Lebron v. Camacho

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Lebron v. Camacho

251 A.D.2d 295, 671 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6337

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 1, 1998

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 251 A.D.2d 295 (Lebron v. Camacho) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lebron v. Camacho, 251 A.D.2d 295, 671 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6337 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barasch, J.), dated July 17, 1997, as granted the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Jose Lebrón had not suffered a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The defendants established that the plaintiff Jose Lebrón suffered only from mild cervical and lumbar strains and other injuries which have been held to be insignificant within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955; Rhind v Naylor, 187 AD2d 498). The papers submitted by the plaintiffs in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment were insufficient to raise a question of fact on this issue (see, Mobley v Riportella, 241 AD2d 443; Antoniou v Duff, 204 AD2d 670). Bracken, J. P., Copertino, Santucci, Florio and McGinity, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barasch, J.), dated July 17, 1997, as granted the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Jose Lebrón had not suffered a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The defendants established that the plaintiff Jose Lebrón suffered only from mild cervical and lumbar strains and other injuries which have been held to be insignificant within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955; Rhind v Naylor, 187 AD2d 498). The papers submitted by the plaintiffs in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment were insufficient to raise a question of fact on this issue (see, Mobley v Riportella, 241 AD2d 443; Antoniou v Duff, 204 AD2d 670). Bracken, J. P., Copertino, Santucci, Florio and McGinity, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

251 A.D.2d 295, 671 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6337, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lebron-v-camacho-nyappdiv-1998.

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