Lederman v. King

54 Misc. 3d 886, 47 N.Y.S.3d 838
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMay 10, 2016
StatusPublished

This text of 54 Misc. 3d 886 (Lederman v. King) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lederman v. King, 54 Misc. 3d 886, 47 N.Y.S.3d 838 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2016).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Roger D. McDonough, J.

Petitioner seeks a judgment: (1) setting aside or vacating the Growth Score and Rating (growth score) of petitioner of 1 out of 20, and the identification of petitioner as “Ineffective” for school year 2013-2014; and (2) declaring that the New York State Growth Measures (growth measures) are arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion, and permanently enjoining the use of said “growth measures” unless they are modified to rationally evaluate teacher performance. Respondents oppose the petition in its entirety.

[888]*888Background

Petitioner is a fourth grade teacher employed by the Great Neck Public School District in the State of New York. She has been so employed since September of 1997. For the school year 2013-2014, she received a growth score of 1 out of a possible 20 points. Said score correlates to a rating of “Ineffective.” A score/ rating sheet defines “Ineffective” as: “Results are well-below State average for similar students.” For the school year 2012-2013, she received a growth score of 14 out of 20 points. Said score correlates to a rating of “Effective,” defined as: “Results meet State average for similar students.” Petitioner, via her counsel, confirmed with the New York State Education Department that neither an administrative appeal nor an appeal to the Education Commissioner was available to challenge her growth score. The instant proceeding ensued.

Procedural Background

Respondents moved to dismiss the petition for lack of standing. Petitioner cross-moved for permission to conduct discovery and to supplement her petition. The court denied the motion to dismiss and reserved decision on the discovery issue. Additionally, the court granted petitioner permission to supplement her petition.

A briefing schedule was established, respondents served their answer and the court heard oral argument on the petition. Additionally, the parties reached a stipulation as to certain issues of confidentiality. Prior to the petition’s final return date, petitioner brought a motion (unsealing motion) to unseal certain data as well as for leave to potentially file an amended petition. Respondents opposed all of the relief requested in the unsealing motion.

During the pendency of the court’s consideration of the petition and the unsealing motion, petitioner attempted to make additional submissions a part of the record. The court requested, on notice to petitioner, respondents’ input as to whether the additional submissions should be considered by the court. Respondents objected to the untimely submissions and argued that the court, if it were to permit and consider any new submissions, should also consider the December 2015 actions of the Board of Regents. The respondents contended that said actions rendered the petition, entirely or in portions, moot and also signaled respondents’ willingness to potentially compromise the remaining claims at issue. Accordingly, respon[889]*889dents asked the court to delay issuance of any decision until either a formal briefing schedule was set for the mootness issue or potential settlement was explored. Over petitioner’s objection, the court agreed to delay the decision to allow further briefing as well as settlement talks. The settlement talks proved unsuccessful and final submissions have been received as to the potential mootness issue. Additionally, the court indicated that it would consider petitioner’s post-return date submissions from November and December of 2015.

Discussion

Mootness

As set forth above, petitioner’s relief requests are twofold. Specifically, she seeks a judgment: (1) setting aside or vacating the growth score and rating of 1 out of 20, and the identification of petitioner as “Ineffective” for school year 2013-2014; and (2) declaring that the New York State Growth Measures are arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion, and permanently enjoining the use of said “growth measures” unless they are modified to rationally evaluate teacher performance. As to the first category of requested relief, respondents maintain that the petition is now moot based on: (1) petitioner’s 2014-2015 growth score and rating;2 (2) the lack of public access to petitioner’s 2013-2014 growth score and rating; and (3) the absence of any adverse employment actions, loss of merit pay, etc., by petitioner. In opposition, petitioner principally points out that the specific relief she sought was a setting aside/ vacating of her growth score and rating. As said relief has not arisen from the Regents’ actions, petitioner maintains that her first category of requested relief has not been rendered moot.

The court finds that the petition is not moot as to the first category of requested relief. Petitioner has not received all the relief she is arguably entitled to in this CPLR article 78 proceeding (see Matter of Ponder v Annucci, 128 AD3d 1255 [3d Dept 2015]). Additionally, respondents’ arguments were largely focused on petitioner’s standing in this matter. The court finds no legal basis to revisit its previous standing determination.

As to the second area of requested relief, respondents maintain that petitioner’s challenges to the growth model have [890]*890been rendered moot by the recent regulatory reforms. In support, respondents rely upon: (1) the implementation of an appeal procedure for an educator to challenge his/her growth score for the 2014-2015 school year and thereafter; (2) the implementation of a four year moratorium on the use of certain state assessments and the state-provided growth model in annual professional performance reviews through the 2018-2019 school year;3 and (3) the implementation of a new state-provided growth model after the 2018-2019 school year. Respondents also note that the Regents have explicitly stated that the growth model that the petitioner is challenging will not be used as it currently exists. As such, respondents argue that the second area of requested relief has been rendered moot.

In opposition, petitioner relies upon: (1) the continued use of the challenged scores; (2) the fact that the regulations are subject to modification at any time; (3) the possibility that at the expiration of the regulations the original growth model will be used again; and (4) the fact that scores can still be provided to parents and collected as aggregate data. Alternatively, petitioner argues that she’s met all components of the exception to the mootness doctrine.

The court finds that the petition is moot as to the second category of requested relief. With new regulations already in place, the court’s declaration as to the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the supplanted regulations would have no practical, binding effect on the parties, the Regents, the legislature, etc. (see Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801, 811 [2003]). Additionally, the court has not been persuaded that the exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Said conclusion is based on, inter alia, the fact that the new regulations are unlikely to evade review (see id.). The court cannot envision how the new regulations could evade judicial challenge from a teacher with proper standing. Additionally, the court and the aggrieved teacher will likely have the added benefit of a full administrative appeal and determination. Based on all of the foregoing, the court finds that the second category of requested relief has been rendered moot by

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
54 Misc. 3d 886, 47 N.Y.S.3d 838, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lederman-v-king-nysupct-2016.