4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 LEAH NICOLE HUNTER, Case No. 1:24-cv-01205-EPG 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 12 ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO 42 13 v. U.S.C. § 406(b) IN PART COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 14 (ECF No. 17) Defendant. 15 16 On May 22, 2026, Attorney Lawrence David Rohlfing, counsel for Plaintiff Leah Nicole 17 Hunter, filed a motion for an award of $26,000 in attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (ECF 18 No. 17). Plaintiff and the Commissioner of Social Security were each served with a copy of the 19 motion. (Id. at 2; ECF No. 19). Plaintiff has not filed any response to the motion. 20 On May 26, 2026, the Commissioner filed a response providing analysis regarding the fee 21 request but taking no position on its reasonableness. (ECF No. 20). Plaintiff’s counsel filed a 22 timely optional reply on June 1, 2026. (ECF No. 22). 23 For the reasons set forth below, the motion for an award of attorney’s fees will be granted 24 in part, in the amount of $15,000, with counsel reimbursing Plaintiff for $3,179 in fees received 25 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). (See ECF No. 14). I. BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff filed the complaint in this case on October 7, 2024. (ECF No. 1). The parties 27 consented to this case proceeding before the undersigned. (ECF No. 9). On December 3, 2024, 28 1 Defendant filed a stipulation for voluntary remand pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. 405(g). 2 (ECF No. 11). On December 4, 2024, the Court issued an order to remanding the action and 3 judgment was entered pursuant to the order. (ECF Nos. 12, 13). 4 On remand, the Commissioner granted Plaintiff’s application for benefits entitling her to receive approximately $168,675.90 in past-due benefits. (ECF No. 17 at 5). Furthermore, the 5 Commissioner awarded an additional $85,573 in past due benefits for Plaintiff’s auxiliary 6 beneficiary. (ECF No. 22 at 2). The additional benefits for the claim resulted in a recovery 7 amount of $254,248.90 in past due benefits for Plaintiff and her dependent. (Id.). 8 Now, the matter is before the Court on counsel’s motion, seeking an award of $26,000 in 9 attorney fees. 10 II. DISCUSSION 11 Under the Social Security Act, attorneys may seek a reasonable fee for cases in which 12 they have successfully represented social security claimants. Section 406(b) provides: 13 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter 14 who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess 15 of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may . . . 16 certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits . . . . 17 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 18 “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the 19 [§ 406(b)] fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing party is not 20 responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 21 (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). Even though the § 406(b) fee award is 22 not paid by the Government, the Commissioner “plays a part in the fee determination resembling 23 that of a trustee for the claimant[].” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 798 n.6. The goal of awarding fees 24 under § 406(b) was to prohibit “exorbitant fees” from being collected by attorneys but also to 25 provide sufficient fee awards “to encourage adequate representation of claimants.” Crawford, 586 26 F.3d at 1149 (internal citations omitted). 27 The 25% maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and courts are required to ensure 28 1 that the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (holding that § 406(b) does not 2 displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts 3 to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements). “Within the 25 percent boundary 4 . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. at 807; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (noting that § 406(b) “does 5 not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is reasonable” but “provides 6 only that the fee must not exceed 25% of the past-due benefits awarded”). It is appropriate to 7 consider the benefits paid to the auxiliary dependent child. Hopkins v. Cohen, 390 U.S. 530, 533– 8 34 (1968) (past due benefits include dependents paid by virtue of the action). 9 Generally, “a district court charged with determining a reasonable fee award under 10 § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee arrangements,’ . . . 11 ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” Crawford, 586 12 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). The United States Supreme Court has 13 identified several factors that may be considered in determining whether a fee award under a 14 contingent-fee agreement is unreasonable and therefore subject to reduction: (1) the character of 15 the representation; (2) the results achieved by the representative; (3) whether the attorney engaged 16 in dilatory conduct in order to increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits; (4) whether the 17 benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the 18 attorney’s record of hours worked. Id. (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807-08). 19 Here, the fee agreement in this case provides, in relevant part, as follows: 20 2. In consideration of the services to be performed by the Attorney and it being the desire of the Claimant to compensate Attorney out of the proceeds shall receive 21 25% of the past due benefits awarded by Social Security Administration to the claimant or such amount as the Commissioner may designate under 42 U.S.C. § 22 406(a)(2)(A) which is $7,200.00 as of November 30, 2022, whichever is smaller, upon successful completion of the case at or before a first hearing decision from an 23 ALJ. If the Claimant and the Attorney are unsuccessful in obtaining a recovery, 24 Attorney will receive no fee. This matter is subject expedited fee approval except as stated in ¶3. 25 3. The provisions of ¶2 only apply to disposition at or before a first hearing 26 decision from an ALJ. The fee for successful prosecution of this matter is 25% of the past due benefits awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for 27 work before the Social Security Administration. Attorney shall petition for authorization to charge this fee in compliance with the Social Security Act for all 28 1 time whether exclusive or not committed to such representation. 2 4.
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4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 LEAH NICOLE HUNTER, Case No. 1:24-cv-01205-EPG 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 12 ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO 42 13 v. U.S.C. § 406(b) IN PART COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 14 (ECF No. 17) Defendant. 15 16 On May 22, 2026, Attorney Lawrence David Rohlfing, counsel for Plaintiff Leah Nicole 17 Hunter, filed a motion for an award of $26,000 in attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (ECF 18 No. 17). Plaintiff and the Commissioner of Social Security were each served with a copy of the 19 motion. (Id. at 2; ECF No. 19). Plaintiff has not filed any response to the motion. 20 On May 26, 2026, the Commissioner filed a response providing analysis regarding the fee 21 request but taking no position on its reasonableness. (ECF No. 20). Plaintiff’s counsel filed a 22 timely optional reply on June 1, 2026. (ECF No. 22). 23 For the reasons set forth below, the motion for an award of attorney’s fees will be granted 24 in part, in the amount of $15,000, with counsel reimbursing Plaintiff for $3,179 in fees received 25 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). (See ECF No. 14). I. BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff filed the complaint in this case on October 7, 2024. (ECF No. 1). The parties 27 consented to this case proceeding before the undersigned. (ECF No. 9). On December 3, 2024, 28 1 Defendant filed a stipulation for voluntary remand pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. 405(g). 2 (ECF No. 11). On December 4, 2024, the Court issued an order to remanding the action and 3 judgment was entered pursuant to the order. (ECF Nos. 12, 13). 4 On remand, the Commissioner granted Plaintiff’s application for benefits entitling her to receive approximately $168,675.90 in past-due benefits. (ECF No. 17 at 5). Furthermore, the 5 Commissioner awarded an additional $85,573 in past due benefits for Plaintiff’s auxiliary 6 beneficiary. (ECF No. 22 at 2). The additional benefits for the claim resulted in a recovery 7 amount of $254,248.90 in past due benefits for Plaintiff and her dependent. (Id.). 8 Now, the matter is before the Court on counsel’s motion, seeking an award of $26,000 in 9 attorney fees. 10 II. DISCUSSION 11 Under the Social Security Act, attorneys may seek a reasonable fee for cases in which 12 they have successfully represented social security claimants. Section 406(b) provides: 13 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter 14 who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess 15 of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may . . . 16 certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits . . . . 17 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 18 “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the 19 [§ 406(b)] fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing party is not 20 responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 21 (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). Even though the § 406(b) fee award is 22 not paid by the Government, the Commissioner “plays a part in the fee determination resembling 23 that of a trustee for the claimant[].” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 798 n.6. The goal of awarding fees 24 under § 406(b) was to prohibit “exorbitant fees” from being collected by attorneys but also to 25 provide sufficient fee awards “to encourage adequate representation of claimants.” Crawford, 586 26 F.3d at 1149 (internal citations omitted). 27 The 25% maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and courts are required to ensure 28 1 that the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (holding that § 406(b) does not 2 displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts 3 to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements). “Within the 25 percent boundary 4 . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. at 807; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (noting that § 406(b) “does 5 not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is reasonable” but “provides 6 only that the fee must not exceed 25% of the past-due benefits awarded”). It is appropriate to 7 consider the benefits paid to the auxiliary dependent child. Hopkins v. Cohen, 390 U.S. 530, 533– 8 34 (1968) (past due benefits include dependents paid by virtue of the action). 9 Generally, “a district court charged with determining a reasonable fee award under 10 § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee arrangements,’ . . . 11 ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” Crawford, 586 12 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). The United States Supreme Court has 13 identified several factors that may be considered in determining whether a fee award under a 14 contingent-fee agreement is unreasonable and therefore subject to reduction: (1) the character of 15 the representation; (2) the results achieved by the representative; (3) whether the attorney engaged 16 in dilatory conduct in order to increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits; (4) whether the 17 benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the 18 attorney’s record of hours worked. Id. (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807-08). 19 Here, the fee agreement in this case provides, in relevant part, as follows: 20 2. In consideration of the services to be performed by the Attorney and it being the desire of the Claimant to compensate Attorney out of the proceeds shall receive 21 25% of the past due benefits awarded by Social Security Administration to the claimant or such amount as the Commissioner may designate under 42 U.S.C. § 22 406(a)(2)(A) which is $7,200.00 as of November 30, 2022, whichever is smaller, upon successful completion of the case at or before a first hearing decision from an 23 ALJ. If the Claimant and the Attorney are unsuccessful in obtaining a recovery, 24 Attorney will receive no fee. This matter is subject expedited fee approval except as stated in ¶3. 25 3. The provisions of ¶2 only apply to disposition at or before a first hearing 26 decision from an ALJ. The fee for successful prosecution of this matter is 25% of the past due benefits awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for 27 work before the Social Security Administration. Attorney shall petition for authorization to charge this fee in compliance with the Social Security Act for all 28 1 time whether exclusive or not committed to such representation. 2 4. If this matter requires judicial review of any adverse decision of the Social Security Administration, the fee for successful prosecution of this matter is a 3 separate 25% of the past due benefits awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the court. Attorney shall seek compensation under 4 the Equal Access to Justice Act and such amount shall credit to the client for fees otherwise payable for that particular work. Client shall endorse such documents as 5 are needed to pay Attorney any amounts under the EAJA and assigns such fee 6 awards to Attorney. (ECF No. 17-1 at 1). 7 The Court has considered the character of counsel’s representation of Plaintiff and the 8 good results achieved by counsel, which included a decision in Plaintiff’s favor remanding this 9 case for further administrative proceedings. While there is no evidence that counsel engaged in 10 any dilatory conduct resulting in delay or provided unsubstantial performance, the Court finds 11 that a reduction is warranted because the requested benefits are large in comparison to the amount 12 of time counsel spent on the case. 13 Counsel represents that 14.6 hours of attorney and paralegal time were expended in this 14 matter. (ECF No. 17 at 5, 17). Because the case was remanded due to a stipulation between the 15 parties, counsel did not prepare any substantive briefing in the case. 16 For the 14.6 hours of time, counsel seeks an award of $26,000. Such an award would 17 result in an approximate hourly rate of $1,781. Such an amount exceeds awards approved in 18 other cases. See, e.g., Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153 (explaining that the majority opinion found 19 reasonable effective hourly rates equaling $519, $875, and $902) (J. Clifton, concurring in part 20 and dissenting in part); Malta v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:18-CV-00415-CDB, 2024 WL 21 3618430, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2024) (observing that hourly rate of $1,553.87 was “within the 22 upper boundaries of reasonableness.”) (collecting cases). 23 After consideration, the Court determines that a reduction in the total award to $15,000 is 24 appropriate. This amount results in an hourly rate of approximately $1,027, which is well within 25 the hourly rates other Courts have awarded. Additionally, an award of § 406(b) fees must be offset by any prior award of attorney’s 26 fees granted under the EAJA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. Plaintiff was 27 awarded $3,170 in EAJA fees, and counsel agrees to refund these fees. (ECF No. 17 at 16; ECF 28 1 | No. 22 at 3). 2 | Il. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 3 For the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 4 1. The motion for attorney’s fees (ECF No. 17) under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is granted in 5 part. 6 2. Plaintiffs counsel shall be awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in 7 the amount of $15,000. g 3. Plaintiffs counsel shall refund Plaintiff $3,170 for the EAJA fees previously awarded
9 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) upon the receipt of the attorney’s fee award. (See ECF No. 14). 4. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to serve a copy of this order on Plaintiff Leah Nicole Hunter 415 S. Lincoln St. Ridgecrest, CA 93555. (ECF No. 26, p. 2).
12 | ITIS SOORDERED. | pated: dune 2, 2026 [Jee hey 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28