Leah Chavez v. East Bay Drayage Drivers Security Fund Plan, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: May 15, 2026
• Docket: 3:24-cv-03487
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 5 LEAH CHAVEZ, Case No. 24-cv-03487-MMC

6 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS 7 v. BRADLEY AND PILLER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 8 EAST BAY DRAYAGE DRIVERS DENYING PLAINTFF’S CROSS- SECURITY FUND PLAN, et al., MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 Defendants. 10 11 Before the Court are defendants Lorrie E. Bradley (“Bradley”) and Geoffery L. 12 Piller’s (“Piller”) “Motion for Summary Judgment,” filed February 11, 2026, and plaintiff 13 Leah Chavez’s “Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,” filed March 6, 2026. The motions 14 have been fully briefed. Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in 15 opposition thereto as well as the applicable administrative record, the Court VACATES 16 the hearing scheduled for May 22, 2026, and rules as follows.1 17 BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff was a participant of the East Bay Drayage Drivers Security Fund Plan (the 19 “Plan”), which provides benefits to certain employees who were members of Teamsters 20 Local 70 (see Administrative Record (“AR”) 44; see also Bradley Decl. ¶ 2), including her 21 husband (see AR 144; see also Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶¶ 7, 9). On 22 September 28, 2023, plaintiff’s benefits were terminated due to the Plan’s determination 23 that her marriage had ended. (See AR 198.) Plaintiff thereafter initiated an 24 administrative appeal of the termination of benefits, which appeal was denied. (See AR 25 186-87; see also SAC ¶ 30.) 26

27 1 The May 22 hearing is not vacated as to the other motions scheduled for hearing 1 Based thereon, plaintiff filed the instant action against the Plan, its Board of 2 Trustees (the “Board”), and the Plan administrators, as well as Bradley and Piller, the 3 Plan’s lawyers. 4 LEGAL STANDARD 5 Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “court shall grant 6 summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 7 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. 8 P. 56(a). 9 The Supreme Court’s 1986 “trilogy” of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 10 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, (1986), and Matsushita Electric 11 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 (1986), requires that a party seeking 12 summary judgment show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once the 13 moving party has done so, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by 14 [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 15 file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Celotex, 16 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation and citation omitted). “When the moving party has 17 carried its burden under Rule 56[ ], its opponent must do more than simply show that 18 there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 19 586. “If the [opposing party’s] evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly 20 probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50 21 (citations omitted). “[I]nferences to be drawn from the underlying facts,” however, “must 22 be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” See Matsushita, 23 475 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 24 DISCUSSION 25 By the instant action, plaintiff asserts two claims against defendants Bradley and 26 Piller, namely, “Breach of Fiduciary Duty” and “Interference With Plaintiff’s Rights Under 27 ERISA.” 1 A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 2 An ERISA plaintiff may assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a 3 professional, e.g., an accountant or attorney, who is not named as a plan fiduciary, but 4 only by showing such individual has “perform[ed] more than the usual professional 5 services.” See Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1502 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding plaintiff 6 stated claim for breach of fiduciary duty against pension plan’s accountant and actuary 7 where those defendants had “discretionary control over the management of the [p]lan”). 8 Here, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 9 Bradley and Piller, both of whom are retained as attorneys for the Plan, performed more 10 than the usual professional services in advising their client in connection with plaintiff’s 11 eligibility for benefits under the Plan. 12 In particular, in support of their motion, Bradley and Piller have submitted 13 declarations averring the work they performed with respect to plaintiff’s claim consisted of 14 reviewing various documents and providing legal advice based thereon. (See Bradley 15 Decl. ¶¶ 4-6; Piller Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.) Although plaintiff disagrees with the legal advice 16 provided and criticizes the adequacy of the legal work done in advance thereof (see, e.g., 17 Pl.’s Cross-Mot. at 15:23-27; id. 17:19-22), such challenge does not constitute the type of 18 showing necessary to support a finding of fiduciary status. See Yeseta v. Baima, 837 19 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1988) (listing examples of attorney conduct sufficient to constitute 20 more than usual professional functions). 21 Plaintiff’s characterization of the legal work performed by Bradley and Piller as 22 “usurp[ing] the Board of Trustee’s [sic] discretion” (see Pl.’s Cross-Mot. at 15:5) and 23 exercising “control over the Fund’s claim’s process” (see Pl.’s Reply at 1:5), likewise is 24 unavailing. The evidence she submits, namely, Board meeting minutes (see Pl.’s Cross- 25 Mot. at 16 (citing AR 158)) and email communications between Bradley and Piller and the 26 Plan administrator and Board (see id. at 16-17 (citing AR 417-19, 479)), reflects no more 27 than traditional legal services. 1 Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of defendants Bradley and 2 || Piller on plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim. 3 || B. Interference With Plaintiff's Rights Under ERISA 4 In her reply, plaintiff states she “is no longer pursuing [an ERISA Inference] claim 5 || against [Bradley and Piller]” (see Pl.’s Reply at 11:5-10), which the Court construes as an 6 amendment governed by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which in turn, 7 || requires a showing of good cause. See Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 || 403 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding “withdrawals of individual claims against a 9 || given defendant” are treated as “amendments to pleadings”); see also Quan v. Cnty. of 10 || Los Angeles, No. 24-cv-04805, 2025 WL 3691863, at *2 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) 11 (holding “[aJmendments sought to be effected after the deadline specified in a scheduling g 12 || order are governed by the good cause standard of Rule 16(b)”).2 In stating she is no 13 || longer pursuing her ERISA Interference claim, plaintiff offers “no good cause to permit S 14 [such] unilateral voluntary withdrawal.” See id. 8 15 Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of defendants Bradley and é 16 || Piller on plaintiff's ERISA Interference claim. See id. (rejecting plaintiffs voluntary 17 || dismissal as “attempt to deprive the defendant of a ruling on [its] summary judgment 5 18 || motion”). 19 CONCLUSION 20 For the reasons stated above, defendants Lorrie E. Bradley and Geoffery L. 21 Piller’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, and plaintiffs Cross-Motion 22 || for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 || Dated: May 15, 2026 {abit lat AXINE M. CHESNEY 25 United States District Judge 26 27 ? In its scheduling order, the Court set January 17, 2025, as the deadline to amend 2g || the pleadings. (See Doc. No. 76.)