Lebanks v. Spears

60 F.R.D. 135, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13929
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedApril 23, 1973
DocketCiv. A. No. 71-2897
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 60 F.R.D. 135 (Lebanks v. Spears) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13929 (E.D. La. 1973).

Opinion

CASSIBRY, District Judge.

This cause came on for hearing on January 31, 1973 on the motion to dismiss or in the alternative to abstain filed on behalf of the defendant State Superintendent of Education, the defendant members of the State Board of Education [hereinafter the State Board of Education], and the defendant Director of the Department of Hospitals and defendant members of the State Board of Hospitals [hereinafter the State Board of Hospitals], was argued by counsel for the respective parties and submitted. •

Whereupon, and upon consideration thereof:

It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that

1. The motion of the defendant State Board of Hospitals is mooted by action of the parties.

2. The motion of the defendant State Board of Education is in all respects, denied.

REASONS

The defendant State Board of Education seeks to be dismissed from this action primarily on the grounds that it is powerless to afford plaintiffs any of the relief they request. Although it does appear that in the past the Louisiana Constitution has been construed so as to limit the role that the State defendant may play in the affairs of local school boards,1 those decisions do not mandate dismissal here, for three reasons. First, those cases dealt primarily with the question whether the State Board of Education was a necessary party to litigation dealing primarily with isolated acts of improper conduct on the part of local school board officials.2 Here the issue is somewhat different: whether that same State defendant is a proper party to a suit to remedy illegal practices of a widespread and systematic nature, whose correction will require the best efforts of and closest cooperation between both State and local officials.

Second, the alleged constitutional deprivations suffered by plaintiffs can only be corrected by a significant infusion of additional funds into the local parish school system. While it is true that the State Board of Education allocates educational funds according to a formula devised by the State Legislature from which it is not free to deviate,3 nevertheless it is the duty of the Board to request of the Legislature an amount of money sufficient to meet the educational needs of all of the children of Louisiana.4 In that exhoratory capacity, the Board may well be of considerable assistance to the other parties to this litigation in arriving at an equitable resolution of their differences.

Third, it appears that the authority of the State Board of Education to act in the area of special education has been [137]*137expanded considerably by the adoption of Act 368 of 1972, amending L.S.A.-R. S. 17:1941-52. This Act, while retaining much of the traditional autonomy of local school boards, does empower the State Board of Education to develop rules and regulations governing the following aspects of locally based special education programs:

(1) The age groups of children who may be reasonably taught or trained together ;5
(2) The procedures that must be followed before a child may be excluded from regular classes because of mental or physical disability or handicap;6
(3) The qualifications of teaching personnel participating in the special education program;7
(4) The eligibility criteria for students participating in the special education program;8
(5) The development of procedures by which outside agencies are employed to evaluate and diagnose handicapped children;9
(6) The development of standards and the approval of conditions under which facilities are furnished or services purchased ;10
(7) The development of channels of cooperation between state and local educational bodies and other agencies within the state, both public and private ;11
(8) The promulgation of "such [other] rules and regulations as it may deem necessary for the proper administration of this [Act].” 12

Thus, the State Board’s arguments of “powerlessness” seem to be singularly inappropriate at this juncture, as the Board stands on the threshold of a new and enlightened statewide educational program for the mentally and physically handicapped.

The State Board of Education, however, maintains here that the enactment of L.S.A.-R.S. 17:1941 et seq. puts this case in a posture where abstention is appropriate. In that regard, the defendant argues that the recent state enactment embodies most, if not all of the relief that the plaintiffs here might hope to obtain after a trial on the merits. It contends further that a federal court should be reluctant to interfere in this most sensitive area of state sovereignty, especially where the state law is ambiguous and the administrative regulations and guidelines necessary to implement it have not yet been developed by state agencies.

This Court finds that position to be without merit. I have no intention of interfering with the orderly development of state programs for the mentally and physically handicapped under the new state law. Neither, apparently, do the plaintiffs for they have made no effort to assert any claims thereunder, but have instead confined themselves to a request for those rights due them under the United States Constitution.13 To the extent that this law will bear on such guarantees in the future,14 I find it neither vague nor ambiguous. But it must also be remembered that this legislation, being prospective only, affords the plaintiffs no relief from any depri[138]*138vations of their constitutional rights occurring prior to its enactment. Even assuming that adherence to this new statute by state and local school officials will bring them into perfect compliance with constitutional standards as to those children now enrolled in public schools or adequate alternative educational facilities, no reason for abstention is presented as to members of the plaintiff class, who—if their allegations are to be believed—have been removed from such suitable institutions and deprived of all opportunities for an education commensurate with their needs and abilities since a time long prior to the effective date of this legislation. Under such circumstances, further delay on my part in determining and implementing minimal federal constitutional guarantees to cover their situation would be unwarranted.

For all of the above reasons, the motion of the defendant State Board of Education to dismiss or to abstain is denied.

ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS ACTION

Upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion and Brief and Defendants’ Objections and Brief, and for good cause shown:

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Related

Kruse v. Campbell
431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Virginia, 1977)
Lebanks v. Spears
417 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. Louisiana, 1976)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
60 F.R.D. 135, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13929, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lebanks-v-spears-laed-1973.