ABOVE SAID GROUNDS verses THE REASONABLE PROBABILI- TY THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT ASIDE FROM HON. FORTINBERRY'S FAILURE TO SEEK THE EXCLUSION OF IT ALL.

6: The opinion on direct appeal was formed based on an imr'~ proper analysis. specifically only addressing Applicant's invocation to terminate the interview that;he made DIRECT~ LY AFTER INTERVIEW BECAHE ACCUSATIONAL.(OHC€ detective in~ formed Applicant his DNA was in the complainant). Id. at * 4-7. Applicant has raised multiple other invocations in his present writ as causing him unfair prejudice,F

7: The majority on direct appeal came to the conclusion the 'jury hearing the Applicant's first invocation to terminate the interview(all the others raised on ll.O7 were not ana~ layzed) was justified and not prejudicial under Strickland based on a misapplication of Ezkins v. State, 784 S.W. 26

p.z of 20

32, 34-36(Tex-Crim.App.1989) Id.

8: In short the majority opinion on direct appeal, citing Lykins, concluded that "the inadmissible part of the in~, terview" which was played to the_jury before the Appli~ cant ever took the stand to testify "in which Appellant invoked his right to terminate it", COULD BE USED TO IM- PEACH HIM. See Ledet v. State,.supra *4-7.

9: This Court in Hardie v. State, supra, and the Supreme Cou- rt in Qoyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19(1976) & Wainwri- ght v. creenfieia; 474'0.$. 284, 291(1986) hé§§"méde it well established that a Constitutionally protected right/ privilege , invoked in the face of accusation, post MIRAN- DA warnings, made in connection with a custodial interro-

gation,is not admissible for impeachment purposes.

lO: The Grounds now raised(#5-19, &.#22 & 23)complain of evi; presented to the jury that led the jury to convict the Applicant on an "unfair" basis that had nothing to do wi- th thézelements of the alleged eisense.

ll: Aside from defense counsel's failure to object to the y presentation of all of the unfairly prejudicial evidence raised in the above said grounds there does exist a rea- sonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different, had that evidence been excluded.

12: The jury rejected the the alleged victims story that she was in the process of exiting the Applicant's vehicle when suddenly:(l) the Applicant pulled a gun, (2) point- ed it at her} (3) commanded she get back in car, (4) and caused her to submit to non-consensual sex under the threat of being shot and killed with the alleged gun. See WState's Proposed...Findings...Conclusions" at p.3, “27 See also alleged victims testimony that was rejected by the Jury. v.5 RR, p.26-p;32; relevant also,va4 RR, p. 18-19, State's opening argument rejected by the jury.

l3: The Applicant testified that the sex was consensual and that he never had a gun, and never threatened the com- plainant with a gun. v.5, RR, p.llO-13l.

14: The Sexual Assault Nurse who examined the alleged vict- im testified that she had based her findings in large part only upon what the alleged victim had told her. v. 4_ RR, p.72, lines 2-8.

15: Detective T.S. O'brien who(along with his partner) con- ducted the custodial interrogation(State's Exhibit 27) testified that other than the complainant telling him she was sexually assaulted there was no evidence that the alleged assault occured. When asked if all he had

p.3 of 20

was her word, he testified "YES”. v.5 RR, p.lOO lines 16~ 22.

18.16: As emphasized by the Applicant in the writ, the Second Di- strict Court of appeals, while analyzing only the Appli* cant's first invocation to terminate the interview, never addressing the evidence now raised, expressed that the outcome of this trial was based on who the jury chose to believe, Applicant or the alleged victim. See Ledet v. State, supra at*p;4-7.` And that DNA evidence merely con- firmed that sex did occur. Id. `

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