Leah Bendele, An Infant v. CW, DMAS

CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedMarch 30, 1999
Docket1219984
StatusPublished

This text of Leah Bendele, An Infant v. CW, DMAS (Leah Bendele, An Infant v. CW, DMAS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Leah Bendele, An Infant v. CW, DMAS, (Va. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Annunziata, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Hodges Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

LEAH BENDELE, AN INFANT, BY HER NEXT FRIENDS AND PARENTS, BRUCE AND BARBARA BENDELE OPINION BY v. Record No. 1219-98-4 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III MARCH 30, 1999 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, DEPARTMENT OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY James W. Haley, Jr., Judge

Daniel B. Streich for appellant.

Brian M. McCormick, Special Counsel (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Ashley L. Taylor, Jr., Deputy Attorney General; Siran S. Faulders, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Leah Bendele appealed to the circuit court an adverse

ruling by the Department of Medical Assistance Services. The

circuit court dismissed the appeal because Bendele did not give

the agency sufficient notice of her filing of the petition for

appeal. Bendele argues that the trial court erred when it held

that mailing a copy of the petition for appeal to the agency did

not satisfy the notice requirements of the Administrative

Process Act. Concluding that the trial court did not err, we

affirm the dismissal. The Department of Medical Assistance Services administers

the state Medicaid program. When it denied services to Bendele,

she gave notice of appeal to the agency and filed a petition for

appeal in the circuit court. On the same day, she mailed a copy

of the petition by certified mail return receipt requested to

the agency. The agency received it timely. Bendele did not

request that the clerk issue process and did not request service

of process. Bendele concedes that she did not comply with the

provisions of Rule 2A:4. 1 However, she asserts that Code

§ 8.01-288 2 cures that defect because the agency received a copy

of the petition within the time required.

1 Rule 2A:4. Petition for Appeal. (a) Within 30 days after the filing of the notice of appeal, the appellant shall file his petition for appeal with the clerk of the circuit court named in the first notice of appeal to be filed. Such filing shall include all steps provided in Rules 2:2 and 2:3 to cause a copy of the petition to be served (as in the case of a bill of complaint in equity) on the agency secretary and on every other party. (b) The petition for appeal shall designate the regulation or case decision appealed from, specify the errors assigned, state the reasons why the regulation or case decision is deemed to be unlawful and conclude with a specific statement of the relief requested. 2 § 8.01-288. Process received in time good though neither served nor accepted.--Except for process commencing actions for divorce or annulment of marriage or other actions wherein service of process is specifically prescribed by statute, process which has

- 2 - The Administrative Process Act does not prescribe the procedure

for perfecting an appeal from the agency to the circuit court.

Code § 9-6:14:16 authorizes the Supreme Court to establish these

by rule, and they are contained in Part Two A, Appeals Pursuant

to the Administrative Process Act. Rule 2A:2 provides that a

party shall file a notice of appeal with the agency secretary.

Rule 2A:4 provides that within 30 days of filing the notice, the

party shall file a petition for appeal with the clerk of the

circuit court. The filing of the petition shall include all the

steps established in Rules 2:2 and 2:3 (the procedures for

initiating an equity bill of complaint and having the clerk

issue a subpoena in chancery). Rule 2A:4 states that the

purpose of the procedure is to cause a copy of the petition to

be served on the agency secretary.

Code § 8.01-288 cures defective service when process

actually reaches the necessary person within the prescribed time

limit. This cure extends to actions unless the particular

statute specifically provides it will not apply.

In our opinion, the emphasized language of Code § 8.01-288 evidences a legislative intent to exclude services of process from its saving provision only in certain limited instances. Such an intent is clearly established with respect to suits for

reached the person to whom it is directed within the time prescribed by law, if any, shall be sufficient although not served or accepted as provided in this chapter.

- 3 - divorce and annulment, which are expressly excluded from the statute's saving provision. Code § 8.01-288. In other instances, the General Assembly has included the following sentence in statutes creating actions: "The provisions of § 8.01-288 shall not be applicable to the service of process required in this subsection," or like language. See Code § 38.2-2206(E) and (F) (uninsured motorist actions); Code § 54.1-1120(1) (Contractor Transaction Recovery Fund claims); Code § 54.1-2114(A)(1) (Real Estate Transaction Recovery Fund claims).

Frey v. Jefferson Homebuilders, Inc., 251 Va. 375, 379-80, 467

S.E.2d 788, 790 (1996).

In Broomfield v. Jackson, 18 Va. App. 854, 858, 447 S.E.2d

880, 882 (1994), this Court held:

When the legislature has deemed it prudent to do so, it has made specific reference in the APA to selected provisions of Title 8.01. See, e.g., Code § 9-6.14:5. From our review of the legislative policy statement in the APA, see Code § 9-6.14:3, we discern no legislative intent to supplement the provisions of an agency's basic laws and the APA with the general laws of the Commonwealth. See also Code § 9-6.14:4(C). The legislative policy statement is consistent with "[t]he general rule in other jurisdictions . . . that rules of civil procedure do not apply to administrative proceedings unless the rules specifically so provide." State Oil and Gas Bd. v. McGowan, 542 So.2d 244, 247 (Miss. 1989).

We need not decide if Bloomfield is distinguishable from

this case because the appellant’s actions did not bring her

within the provisions of Code § 8.01-288. Bendele mailed a copy

- 4 - of the petition for appeal that she had filed to the agency.

That was not process. Process in this case would have been a

subpoena in chancery, which the clerk would have attached to a

copy of the filing. Process is an official notice informing the

recipient of a pending action filed and advising when a response

is required.

"Process to commence an action is normally an order

(summons) to a court official (sheriff) to notify (summon) a

defendant to answer the plaintiff’s complaint at a time and

place mentioned in the order." Kent Sinclair & Leigh B.

Middleditch, Jr., Virginia Civil Procedure § 7.1, at 333 (3d ed.

1998). When following the equity procedures incorporated by

Rule 2A:4, process would be the subpoena in chancery. See id.

The clerk of the issuing court would attach process, the

subpoena in chancery, to a copy of the bill of complaint and

direct it to the sheriff of the bailiwick for service. See id.

§ 7.3, at 335. Under Rule 2A:4, the clerk would attach the

subpoena in chancery to a copy of the petition for appeal and

direct it to the sheriff for service.

The formality of process serves a legitimate purpose.

Process is official notice which informs the opposing party of

the litigation and instructs the party when and where it must

respond. Without this official notice, the recipient knows

neither if the action was filed nor when it was filed. The

- 5 - party would not know when critical time limits expire. Without

process a party would need to resort to other means to obtain

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Related

Frey v. Jefferson Homebuilders, Inc.
467 S.E.2d 788 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1996)
State Oil & Gas Bd. v. McGowan
542 So. 2d 244 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1989)
School Board v. Caudill Rowlett Scott, Inc.
379 S.E.2d 319 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1989)
Mayo v. Department of Commerce
358 S.E.2d 759 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1987)
Broomfield v. Jackson
447 S.E.2d 880 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1994)
Parker v. Prince William County
93 S.E.2d 136 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1956)
Davis v. American Interinsurance Exchange
319 S.E.2d 723 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1984)

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