NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-96
LEAH C. GRIFFIN & another1
vs.
ERIC L. MEARS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The parties live on abutting parcels and have long
quarreled over an easement that crosses their properties. A
judge of the Superior Court referred the parties to binding
arbitration, pursuant to arbitration clauses in the parties'
settlement agreement and amendment of easement. The judge
confirmed the arbitration award and denied the defendant's
motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award. The defendant
appealed from the judgment and argues that the arbitrator
exceeded the scope of his authority by modifying the parties'
rights and obligations under the settlement agreement and
amendment of easement. He also asserts that the plaintiffs made
1 Dana R. Griffin. fraudulent statements to the court and that the arbitrator acted
with bias. We affirm.
Background. The parties live on abutting parcels. The
plaintiffs live on Lot A and the defendant lives on Lot B. An
unpaved roadway crosses Lot B to provide road access to the rear
of Lot A. The roadway, which has existed for decades, is
recorded as an easement. The recorded easement allows the owner
of Lot A "to pass and repass with vehicles or otherwise."
In 2020, the plaintiffs sued the defendant. Their
principal contention was that the defendant had obstructed the
easement by parking vehicles on it. The plaintiffs wanted to
install a septic system on their property and the defendant's
parked cars interfered with the project. In 2021, the parties
executed a settlement agreement to resolve the dispute. They
agreed to hire a surveyor to plan the location and bounds of the
easement. The defendant would be able to locate the easement
within certain parameters.
The settlement agreement also addressed parking. The
parties agreed that the
"[o]wner of Lot B shall be permitted to use the Easement for parking and other uses subject to the following: Between the hours of 7:00am and 7:00pm, owner of Lot A and their successors and assigns shall provide one (1) hour notice to the owner of Lot B of their intention to make actual use of the Easement and owner of Lot B shall ensure that the easement is open to permit vehicular access to Lot A."
2 The parties recorded an amendment of easement that reflected the
terms of the settlement agreement. Both the amendment of
easement and the settlement agreement contained arbitration
clauses. In relevant part, the settlement agreement provided
that if "alleged violations of this agreement" cannot be
resolved, "the parties agree to submit the dispute to binding
arbitration by a commercial provider."
The settlement agreement did not end the dispute. In 2022,
the plaintiffs filed a motion for order of reference for binding
arbitration. They alleged that the defendant had violated the
settlement agreement by parking vehicles in the easement and by
relocating the entrance of the easement such that it was
impassable to vehicles. The judge ordered that their dispute be
submitted to mediation and, if unsuccessful, to arbitration.
The dispute proceeded to arbitration, presided over by a
retired justice of the Land Court. After a two-day arbitration
that included a view of the property, the arbitrator ordered the
defendant to improve the easement to make it passable for
vehicular and pedestrian access by regrading it and removing
certain impediments. Further, the arbitrator ordered the
defendant to refrain from parking vehicles in the easement
between 7 P.M. and 7 A.M. The judge confirmed the arbitrator's
award and denied the defendant's motion to vacate or modify the
award.
3 Discussion. 1. Arbitrator's authority. The defendant
argues that the judge erred by confirming the arbitrator's award
because the arbitrator exceeded his authority, G. L. c. 251,
§ 12 (a) (3), by depriving him of his historical right to park
overnight in the easement and by ordering him to make
improvements to the easement not contemplated by the settlement
agreement. We disagree.
"We review the trial judge's decision to uphold the
arbitration award de novo, but our examination of the underlying
award is informed by the 'strong public policy favoring
arbitration'" (citation omitted). Pittsfield v. Local 447 Int'l
Bhd. of Police Officers, 480 Mass. 634, 637 (2018). "Indeed, an
arbitration award carries a presumption of propriety because it
is the arbitrator's judgment, not necessarily an objectively
correct answer, for which the parties have bargained." Id. at
638, citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 568 (1960). "[T]he powers of the arbitrator . . . are
wide and the scope of judicial review of the arbitration
proceedings is narrow" (citation omitted). Katz, Nannis &
Solomon, P.C. v. Levine, 473 Mass. 784, 793 (2016) (Levine). A
court will "uphold an arbitrator's decision even where it is
wrong on the facts or the law, and whether it is wise or
foolish, clear or ambiguous." Pittsfield, 480 Mass. at 638,
4 quoting Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 443 Mass.
813, 818 (2005).
"An arbitrator exceeds his or her authority by granting
relief that is beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement,
beyond that to which the parties bound themselves, or prohibited
by law." Levine, 473 Mass. at 795. Here, the parties bound
themselves under the settlement agreement and agreed to
arbitrate all claimed violations of the agreement. The source
of their disagreement was an ambiguity in the settlement
agreement. It required the plaintiffs to give the defendant one
hour's notice during the daytime before using the easement, to
allow the defendant to move his vehicles. There was no notice
requirement, however, between 7 P.M. and 7 A.M. The settlement
agreement was thus ambiguous about whether the defendant could
park overnight in the easement. The arbitrator had the
authority to interpret the ambiguity and prescribe remedies
accordingly. See Grobet File Co. of Am. v. RTC Sys., Inc., 26
Mass. App. Ct. 132, 135 (1988) (arbitrator acted within his
authority by construing ambiguity in contract, which parties had
agreed to arbitrate). Because it is the judgment of the
arbitrator that the parties bargained for, "it is the
arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the
contract that they have agreed to accept." Pittsfield, 480
5 Mass.
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-96
LEAH C. GRIFFIN & another1
vs.
ERIC L. MEARS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The parties live on abutting parcels and have long
quarreled over an easement that crosses their properties. A
judge of the Superior Court referred the parties to binding
arbitration, pursuant to arbitration clauses in the parties'
settlement agreement and amendment of easement. The judge
confirmed the arbitration award and denied the defendant's
motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award. The defendant
appealed from the judgment and argues that the arbitrator
exceeded the scope of his authority by modifying the parties'
rights and obligations under the settlement agreement and
amendment of easement. He also asserts that the plaintiffs made
1 Dana R. Griffin. fraudulent statements to the court and that the arbitrator acted
with bias. We affirm.
Background. The parties live on abutting parcels. The
plaintiffs live on Lot A and the defendant lives on Lot B. An
unpaved roadway crosses Lot B to provide road access to the rear
of Lot A. The roadway, which has existed for decades, is
recorded as an easement. The recorded easement allows the owner
of Lot A "to pass and repass with vehicles or otherwise."
In 2020, the plaintiffs sued the defendant. Their
principal contention was that the defendant had obstructed the
easement by parking vehicles on it. The plaintiffs wanted to
install a septic system on their property and the defendant's
parked cars interfered with the project. In 2021, the parties
executed a settlement agreement to resolve the dispute. They
agreed to hire a surveyor to plan the location and bounds of the
easement. The defendant would be able to locate the easement
within certain parameters.
The settlement agreement also addressed parking. The
parties agreed that the
"[o]wner of Lot B shall be permitted to use the Easement for parking and other uses subject to the following: Between the hours of 7:00am and 7:00pm, owner of Lot A and their successors and assigns shall provide one (1) hour notice to the owner of Lot B of their intention to make actual use of the Easement and owner of Lot B shall ensure that the easement is open to permit vehicular access to Lot A."
2 The parties recorded an amendment of easement that reflected the
terms of the settlement agreement. Both the amendment of
easement and the settlement agreement contained arbitration
clauses. In relevant part, the settlement agreement provided
that if "alleged violations of this agreement" cannot be
resolved, "the parties agree to submit the dispute to binding
arbitration by a commercial provider."
The settlement agreement did not end the dispute. In 2022,
the plaintiffs filed a motion for order of reference for binding
arbitration. They alleged that the defendant had violated the
settlement agreement by parking vehicles in the easement and by
relocating the entrance of the easement such that it was
impassable to vehicles. The judge ordered that their dispute be
submitted to mediation and, if unsuccessful, to arbitration.
The dispute proceeded to arbitration, presided over by a
retired justice of the Land Court. After a two-day arbitration
that included a view of the property, the arbitrator ordered the
defendant to improve the easement to make it passable for
vehicular and pedestrian access by regrading it and removing
certain impediments. Further, the arbitrator ordered the
defendant to refrain from parking vehicles in the easement
between 7 P.M. and 7 A.M. The judge confirmed the arbitrator's
award and denied the defendant's motion to vacate or modify the
award.
3 Discussion. 1. Arbitrator's authority. The defendant
argues that the judge erred by confirming the arbitrator's award
because the arbitrator exceeded his authority, G. L. c. 251,
§ 12 (a) (3), by depriving him of his historical right to park
overnight in the easement and by ordering him to make
improvements to the easement not contemplated by the settlement
agreement. We disagree.
"We review the trial judge's decision to uphold the
arbitration award de novo, but our examination of the underlying
award is informed by the 'strong public policy favoring
arbitration'" (citation omitted). Pittsfield v. Local 447 Int'l
Bhd. of Police Officers, 480 Mass. 634, 637 (2018). "Indeed, an
arbitration award carries a presumption of propriety because it
is the arbitrator's judgment, not necessarily an objectively
correct answer, for which the parties have bargained." Id. at
638, citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 568 (1960). "[T]he powers of the arbitrator . . . are
wide and the scope of judicial review of the arbitration
proceedings is narrow" (citation omitted). Katz, Nannis &
Solomon, P.C. v. Levine, 473 Mass. 784, 793 (2016) (Levine). A
court will "uphold an arbitrator's decision even where it is
wrong on the facts or the law, and whether it is wise or
foolish, clear or ambiguous." Pittsfield, 480 Mass. at 638,
4 quoting Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 443 Mass.
813, 818 (2005).
"An arbitrator exceeds his or her authority by granting
relief that is beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement,
beyond that to which the parties bound themselves, or prohibited
by law." Levine, 473 Mass. at 795. Here, the parties bound
themselves under the settlement agreement and agreed to
arbitrate all claimed violations of the agreement. The source
of their disagreement was an ambiguity in the settlement
agreement. It required the plaintiffs to give the defendant one
hour's notice during the daytime before using the easement, to
allow the defendant to move his vehicles. There was no notice
requirement, however, between 7 P.M. and 7 A.M. The settlement
agreement was thus ambiguous about whether the defendant could
park overnight in the easement. The arbitrator had the
authority to interpret the ambiguity and prescribe remedies
accordingly. See Grobet File Co. of Am. v. RTC Sys., Inc., 26
Mass. App. Ct. 132, 135 (1988) (arbitrator acted within his
authority by construing ambiguity in contract, which parties had
agreed to arbitrate). Because it is the judgment of the
arbitrator that the parties bargained for, "it is the
arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the
contract that they have agreed to accept." Pittsfield, 480
5 Mass. at 638, quoting United Paperworks Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987).
Likewise, the arbitrator acted within his authority in
ordering the defendant to relocate the entrance of the easement
and make certain improvements on the basis that the defendant
had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied in every
contract, requires that "neither party shall do anything which
will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the
other party to receive the fruits of the contract." Druker v.
Roland Wm. Jutras Assocs., 370 Mass. 383, 385 (1976), quoting
Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 81 F.2d 373, 377 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936). See also Warner Ins.
Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 406 Mass. 354, 360 n.7 (1990)
(noting that settlement agreement is contract governed by
general contract law).
The arbitrator concluded that the defendant violated the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by locating the
easement in such a way as to render it impassable. This
effectively deprived the plaintiffs of all fruits of the
contract. Whether the easement could be traversed by vehicles
was a critical issue in the parties' dispute, and the location
and condition of the easement cut to the heart of the matter.
Because the parties had agreed to arbitrate any "alleged
6 violation" of the settlement agreement, this issue was squarely
within the ambit of the arbitrator.
2. Fraud and partiality. The defendant argues that the
plaintiffs' lawyer "duped" the judge into ordering reference to
binding arbitration by misleading the judge on the chief issue
of the case. He also argues that the arbitrator acted with
evident partiality. Both arguments are meritless.
The defendant cherry-picks one quotation from the trial
court transcript to buttress his argument that the plaintiffs'
trial counsel misled the judge.2 A full reading of the
transcript shows that the judge was well-apprised of the
parties' dispute. Trial counsel for the plaintiffs explained
that the dispute concerned access to the easement. Trial
counsel noted that boulders and a sapling were obstructing the
easement, in violation of the settlement agreement. The judge
accordingly referred the dispute to binding arbitration. There
is no factual or legal basis for the defendant's claim.
Secondly, the defendant argues that the arbitrator acted
with evident partiality. An arbitration award may be vacated
pursuant to G. L. c. 251, § 12 (a) (2), if "there was evident
partiality by an arbitrator." "Evident partiality" exists when
2 "[T]he ground monuments are supposed to be located by a jointly-retained registered land surveyor and the fact of the matter is that they weren't. That's the dispute that we have."
7 "a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator
was partial to one party to an arbitration." Buffalo-Water 1,
LLC v. Fidelity Real Estate Co., 481 Mass. 13, 26 (2018),
quoting JCI Communications, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2003). The
defendant does not point to any facts in the record from which a
reasonable person could infer partiality. Instead, he argues
that the arbitrator showed evident partiality by depriving him
of his historical right to park. This is a recycled form of the
defendant's main argument; namely, that the arbitrator exceeded
his authority by addressing parking. Whether the plaintiffs
could use the easement without impediment was integral to the
parties' dispute concerning the settlement agreement. The
arbitrator could not have exhibited partiality solely by
exercising his authority to resolve the dispute.3
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Grant, Brennan & Toone, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: March 6, 2025.
3 The parties' requests for attorney's fee and damage awards are denied. The plaintiffs' motion to strike portions of the defendant's brief is also denied.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.