Leatherberry v. Bahr

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 17, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00913
StatusUnknown

This text of Leatherberry v. Bahr (Leatherberry v. Bahr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Leatherberry v. Bahr, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

DAVID LEATHERBERRY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-cv-913

ANDREW BAHR, et al,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff David Leatherberry, a former prisoner who is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Leatherberry’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE Leatherberry has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). Leatherberry has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $12.00. The Court will grant Leatherberry’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, and dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well

as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT At the relevant time, Leatherberry was a public citizen in Hartford, Wisconsin. Dkt. No. 1. Defendants are Police Officers Andrew Bahr, Craig Beine, James Fidler, Steven Nurkala, Dirk Stolz, Washington County Police Department, Hartford Police Department and John Doe Police Officers #1-3. Id. On May 14, 2023, Leatherberry was at the Bank Shot Sports Bar waiting for friends. Id. at 2. While at the bar, he saw two individuals in police uniforms (who he later discovered were Officers Bahr and Beine) intently looking at him or in his direction. Id. Leatherberry later went outside to smoke a cigarette and his friends texted him to meet in a new location, the Mineshaft bar, located about 70 feet away. Id. Leatherberry went to the new bar, and within minutes, Officers Bahr and Beine were behind him asking to see his ID because he looked “suspicious.” Id. at 2-3.

Leatherberry declined and said he was going to the bathroom and then going home. Id. at 3. The officers said he had “nothing to worry about” but stood in front of the bathroom door to block entry, so Leatherberry went towards the front door. Id. As he went out the front door, he saw one of the officers’ hands near his taser. Id. Out of fear of the taser, Leatherberry ran for about 30 to 40 seconds before being tased. Id. Leatherberry states that the officers never told him their purpose, or that they were trying to arrest him, until after he had already started running. Id. at 3- 4. Once he was tased, they kicked him to the ground, and applied leg irons and handcuffs that were attached around his back. Id. at 4. Despite being on the ground and secured, Officers Bahr and Beine, along with Officer Fidler, Officer Nurkala, Officer Stolz, and John Doe Officers #1-3 (all of whom arrived on the scene later), kicked him, kneed him, punched him, and tased him six to eight more times, for a total of about 25 minutes. Id. For relief, Leatherberry seeks monetary damages. Id. at 6-8. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS “To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons acting under the color of state law.” D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). A claim that a police officer used excessive force is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. Avina v. Bohlen, 882 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2010)). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege that an officer’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the specific circumstances, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he [] actively resist[ed] arrest

or attempt[ed] to evade arrest by flight.’” Cyrus, 624 F.3d at 861–62 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, (1989)).

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Related

Graham v. Connor
490 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago
624 F.3d 856 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Enrique Avina v. Todd Bohlen
882 F.3d 674 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)

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Leatherberry v. Bahr, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/leatherberry-v-bahr-wied-2024.