7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 LEANTHONY T. WINSTON, Case No. 1:25-cv-01799-KES-SAB-HC
11 Petitioner, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 12 v. PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 13 WARDEN J. DOERER, COGNIZABLE CLAIM AND FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 14 Respondent.
15 16 Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 17 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which challenges Petitioner’s housing in the Special Housing Unit 18 (“SHU”) and asserts that Petitioner meets the standard for actual innocence. (ECF No. 1 at 4.1) 19 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases2 requires preliminary review of a 20 habeas petition and allows a district court to dismiss a petition before the respondent is ordered 21 to file a response, if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 22 petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 23 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 24 A. Jurisdiction Regarding Actual Innocence Claim 25 A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or constitutionality of his federal 26 conviction or sentence must do so by moving the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set
27 1 Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page. 2 The Court may apply any or all of these rules to habeas corpus petitions that are not brought under 28 U.S.C. 1 aside, or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 2 1046 (9th Cir. 2011). “The general rule is that a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the exclusive 3 means by which a federal prisoner may test the legality of his detention, and that restrictions on 4 the availability of a § 2255 motion cannot be avoided through a petition under 28 U.S.C. 5 § 2241.” Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 6 Nevertheless, a “savings clause” or “escape hatch” exists in § 2255(e) by which a federal 7 prisoner may seek relief under § 2241 if he can demonstrate the remedy available under § 2255 8 to be “inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of his detention.” Alaimalo, 645 F.3d at 1047 9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 10 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2008); Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864–65 (9th Cir. 2000) (per 11 curiam). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that it is a very narrow exception. See Ivy v. Pontesso, 12 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003). The remedy under § 2255 usually will not be deemed 13 inadequate or ineffective merely because a prior § 2255 motion was denied, or because a remedy 14 under § 2255 is procedurally barred. Id. The burden is on the petitioner to show that the remedy 15 is inadequate or ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 1963). 16 “An inquiry into whether a § 2241 petition is proper under these circumstances is critical 17 to the determination of district court jurisdiction” because § 2241 petitions must be heard in the 18 custodial court while § 2255 motions must be heard in the sentencing court. Hernandez, 204 F.3d 19 at 865. If the instant petition is properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, it may be heard in this 20 Court. Conversely, if the instant petition is in fact a disguised § 2255 motion, it must be heard in 21 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia as the sentencing court. 22 A petitioner may proceed under § 2241 pursuant to the escape hatch when the petitioner 23 “(1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has not had an ‘unobstructed procedural shot’ at 24 presenting that claim.” Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898 (citing Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060). In the Ninth 25 Circuit, a claim of actual innocence for purposes of the § 2255 escape hatch is tested by the 26 standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998). 27 Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898. In Bousley, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]o establish actual 1 that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” 523 U.S. at 623 (internal quotation marks 2 and citation omitted). Furthermore, “actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal 3 insufficiency.” Id. “In determining whether a petitioner had an unobstructed procedural shot to 4 pursue his claim, we ask whether petitioner’s claim ‘did not become available’ until after a 5 federal court decision. In other words, we consider: (1) whether the legal basis for petitioner’s 6 claim ‘did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion;’ and 7 (2) whether the law changed ‘in any way relevant’ to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 8 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (citations omitted)). 9 Here, Petitioner states that “28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) applies to this petition because the 10 petitioner has not had a[n] unobstructed procedural shot to present his claim, due to ineffective 11 assistance of counsel.” (ECF No. 1 at 1.) However, in determining whether a petitioner had an 12 unobstructed procedural shot to pursue his claim, the Court considers “(1) whether the legal basis 13 for petitioner’s claim ‘did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 14 motion;’ and (2) whether the law changed ‘in any way relevant’ to petitioner’s claim after that 15 first § 2255 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (citations omitted)). Ineffective assistance of 16 counsel does not provide a basis for establishing that Petitioner has not had an unobstructed 17 procedural shot at presenting his claim. 18 B. Exhaustion of SHU Claim 19 “As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available 20 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678 21 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). However, because it is not a jurisdictional 22 prerequisite, “a court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative 23 remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile 24 gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.’” 25 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 26 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). Here, Petitioner has provided no information regarding whether he 27 has pursued administrative remedies with regard to his SHU claim.
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 LEANTHONY T. WINSTON, Case No. 1:25-cv-01799-KES-SAB-HC
11 Petitioner, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 12 v. PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 13 WARDEN J. DOERER, COGNIZABLE CLAIM AND FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 14 Respondent.
15 16 Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 17 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which challenges Petitioner’s housing in the Special Housing Unit 18 (“SHU”) and asserts that Petitioner meets the standard for actual innocence. (ECF No. 1 at 4.1) 19 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases2 requires preliminary review of a 20 habeas petition and allows a district court to dismiss a petition before the respondent is ordered 21 to file a response, if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 22 petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 23 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 24 A. Jurisdiction Regarding Actual Innocence Claim 25 A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or constitutionality of his federal 26 conviction or sentence must do so by moving the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set
27 1 Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page. 2 The Court may apply any or all of these rules to habeas corpus petitions that are not brought under 28 U.S.C. 1 aside, or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 2 1046 (9th Cir. 2011). “The general rule is that a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the exclusive 3 means by which a federal prisoner may test the legality of his detention, and that restrictions on 4 the availability of a § 2255 motion cannot be avoided through a petition under 28 U.S.C. 5 § 2241.” Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 6 Nevertheless, a “savings clause” or “escape hatch” exists in § 2255(e) by which a federal 7 prisoner may seek relief under § 2241 if he can demonstrate the remedy available under § 2255 8 to be “inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of his detention.” Alaimalo, 645 F.3d at 1047 9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 10 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2008); Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864–65 (9th Cir. 2000) (per 11 curiam). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that it is a very narrow exception. See Ivy v. Pontesso, 12 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003). The remedy under § 2255 usually will not be deemed 13 inadequate or ineffective merely because a prior § 2255 motion was denied, or because a remedy 14 under § 2255 is procedurally barred. Id. The burden is on the petitioner to show that the remedy 15 is inadequate or ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 1963). 16 “An inquiry into whether a § 2241 petition is proper under these circumstances is critical 17 to the determination of district court jurisdiction” because § 2241 petitions must be heard in the 18 custodial court while § 2255 motions must be heard in the sentencing court. Hernandez, 204 F.3d 19 at 865. If the instant petition is properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, it may be heard in this 20 Court. Conversely, if the instant petition is in fact a disguised § 2255 motion, it must be heard in 21 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia as the sentencing court. 22 A petitioner may proceed under § 2241 pursuant to the escape hatch when the petitioner 23 “(1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has not had an ‘unobstructed procedural shot’ at 24 presenting that claim.” Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898 (citing Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060). In the Ninth 25 Circuit, a claim of actual innocence for purposes of the § 2255 escape hatch is tested by the 26 standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998). 27 Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898. In Bousley, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]o establish actual 1 that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” 523 U.S. at 623 (internal quotation marks 2 and citation omitted). Furthermore, “actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal 3 insufficiency.” Id. “In determining whether a petitioner had an unobstructed procedural shot to 4 pursue his claim, we ask whether petitioner’s claim ‘did not become available’ until after a 5 federal court decision. In other words, we consider: (1) whether the legal basis for petitioner’s 6 claim ‘did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion;’ and 7 (2) whether the law changed ‘in any way relevant’ to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 8 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (citations omitted)). 9 Here, Petitioner states that “28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) applies to this petition because the 10 petitioner has not had a[n] unobstructed procedural shot to present his claim, due to ineffective 11 assistance of counsel.” (ECF No. 1 at 1.) However, in determining whether a petitioner had an 12 unobstructed procedural shot to pursue his claim, the Court considers “(1) whether the legal basis 13 for petitioner’s claim ‘did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 14 motion;’ and (2) whether the law changed ‘in any way relevant’ to petitioner’s claim after that 15 first § 2255 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (citations omitted)). Ineffective assistance of 16 counsel does not provide a basis for establishing that Petitioner has not had an unobstructed 17 procedural shot at presenting his claim. 18 B. Exhaustion of SHU Claim 19 “As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available 20 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678 21 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). However, because it is not a jurisdictional 22 prerequisite, “a court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative 23 remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile 24 gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.’” 25 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 26 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). Here, Petitioner has provided no information regarding whether he 27 has pursued administrative remedies with regard to his SHU claim. 1 Accordingly, Petitioner is HEREBY ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE within THIRTY 2 | (30) days from the date of service of this order why the petition should not be dismissed for lack 3 | of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 4 Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order may result in a recommendation 5 | for dismissal of the petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (a petitioner’s 6 | failure to prosecute or to comply with a court order may result in a dismissal of the action). 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. FA. Be 9 | Dated: _ January 20, 2026 : STANLEY A. BOONE 10 United States Magistrate Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28