League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon

Oregon Supreme Court

League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon

87 P.3d 672, 336 Or. 593, 2004 Ore. LEXIS 227

CourtOregon Supreme Court

DecidedApril 8, 2004

DocketCC 00C-20156; CA A113789; SC S48450; CC 00C-19871; CAA113790; SC S48451

StatusPublished

This text of 87 P.3d 672 (League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon, 87 P.3d 672, 336 Or. 593, 2004 Ore. LEXIS 227 (Or. 2004).

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Opinion

*596 PER CURIAM

The plaintiff-respondents in McCall v. Kitzhaber, S48451 (hereafter “McCall plaintiffs”), petitioned this court for an award of attorney fees, which petition the court denied by an equally divided court. McCall plaintiffs now ask us to reconsider that order. We deny the petition for reconsideration.

McCall plaintiffs argue that, when the court divides equally, it should allow a petition for attorney fees. We, however, do not share that view. Instead, we align ourselves with the United States Supreme Court, which has held that an equally divided court cannot act to grant affirmative relief. See Durant v. Essex Company, 74 US 107, 110, 19 L Ed 154 (1868) (“no affirmative action can be had in a cause where the judges are equally divided in opinion as to the judgment to be rendered or order to be made”).

McCall plaintiffs also contend that an order denying by an equally divided court is no ruling and that this court has left the trial court without guidance. It was not the office of our order to give guidance to the trial court. Again, we deem the Supreme Court’s decision in Durant instructive. First, the order is in fact a ruling of the court. See id. (“The division of opinion between the judges was the reason for the entry of that judgment; but the reason is no part of the judgment itself.”). Second, the order is binding on the parties even though it is not precedent for other cases. See id. at 113 (judgment by equally divided court “prevents the decision from becoming an authority for other cases of like character. But the judgment is as conclusive and binding in every respect upon the parties as if rendered upon the concurrence of all the judges upon every question involved in the case.”).

The petition for reconsideration is denied.

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*596 PER CURIAM

The plaintiff-respondents in McCall v. Kitzhaber, S48451 (hereafter “McCall plaintiffs”), petitioned this court for an award of attorney fees, which petition the court denied by an equally divided court. McCall plaintiffs now ask us to reconsider that order. We deny the petition for reconsideration.

McCall plaintiffs argue that, when the court divides equally, it should allow a petition for attorney fees. We, however, do not share that view. Instead, we align ourselves with the United States Supreme Court, which has held that an equally divided court cannot act to grant affirmative relief. See Durant v. Essex Company, 74 US 107, 110, 19 L Ed 154 (1868) (“no affirmative action can be had in a cause where the judges are equally divided in opinion as to the judgment to be rendered or order to be made”).

McCall plaintiffs also contend that an order denying by an equally divided court is no ruling and that this court has left the trial court without guidance. It was not the office of our order to give guidance to the trial court. Again, we deem the Supreme Court’s decision in Durant instructive. First, the order is in fact a ruling of the court. See id. (“The division of opinion between the judges was the reason for the entry of that judgment; but the reason is no part of the judgment itself.”). Second, the order is binding on the parties even though it is not precedent for other cases. See id. at 113 (judgment by equally divided court “prevents the decision from becoming an authority for other cases of like character. But the judgment is as conclusive and binding in every respect upon the parties as if rendered upon the concurrence of all the judges upon every question involved in the case.”).

The petition for reconsideration is denied.

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Bluebook (online)

87 P.3d 672, 336 Or. 593, 2004 Ore. LEXIS 227, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/league-of-oregon-cities-v-state-of-oregon-or-2004.

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