Lederer v. Yule

57 A. 309, 67 N.J. Eq. 65, 1 Robb. 65, 1904 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 142
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedJanuary 28, 1904
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 57 A. 309 (Lederer v. Yule) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lederer v. Yule, 57 A. 309, 67 N.J. Eq. 65, 1 Robb. 65, 1904 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 142 (N.J. Ct. App. 1904).

Opinion

Pitney, V. C.

(orally).

This cause was argued the day before yesterday, and I have since read the evidence, and I think that I can dispose of it now as well as to hold it.

I do not think there can be any serious dispute about the law applicable to it, and the facts, I think, are sufficiently clear, so that I shall be no more liable to fall into error by deciding it now than I would if I should hold it.

The suit is brought by Samuel L. Lederer, a resident of Paterson, this state, against the trustees of his father’s will and against Fellie McCrea.

The contest is between the complainant and Fellie McCrea, who lives with her father, John McCrea, at Chestnut Hill, a suburb of the city of Philadelphia. The real defendant is the father, John McCrea.

The contract which is called in question by the bill was made with John McCrea, and while the obligation from which the complainant seeks to be relieved was made nominally to Fellie McCrea, yet she took it with notice of and is chargeable with every equity complainant has against it, if any. There is no dispute but that the case must be decided according to the merits as they stood and stand between the complainant and John McCrea.

’The particular obligation from which the complainant seeks toibe relieved is a promissory note (in the shap>e of a judgment noté);■"dated December 20th, 1900, executed by him to Fellie McCripj'TtY <j>9,000, payable in three years, and secured by a nioy'fcggga.pn,, tjhe complainant’s interest in his father’s estate, which is a life interest merely, and the effect of the mortgage was to assign in advance his annual income under his father’s will arising from ,the< corpus of his father’s estate.

As additional security for that obligation the complainant procured.-td be issued .a life 'insurance policy for $10,000 on his life, payable to Fellie McCrea. He also assigned to her the certain letters-patent which had been at the same time assigned to him by.JohiaAMfiCl'ea. ¡ ,-u 'J

The consideration■ óf .the<.judgmentmp;tfe/.was $3,000 in cash, [67]*67advanced by John McCrea to him at the date of the obligation and the assignment to him of the lettors-patent just mentioned.

The allegation of the complainant is that the letters-patent were assigned to him by John McCrea tinder such circumstances as that he has a right to rescind the contract and to be relieved ■of his obligation upon equitable terms.

Those equitable terms are, he says, that he should reassign the patent; that he should pay back to John McCrea, or Nellie McCrea, the $3,000 which he borrowed, and which he received, with interest, and that having done this he should have delivered up to be canceled the mortgage and have the policy of insurance so framed as to inure to his own benefit.

The contest, then, is over the validity of the deal or contract by which the complainant agreed to purchase from Mr. John McCrea the letters-patent in question.

Now, the allegation of the complainant is that that sale by McCrea to him of the letters-patent was. procured by misrepresentations of fact; also, as he alleges, by misrepresentations of the value and the prospective profit to be derived from the ownership of the letters.

Now, the law on that subject is, I think, as I remarked at the start, thoroughly settled.

There must be proof that the vendor made some untrue representation of a matter of fact — present fact. The cases cited by counsel of complainant of transfers of patents indicate a disposition on the part of the courts to include in the classification of misrepresentation of present facts many matters which can hardly be brought strictly within that category, and the tempta-. tion to judges to do that is very great, and they sometimes call a misrepresentation of present fact what is nothing more than a promise of what will occur hereafter, a prediction in the nature of a speculation. But I take the law to be as I have stated it. There must be a misrepresentation of a present fact, or of a fact' which though not immediately present will be in the future, and the principal matter dealt with in such cases is the cost of the patented article — what it will cost to manufacture it — which is [68]*68what may be termed a continuing fact, and not a mere prediction of results.

I say the disposition of courts is in that direction, because, as everybody knows, the putting on the market and sale of patent rights is one of the means by which persons of not over good sense of right and wrong have heretofore in many cases deluded persons of weaker mind out of a good deal of money; they have made rosy predictions as to what could be done with the patent; that it would do this, and that and the other, and have deluded people in that way, so that the selling of patent rights, at one time, was a notorious branch of the business of getting money without giving an equivalent for it.

But, as I said, I think the law in New Jersey, as it stands, must be confined to this — there must be a misrepresentation of a present continuing fact as distinguished from a mere prediction of speculative results.

Now, applying that law to the facts, we come to this:

Mr. John McCrea, in the month of October, 1900, was the owner of a patent for the manufacture and sale of what is called a burglar alarm and door check. Samples of the device have been handed up and were carefully examined during the production of the evidence to the court, and I have two or three of them in my hands at this moment. The article is somewhat of the character of a gun lock — is of a wedge-shape — so that when placed just before a door or behind it — I do not know which is the proper expression — in such position that when the door is opened the bottom of it will slide up- on the inclined plane and will spring a lock, or the catch of a lock, which will act like a trigger and release the hammer, which in turn strikes against the end of a blank cartridge and creates a slight explosion, which is supposed to alarm the people in the house, and also, perhaps, scare the proposed burglar.

I say that Mr. McOrea was the owner of this patent. It was a recent affair, and he had procured to have made up two different working models or actual productions of the patent — that is, two kinds- — one made of cast-iron, which is called throughout the •case the cast-iron model, and the other made of sheet-steel. [69]*69The one is cast in a mould — the greater part of it — the springs being made, of course, by a different process, and after being cast in a mould is smoothed off and partly burnished with nickel- — ■ I think nickel-plated.

The other is made of sheet-steel, the parts being stamped out by a stamp and fastened together with rivets and screws — mainly rivets, I believe; there are one or two screws in it. The two products are in appearance very much alike, but when you come to examine them carefully they are quite different in some very material respects, as I think, and found when under examination during the production of the evidence.

McCrea found the cost of manufacturing the cast-iron alarm considerably greater than that of manufacturing it out of sheet-steel, and it is an admitted fact in the case. He applied to a manufacturing concern called the Woodbine Company, located at Woodbine, New Jersey, to see at what price they would manufacture a lot of these sheet-steel ones.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.
471 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Illinois, 1979)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
57 A. 309, 67 N.J. Eq. 65, 1 Robb. 65, 1904 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 142, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lederer-v-yule-njch-1904.