USCA4 Appeal: 23-2253 Doc: 54 Filed: 07/22/2025 Pg: 1 of 16
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-2253
LEANNA JEAN COFFMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NEXSTAR MEDIA INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley, Frank W. Volk, Chief District Judge. (5:22-cv-00396)
Argued: December 11, 2024 Decided: July 22, 2025
Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD Senior Circuit Judge
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Mark Alan Atkinson, ATKINSON & FRAMPTON, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Andrew F. Maunz, JACKSON LEWIS P.C., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Marla N. Presley, JACKSON LEWIS P.C., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-2253 Doc: 54 Filed: 07/22/2025 Pg: 2 of 16
PER CURIAM:
Leanna Jean Coffman appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to her
employer Nexstar Media, Inc. on three claims under the West Virginia Human Rights Act
(WVHRA) and one claim under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Having reviewed
the record and considered oral argument, we affirm.
I.
A.
From February 17, 2020 to August 19, 2022, Coffman worked as an Account
Executive at Nexstar’s news station in Beckley, West Viriginia. In 2021, she became
pregnant with twins. Near the end of her pregnancy, Coffman was diagnosed with placenta
previa (i.e., a condition that causes severe bleeding) and placed on bedrest. Nexstar
approved Coffman’s request to work remotely.
After about eight weeks of remote work (including a multi-week hospital stay),
Coffman delivered twins via c-section on February 23, 2022. She immediately received
12 weeks of FMLA leave. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (“an eligible employee shall be
entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave … [b]ecause of a serious health condition that
makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee”).
A few days into leave, Coffman learned that her ureter (i.e., a tube that transports
urine from the kidneys to the bladder) had been damaged during her c-section. After an
initial surgery to repair her ureter, Coffman was given a nephrostomy bag to drain her
urine. The bag caused severe pain and restricted her ability to stand, walk, and drive.
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In early April, Dennie Large, Nexstar’s Local Sales Manager, asked Coffman about
her recovery. Coffman explained that she was “in and out of the hospital” with “constant
Kidney infections and pain.” J.A. 168. She recognized that she was about halfway through
her FMLA leave but added: “the issue is I have to have another surgery.” J.A. 169.
Coffman claims that she spoke with Large again in “mid to late April to May” to
request a remote work accommodation. J.A. 146. Large denies that this conversation took
place, but, according to Coffman, he promised to “run it up the flag pole” and then never
got back to her. Id.
B.
During several months of her recovery, Coffman received short-term disability
benefits. The benefits were originally set to run from March 10 (i.e., when Coffman’s paid
leave expired) to June 27 (i.e., when doctors predicted that she could return to work). But,
by June 28, Nexstar had yet to receive a doctor’s return-to-work approval. Nexstar’s
Human Resources Assistant Cyndi Patrick called Coffman to check-in.
During the call, Coffman confirmed that she was unable to return to work: “they’re
extending [my short-term disability], I still have the [nephrostomy] tube.” J.A. 174. When
Patrick clarified that disability benefits did not extend FMLA leave (i.e., job-protected
leave), Coffman asked if Patrick wanted to speak to her lawyer. Patrick declined and said
that she would update Nexstar. After the call, Coffman texted Patrick: “Please do not
contact me regarding a return to work date when I have been classified as unable to return
and still have shortterm disability plus bonding leave.” Id. In this same message, Coffman
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provided her lawyer’s contact information.
On July 28, Nexstar sent Coffman a letter to again request her return-to-work date.
The letter began by outlining the history of Coffman’s leave: “You have been on leave
from work since February 23, 2022. You were provided with 12 weeks of leave under our
FMLA policy which expired on May 17, 2022…. You applied for and received benefits
under our Short-Term Disability policy. This policy provides a money benefit, but it is
separate from job-protected leave.” J.A. 208. The letter also highlighted Nexstar’s earlier
attempt to reach out and noted: “A directive not to contact you is not acceptable.” Id.
Coffman responded on August 4. She explained that she was “still under intense
care” and had another surgery scheduled for August 8. J.A. 184. She added that her
recovery time would be about four-to-six weeks followed by a potential surgery in October.
On August 15, Nexstar terminated Coffman by email, effective August 19. The
email stated: “Since you have been off work since February 23, 2022 and given the critical
nature of the Account Executive position, we can no longer hold your job.” J.A. 186.
C.
About a month after her termination, Coffman filed the instant action in the
Southern District of West Virginia. She alleges three counts under the WVHRA: (1)
failure to accommodate; (2) discriminatory discharge; and (3) retaliatory discharge. And
she alleges one count under the FMLA: retaliatory discharge.
Nexstar moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district court granted
the motion in full. The court largely reasoned: (1) Nexstar provided Coffman six months
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of leave, and her latest communications still “indicate[d] an inability and unwillingness to
work” (J.A. 254); and (2) Coffman failed to demonstrate the existence of a reasonable
accommodation that met her needs. Coffman now appeals.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “applying the
same legal standards as the district court.” Shipton v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 109 F.4th 701,
705 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir.
2017)). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
We begin by examining Coffman’s WVHRA accommodation claim. To succeed
on such a claim, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie case that:
(1) [t]he plaintiff is a qualified person with a disability; (2) the employer was aware of the plaintiff’s disability; (3) the plaintiff required an accommodation in order to perform the essential functions of a job; (4) a reasonable accommodation existed that met the plaintiff’s needs; (5) the employer knew or should have known of the plaintiff’s need and of the accommodation; and (6) the employer failed to provide the accommodation.
Burns v. W. Va. Dep’t of Educ. & Arts, 836 S.E.2d 43, 49–50 (W. Va. 2019) (quoting
Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 479 S.E.2d 561, 575 (W. Va. 1996)). The district court found
that Coffman did not meet prong four: she failed to present a reasonable accommodation
that met her needs.
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Because “reasonableness” is a case-specific inquiry, Coffman argues that the district
court erred by taking the prong four analysis away from the jury. See Haynes v. Rhone-
Poulenc, Inc., 521 S.E.2d 331, 344 (W. Va. 1999) (“the process of determining what
constitutes reasonable accommodation in a particular case [is] flexible, in order to balance
the interests of the employee in continued employment and the interests of the employer in
avoiding unreasonable burdens or expenses”). We disagree. “Although determination of
the reasonableness of a proposed [accommodation] is often fact-specific,” courts may
strike down accommodations at the summary judgment stage for a number of reasons,
including that the accommodation is not “reasonable on its face.” Halpern v. Wake Forest
Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 464 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,
535 U.S. 391, 401–02 (2002)). 1
Ultimately, we agree with the district court that each of Coffman’s accommodations
is not reasonable on its face. She proposes three accommodations: (1) unpaid leave; (2)
paid parental leave; and (3) remote work. We examine them below.
First, we consider unpaid leave. The district court found that this accommodation
was not reasonable because, at the time of her termination, Coffman had been absent for
six months and could not provide an approximate return-to-work date. We agree.
1 At times, this opinion relies on case law examining the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. This case law is “instructive” as “the rights under the ADA and the WVHRA are coextensive.” Burns, 836 S.E.2d at 49 n.7.
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“Nothing in the text of the reasonable accommodation provision requires an
employer to wait an indefinite period for an accommodation to achieve its intended effect.
Rather, reasonable accommodation is by its terms most logically construed as that which
presently, or in the immediate future, enables the employee to perform the essential
functions of the job in question.” Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995). Simply
put, an employer is not required “to give a disabled employee ‘an indefinite period of time
to correct [a] disabling condition’ that renders him unqualified.” Halpern, 669 F.3d at 465
(quoting Myers, 50 F.3d at 280).
Coffman’s original return-to-work date came and passed on June 27. About a month
later, Nexstar asked for a new return date. Coffman responded by email: “As I have
previously stated …, I am still under intense care by my healthcare team…. I have surgery
…. August 8” with a “recovery time [of] generally 4-6 weeks,” and “I have an additional
surgery October (tentatively).” J.A. 184. This exchange clearly communicates an
indefinite period of recovery: Coffman might recover in about four-to-six weeks, but a
tentative follow-up surgery remains scheduled.
Coffman claims that this level of uncertainty is not meaningful. She emphasizes
that our case law does not require an employee to provide a precise return date. While true,
this does not change our outcome. The debate here does not concern whether Coffman
will return on August 10th or 15th. The debate concerns whether she can return at any
point in the near future. Five months into her absence, the best she could offer was: “[I]
probably [will] be released in September or October.” Opening Br. 24. While the Court
is sympathetic to Coffman’s injuries, we do find this level of uncertainty meaningful.
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At bottom, indefinite leave is not a reasonable accommodation, and, here, unpaid
leave amounted to indefinite leave. See Halpern, 669 F.3d at 465 (“the indefinite duration
and uncertain likelihood of success of Halpern’s proposed accommodation renders it
unreasonable”); Myers, 50 F.3d at 283 (“reasonable accommodation does not include duty
to await uncertain results”) (citing Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1990));
Haynes, 521 S.E.2d at 344 n.17 (“by disabling condition, we refer to a totally disabling
medical condition of limited duration”) (emphasis added). Therefore, Coffman’s proposed
accommodation of unpaid leave is not reasonable on its face.
Next, we examine paid parental leave. We find that paid leave is not reasonable for
the same reason that unpaid leave is not reasonable (i.e., under the WVHRA, employers
are not required to give employees indefinite periods of time to cure disabling conditions).
Moreover, the record shows that Coffman did not actually qualify for Nexstar’s paid
parental leave program. Terri Bush, Nexstar’s Associate General Counsel and Senior Vice
President of Human Resources, testified that Nexstar offers up to six weeks of paid parental
leave “[a]fter short-term disability is over.” J.A. 61 (“We make the participants exhaust
their short-term disability benefits before the paid parental leave.”). She added: because
“[Coffman] never returned from disability,” “she wouldn’t have achieved it.” J.A. 65.
Coffman does not refute that she was ineligible for paid parental leave. In fact, she
emphasizes it: Coffman argues that she was terminated “while she was receiving disability
benefits so that she would not be eligible to receive paid parental leave.” Opening Br. 23.
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But this argument does not hold water: Coffman cannot use Nexstar’s refusal to provide
one unwarranted accommodation (additional unpaid leave) to bolster her need to receive a
second (paid parental leave). Therefore, Coffman’s proposed accommodation of paid
parental leave is not reasonable on two separate but related grounds.
iii.
Finally, we turn to remote work. The district court found that this accommodation
was not reasonable because Coffman “failed to demonstrate that, at the time of her August
2022 termination, she was able to work at all, whether in person or remotely.” J.A. 254.
We agree.
To begin, the parties dispute whether Coffman ever requested to work remotely after
she gave birth. Coffman claims that she made this request in “mid to late April to May,”
which Nexstar denies. J.A. 146. But, assuming the request was made, its existence does
not help Coffman because the record demonstrates an inability to follow through, i.e., an
inability to actually work remotely.
Although Coffman disagrees, she neglects to present any evidence indicating
otherwise. Instead, she argues that her ability to work remotely before giving birth
demonstrates her ability to work remotely after giving birth. But this claim is easily
rejected. As Coffman’s own briefing explains: “During [her] c-section, an attending
physician cut her ureter. Consequently, Coffman developed serious complications,
including infections, hospitalizations and multiple surgeries.” Opening Br. 2. Coffman’s
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condition before giving birth therefore tells us little about her condition after giving birth,
and we must turn to the record to understand the extent of her recovery.
According to the record, following the twins’ delivery in late February, Coffman
instructed Nexstar in late June: “Please do not contact me regarding a return to work date
when I have been classified as unable to return and still have shortterm disability plus
bonding leave.” J.A. 174. She repeated much of the same in early August: “I am still
under intense care by my healthcare team. I have surgery … [on] August 8th,” and “I have
an additional surgery [in] October (tentatively).” J.A. 184.
Coffman now claims that her statements about an inability to work were limited to
in-person work. But, for one, a plain reading of her communications does not support this.
And, for another, Coffman acknowledges that she remained on short-term disability
through the day of her termination. Short-term disability is provided to employees who
are classified as completely unable to work. See J.A. 57–62 (Nexstar’s Associate General
Counsel and Senior Vice President of Human Resources explaining that “until [Coffman’s]
released from disability… she’s not able to work” in any capacity).
As a result, we find that the record demonstrates a difficult and lengthy recovery
process for Coffman—one that left her unable to work, whether in-person or remotely,
until after her termination. Because Coffman was unable to work remotely, her proposed
accommodation of remote work is not reasonable on its face. 2
2 Because we find that Coffman was unable to work remotely, we do not examine whether remote work would have fulfilled the essential functions of her position.
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iv.
In sum, we agree with the district court that each of Coffman’s proposed
accommodations is not reasonable on its face. And, without evidence of a reasonable
accommodation that met her needs, Coffman’s claim fails. See Alley v. Charleston Area
Med. Ctr., Inc., 602 S.E.2d 506, 516 (W. Va. 2004) (plaintiff must show that “some
accommodation was possible”) (quoting Skaggs, 479 S.E.2d at 575 n.11); Burns, 836
S.E.2d at 50 (outlining required prongs); Hannah v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 72 F.4th 630,
636 (4th Cir. 2023) (“Hannah has not carried his burden of demonstrating that the
accommodations he requested were reasonable.”).
Coffman pursues one alternative argument, however. She claims that Nexstar is
liable for failing to engage in the interactive accommodation process (i.e., for failing to
respond to her remote-work request). Coffman is correct that “[t]he duty to engage in an
interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation is generally triggered when an
employee communicates to [her] employer [her] disability and [her] desire for an
accommodation for that disability.” Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 346–47
(4th Cir. 2013) (citing cases). “But the interactive process ‘is not an end in itself; rather it
is a means for determining what reasonable accommodations are available to allow a
disabled individual to perform the essential job functions of the position sought.’” Id.
(quoting Rehling v. City of Chi., 207 F.3d 1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Therefore, “an employer will not be liable for failure to engage in the interactive
process if the employee ultimately fails to demonstrate the existence of a reasonable
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accommodation that would allow her to perform the essential functions of the position.”
Perdue v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 999 F.3d 954, 962 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Jacobs v.
N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 581 (4th Cir. 2015)). Applied here: “As
[Coffman] fails to demonstrate the existence of a reasonable accommodation, [Nexstar]
cannot separately be liable for failing to engage in the interactive process.” Id.; see Wilson,
717 F.3d at 347 (recognizing same).
Next, we assess Coffman’s WHVRA discriminatory discharge claim. To succeed
on such a claim, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie case that “(1) he or she meets the
definition of having a ‘disability,’ (2) he or she is a ‘qualified individual with a disability,’
and (3) he or she was discharged from his or her job.” Woods v. Jefferds Corp., 824 S.E.2d
539, 547 (W. Va. 2019) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Morris Mem’l Convalescent
Nursing Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 431 S.E.2d 353, 357 (W. Va. 1993)).
The district court found that Coffman did not meet prong two: she failed to show that she
is a qualified individual with a disability. We agree.
Under the WVHRA, “[a] ‘qualified individual with a disability’ … is one who is
able and competent, with reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of
the job in question.” Id. at 546, 551 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Coffman v. W. Va.
Bd. of Regents, 386 S.E.2d 1, 4 (W. Va. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Skaggs, 479
S.E.2d at 579). As discussed in Section II.A., Coffman fails to demonstrate that such an
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accommodation existed. She therefore is not a “qualified individual with a disability” and
cannot meet an essential element of her discriminatory discharge claim. 3
We next turn to Coffman’s WVHRA retaliatory discharge claim. To succeed on
such a claim, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie case:
(1) that the complainant engaged in protected activity, (2) that complainant’s employer was aware of the protected activities, (3) that complainant was subsequently discharged and (absent other evidence tending to establish a retaliatory motivation), (4) that complainant’s discharge followed his or her protected activities within such period of time that the court can infer retaliatory motivation.
Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d. 183, 193 (W. Va. 2010) (quoting Frank’s Shoe
Store v. W. Va. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 365 S.E.2d 251, 259 (W. Va. 1986)).
The district court found that Coffman did not meet prong one: she failed to show
that she engaged in “protected activity.” More specifically, the district court held that,
because Coffman “failed to demonstrate any of her proffered accommodations … were
reasonable at termination,” she did not actually request a “reasonable” accommodation and
therefore did not engage in “protected activity.” J.A. 260.
3 Because Coffman does not make a prima facie case, we do not address arguments that speak to later stages of this claim’s burden-shifting framework, e.g., arguments about whether Nexstar’s proffered reason for her termination is a mere pretext. See Woods, 824 S.E.2d at 547–48 (recognizing that the WVHRA incorporates the burden-shifting framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
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This holding may have been error. See Kelley v. Mayorkas, 694 F. Supp. 3d 715,
730 (E.D. Va. 2023) (finding that courts disagree as to whether “a request for
accommodation that is not reasonable is … a protected activity”) (citing cases). But
Coffman does not contest this holding: she argues that her proposed accommodations were
reasonable but never disputes that her requests must be reasonable to qualify as protected
activity. The parties therefore did not brief this issue. 4
Ultimately, we agree with the district court that Coffman did not request a
“reasonable” accommodation, and we have long held that “[f]ailure to present or argue
assignments of error in opening appellate briefs constitutes a waiver of those issues.”
IGEN Int’l, Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 335 F.3d 303, 308–09 (4th Cir. 2003)
(declining to consider waived argument despite being “inclined to believe” the district
court erred); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). We therefore affirm the judgment of
the district court and do not address arguments that speak to Nexstar’s motive (i.e., a later
prong in the WVHRA retaliatory discharge analysis).
D.
Finally, we examine Coffman’s FMLA retaliatory discharge claim. To succeed on
such a claim, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie case that: “(1) [they] engaged in a
4 Coffman also does not argue that the district court erred by failing to consider whether any other activities qualified as “protected activities” under the WVHRA. In fact, it is difficult to decipher what assignments of error (if any) Coffman pursues with respect to prong one.
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protected activity; (2) [their] employer took an adverse employment action against [them];
and (3) there was a causal link between the two events.” Roberts v. Gestamp W. Va., LLC,
45 F.4th 726, 738 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Hannah P. v. Coats, 916 F.3d 327, 347 (4th Cir.
2019)). The district court found that the first two prongs were not in dispute: Coffman took
FMLA leave (a protected activity) and was terminated (an adverse employment action).
But the court went on to conclude that Coffman did not meet prong three: she failed to
show the required “causal link between the two events.” We agree. 5
As the district court recognized, “Nexstar permitted Ms. Coffman to take FMLA
leave when she wanted and without issue. Indeed, Nexstar gave her an additional twelve
weeks of leave after her guaranteed initial twelve weeks of FMLA leave expired in May
2022.” J.A. 259. As a result, three months passed between the end of Coffman’s FMLA
leave (May 17) and her termination (August 19). This timeline undermines any inference
of causation. See King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 151 n.5 (4th Cir. 2003) (Under the
FMLA, “two months and two weeks … is sufficiently long so as to weaken significantly
the inference of causation between the two events.”); Ranade v. BT Americas, Inc., 581
Fed. Appx. 182, 183 (4th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (recognizing same).
Without the aid of a sufficiently close timeline, Coffman turns to a statement from
Nexstar’s Local Sales Manager that the company was “trying to keep [her] off of FMLA.”
J.A. 137. But this statement does little work for Coffman. During her deposition, she
5 Again, Coffman does not explicitly argue that FMLA leave is a “protected activity” under the WVHRA. See supra Note 4. To the extent that this is implied, her WVHRA retaliation claim would fail for the reasons provided in this section.
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conceded that the statement was made “early in [her pregnancy]” and that she, too, wanted
to wait to use her FMLA leave. See J.A. 137–38 (“Was it beneficial for me? Yes, because
I would have had the FMLA after I had the twins.”). Because this is the sole argument that
Coffman uses to demonstrate the required “causal link,” we agree with the district court
that her claim fails.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.