Leah Faith Pugh v. Charles Darin Helphenstine

Opinion

RENDERED: AUGUST 28, 2026; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2025-CA-0379-MR

LEAH FAITH PUGH APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FLEMING CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JEFFREY L. SCHUMACHER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-00086

CHARLES DARIN HELPHENSTINE APPELLEE

OPINION

VACATING AND REMANDING

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BEFORE: L. JONES, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

JONES, L., JUDGE: Leah Faith Pugh brings this appeal from the Findings of

Fact, Issues Presented, Conclusions of Law, Judgment, and Decree (Decree)

entered in the Fleming Circuit Court on March 13, 2025. We vacate and remand.

Leah Faith Pugh (Leah) and Charles Darin Helphenstine (Darin)

began dating in late summer of 2023. Shortly after they began dating, Darin

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invited Leah to move into his home located at 142 Amanda Brooke Drive,1

Flemingsburg, Kentucky. In an effort to convince Leah to move in with him,

Darin offered to put Leah’s name on the deed to his home. A deed conveying the

property from Darin back to himself and Leah “jointly and equally for life with

remainder in fee simple to the survivor of them” was executed on November 6,

2023. Darin’s Trial Exhibit 2. Shortly after the deed was executed, Leah moved

into Darin’s home.

On November 17, 2023, while the couple was traveling to Tennessee,

Leah accepted Darin’s marriage proposal on the condition they would enter into a

prenuptial agreement. Leah found a prenuptial agreement on the internet and filled

in the terms of the agreement.2 The parties executed the prenuptial agreement on

the following day and then married in Tennessee on November 19, 2023.

The parties separated a short time later,3 and Darin filed a Petition of

Dissolution of Marriage in the Fleming Circuit Court on April 17, 2024.

1 The address of the real property at issue is spelled inconsistently in the record. We shall refer to the property as it was identified in the November 6, 2023 Deed as 142 Amanda Brooke Drive. 2 The prenuptial agreement executed by the parties included the following provisions: “It is the intention of the parties that the residence presently owned by Leah Pugh, Darin Helphenstine located at 142 Amanda Brooke Drive, Flemingsburg, Kentucky, shall not be affected by their Agreement.” Plaintiff Exhibit No. 1 at 2. There are no issues on appeal related to the prenuptial agreement. 3 Darin testified the parties separated after five weeks of marriage, Leah, on the other hand, testified the separation occurred some five months after the marriage.

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Following a hearing in the circuit court, the Decree was entered on March 13,

2025. Relevant to this appeal, the following findings of fact and conclusions of

law were set forth in the March 13, 2025 Decree:

The subject real property was conveyed to the parties in survivorship PRIOR to their marriage. There is no factual dispute that the parties own the subject real property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Further, there is no factual dispute that [Darin] has provided ALL of the money for the purchase and payment of the mortgage on the subject real property. Post-breakup, the parties[’] current dispute concerns the allocation of the subject real property between them. It is undisputed that the conveyance to the two of them created a survivorship form of ownership with the possibility that one might survive the other and become the sole owner of the subject real property. The parties had no written agreement detailing what would occur if their relationship soured, as in fact has now occurred. This couple’s interest in the subject real property is characterized by this Court as an implied partnership since it was acquired prior to their marital union. See Akers v. Stamper, 410 S.W.2d 710, 711 (Ky. 1966); and Glidewell v. Glidewell, 790 S.W.2d 925, 926-927 (Ky. App. 1990). Being characterized as such, per Glidewell, the subject real property would be “allocated to the parties in proportion to their respective share of any capital left after payment of partnership debt.” Glidewell, [790 S.W.2d] at 927.

....

Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is the ruling and judgment of this Court that these parties, while not married, entered into a partnership as to the subject real estate at issue. Then, upon the dissolution of their relationship, the applicable case law and statutory law deem that they are both to be restored to their percentage

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contribution to the acquisition of the subject partnership property. It being uncontroverted (and agreed by [Leah] in open Court) that [Darin] provided ONE HUNDRED PERCENT (100%) of the funds used to purchase and pay the mortgage on said real property, it only stands to reason that [Darin] is entitled to be restored to the same upon the breakup of the partnership.

Now, in the event that an appellate court determines that this Court’s approach, viewing the parties as a partnership, is incorrect, this Court has also analyzed the subject real property from a marital standpoint. Such analysis also leads to the conclusion that [Darin] is entitled to 100% of the real property. The title to the property is irrelevant in determining the marital versus non-marital nature of same. This was [Darin’s] premarital real estate and he conveyed same back to himself and [Leah] in anticipation of marriage which, in fact, did later occur. Had they remained married until “death do us part” she would have owned and been entitled to the whole property per the deed. Since they broke up, the question becomes what exactly is she entitled to receive? Simple tracing, as well as the party’s statements on the record, show that [Leah] contributed nothing to the property. That fact, coupled with the fact the parties were barely together for the blink of an eye, leads to the conclusion that [Darin] is entitled to be wholly restored to his real property, same being found to be his non-martial asset.

Upon either approach to the question, the end result is the same. Therefore, the Court orders that the Master Commissioner of the Fleming Circuit Court shall draft and execute a deed conveying any and all interest of the Respondent, Leah Faith Pugh, in and to the subject real property located at 142 Amanda Brook[e] Drive, Flemingsburg, Kentucky, and as more specifically identified in Fleming County Deed Book 291, page 43, to the Petitioner, Charles Darin Helphenstine, free and clear of any claims whatsoever of [Leah]. Compliance with

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this order thereby vests full title in and to the subject real property in the Petitioner, Charles Darin Helphenstine. [Darin] shall pay all costs and fees of the Master Commissioner regarding such deed.

Trial Record (R.) 72-75. This appeal follows.

The sole issue presented on appeal is disposition of the property

located at 142 Amanda Brooke Drive. The circuit court’s initial rationale for

restoring the property to Darin was based upon a theory of implied partnership. In

support thereof, the circuit court relied upon Glidewell v. Glidewell, 790 S.W.2d

925 (Ky. App. 1990). However, the facts presented in Glidewell are clearly

distinguishable from the facts sub judice. In Glidewell, the two parties, Otis and

Elizabeth, never married, but they cohabitated for over fifteen years, had a child

together, held themselves out as husband and wife, filed joint tax returns,

purchased property jointly, instituted a personal injury lawsuit together, and

received the lawsuit proceeds jointly. Id. The Glidewell Court ultimately

concluded that as to the one parcel of property Otis and Elizabeth purchased

jointly4 there existed an implied partnership, and the court divided the one property

accordingly. Id. at 927. In support of the implied partnership theory, the Glidewell

Court noted that Elizabeth had contributed financially to household expenses and

4 During the fifteen-year period, Otis purchased several other properties in his name only. The property the circuit court divided between the parties was the only parcel purchased in the name of both Otis and Elizabeth. Id. at 925.

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had tended to the livestock on the property. Id. Regarding the properties

purchased solely in Otis’s name, the Glidewell Court concluded those properties

were not subject to division under an implied partnership theory or otherwise.

It is well established that if parties cohabitate without marrying,

application of KRS5 Chapter 403 for disposition of property would be erroneous;

however, if the facts presented support an implied partnership between the parties

the property may be divided accordingly. See 12 Richard A. Revell, Diana L.

Skaggs & Michelle E. Mapes, Kentucky Divorce, § 12:7 (Dec. 2024).

In the case sub judice, unlike the parties in Glidewell, there are no

facts to support an implied partnership. Furthermore, as Leah and Darin were

married, KRS Chapter 403 controls disposition of the parties’ property. More

specifically, KRS 403.1906 governs the classification, assignment, and division of

5 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

6 (1) In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage or for legal separation, . . . the court shall assign each spouse’s property to him. It also shall divide the marital property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant factors including:

(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property, including contribution of a spouse as homemaker;

(b) Value of the property set apart to each spouse;

(c) Duration of the marriage; and

(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to become effective[.]

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marital property. The proper method for such disposition was succinctly

summarized in Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W. 3d 258 (Ky. 2004), as follows:

a trial court utilizes a three-step process to divide the parties’ property: (1) the trial court first characterizes each item of property as marital or nonmarital; (2) the trial court then assigns each party’s nonmarital property to that party; and (3) finally, the trial court equitably divides the marital property between the parties.

Id. at 264-65 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Applying the three-step process as set forth in Sexton to the facts

presented, we must first determine whether the parties’ interest in the property

located at 142 Amanda Brooke Drive is marital or nonmarital. Darin purchased

the property some six years before he dated and then married Leah. Shortly after

the parties met, Darin wanted Leah to move in with him. Leah responded that she

would only move in with Darin if she had an ownership interest in the property.

Darin then contacted an attorney of his choosing and executed a deed conveying

the property from Darin back to himself and Leah, with joint rights of survivorship.

As Leah was deeded an interest in the property as a gift before the marriage, she

clearly has a nonmarital interest in the property. As to the second step under

Sexton, Leah must be assigned her nonmarital interest in the property. Leah’s

nonmarital interest in the property is an undivided one-half interest, with rights of

survivorship, as described in the deed Darin’s attorney prepared. The third step

under Sexton, equitable division of any marital property, is not applicable as Leah

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is currently only asserting entitlement to the real property we have characterized as

nonmarital. We remand the matter to the circuit court for an order that assigns

Leah’s undivided one-half interest in the property located at 142 Amanda Brooke

Drive to her.

We view any remaining contentions of errors as moot or without

merit.

For the forgoing reasons, we vacate the portion of the March 13, 2025

Findings of Fact, Issues Presented, Conclusions of Law, Judgment, and Decree

entered in the Fleming Circuit Cout that ordered the subject property be wholly

restored to Darin as his nonmarital asset and remand for proceeding consistent with

this Opinion.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.

Chris Ring Morehead, Kentucky