League of Women Voters of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans

449 So. 2d 1153
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 13, 1984
DocketNos. CA 0868 to CA 0871
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 449 So. 2d 1153 (League of Women Voters of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
League of Women Voters of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 449 So. 2d 1153 (La. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

These consolidated cases have one issue common to all: Did the tax recipient bodies in Orleans Parish correctly determine the millage rate applicable to the assessed valuation of property when collecting ad valo-rem taxes from Orleans Parish property owners? The answer depends upon the interpretation of Section 23 of Article VII of Louisiana’s Constitution of 1974.

Section 23. Prior to the end of the third year after the effective ¿ate of this constitution, the assessors and the Louisiana Tax Commission or its successor shall complete determination of the fair market value or the use value of all property subject to taxation within each parish for use in implementing this Article. Except as provided in this Paragraph, the total amount of ad valorem taxes collected by any taxing authority in the year in which Sections 18 and 20 of this Article are implemented shall not be increased or decreased, because of their provisions, above or below ad valorem taxes collected by that taxing authority in the year preceding implementation. To accomplish this result, it shall be mandatory for each affected taxing authority, in the year in which Sections 18 and 20 of this Article are implemented, to adjust millages upwards or downwards without regard to millage limitations contained in this constitution, and the maximum authorized millages shall be increased or decreased, without further voter approval, in proportion to the amount of the adjustment upward or downward. Thereafter, such millages shall remain in effect unless changed as permitted by this constitution. Nothing herein shall prohibit a taxing authority from collecting, in the year in which Sec[1155]*1155tions 18 and 20 of this Article are implemented or in any subsequent year, a larger dollar amount of ad valorem taxes by (a) levying additional or increased mil-lages as provided by law; (b) placing additional property on the tax rolls; or (c) increases in the fair market or use value of property after the first determination of that value to implement this Article. This Section shall not apply to millages required to be levied for the payment of general obligation bonds.

After approval by the voters of the new Constitution, in response to Section 23, the Orleans Parish assessors began the enormous task of revaluing property in New Orleans at its fair market value to determine its assessed valuation. The assessed valuation would be either ten or fifteen percent of fair market value, depending on the classification of the property, and this would become the tax base for property in New Orleans. The tax recipient bodies began preparations to adjust the millage rates to be applied to the new tax base, anticipating receipt from the assessors of the new assessed valuation before the end of 1977. They also anticipated adjusting the permanent millage rates by use of the assessed valuation for 1977 as a base year.

The assessors, however, did not revalue the property at fair market value for 1977, and, of course, they did not submit to the tax recipient bodies the assessed valuation of property for that year. The tax recipient bodies, believing Section 23 required millage rates to be adjusted by use of the assessed valuation for the year 1977 as a base year, estimated the 1977 assessed valuation and adjusted the millage rates based on that estimate.

The assessors completed revaluation of the property in 1978, and submitted to the tax recipient bodies the assessed valuation based on fair market values for that year, 1978.

The millage rates determined by the tax recipient bodies using their estimates of an assessed valuation for 1977 are higher than the millage rates would be if the assessed valuation for 1978 were used by them as the base year in determining permanent millage rates. ■

As a result, whether the base year is 1977 or 1978 is crucial. The tax recipient bodies argue Section 23 of the Constitution sets 1977 as the base year. The assessors argue that 1978 is the year, hence the permanent millage rates set by the tax recipient bodies are too high.

Although not nearly as important, another issue arose as a result of the tax recipient bodies, relying on Section 23, subsection c, applying their estimated millage rates to the increases in fair market value from 1977 to 1978. Mr. and Mrs. Childress paid taxes under protest, arguing that Section 23(c) only permits the tax recipient bodies to apply the adjusted millage rate to increases after 1978, not to increases in fair market value from 1977 to 1978. They have filed suit to recover the additional amount paid as taxes under protest, as individuals and as representatives of all taxpayers who they allege overpaid their taxes.

During trial the assessors and the tax recipient bodies stipulated as to fair market value for 1977 and the recipient bodies now argue that the stipulated fair market value of 1977 should be used to set the permanent millage rate.

The Trial Judge agreed with the assessors and held that the millage rates established by the tax recipient bodies were not authorized by either the Constitution or Statutes and ordered the tax recipient bodies to reduce the rates. The Trial Judge did not reach the merits of Mr. and Mrs. Childress’ claim because after he ruled the Childresses could bring a class action suit, that ruling was appealed.

We believe that the tax recipient bodies correctly interpreted and applied Section 23 when determining the millage, and we reverse. As a consequence, we do not have to decide if a class action may be brought by Mr. and Mrs. Childress or if the Trial Judge’s ruling that it was a class action could be appealed to this Court.

[1156]*1156Although our decision is based upon Section 23 of Article VII, to understand Section 23 it is necessary to have in mind other sections of Article VII because Section 23 is only one of several provisions of the new constitution which changed property taxes in Louisiana. Section 18 of Article VII changed the method of determining assessed valuation, requiring all parish assessors throughout the state first to determine fair market value of land and improvements, and then to list property on the assessment rolls at 10% of fair market value for land and residential improvements and 15% of fair market value for other property. Assessed valuation of some property was to be determined by its use, but that is of no importance in this case. Section 20 provided for another change authorizing the Legislature to increase the homestead exemption.

Section 23, which is determinative of this lawsuit, recognized that in most instances property had not previously been assessed at fair market value and that assessors would have to revalue the property within their jurisdictions to conform to Section 18. Consequently, Section 23 gave the assessors three years to revalue the property in their parishes:

Section 23. Prior to the end of the third year after the effective date of this constitution, the assessors and the Louisiana Tax Commission or its successor shall complete determination of the fair market value or the use value of all property subject to taxation within each parish for use in implementing this Article.
* * * * * *

Section 23 made other changes. In most parishes changing assessed valuation to either 10% or 15% of fair market value would dramatically alter the prior valuation, increasing the tax base in some parishes and lowering it in others.

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Related

Opinion Number
Louisiana Attorney General Reports, 1993
League of Women Voters v. City of New Orleans
456 So. 2d 1390 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1984)

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Bluebook (online)
449 So. 2d 1153, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/league-of-women-voters-of-new-orleans-v-city-of-new-orleans-lactapp-1984.