Lea v. South Atlantic Pecan Co.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Lea v. South Atlantic Pecan Co.

88 S.E. 530, 104 S.C. 234, 1916 S.C. LEXIS 113

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina

DecidedApril 6, 1916

Docket9374

StatusPublished

This text of 88 S.E. 530 (Lea v. South Atlantic Pecan Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lea v. South Atlantic Pecan Co., 88 S.E. 530, 104 S.C. 234, 1916 S.C. LEXIS 113 (S.C. 1916).

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Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Gage.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for $530, alleged to be due to the plaintiff for personal service. The Court directed a verdict for the plaintiff for that amount, and the defendant has appealed.

The contract betwixt the parties is evidenced by a letter from the defendant to the plaintiff, which will be reported. Thu. plaintiff sued on that, and stated for a second cause of action an implied agreement by the defendant to pay the plaintiff that which the plaintiff’s services were worth. During the trial the second cause of action was withdrawn, and the recovery was had on the written contract. The appeal involves only one question, and that is the meaning of the letter of employment.

Confessedly the plaintiff began his service September 1, 1913, and confessedly he was to be paid “$100 per month and expenses.” The only testimony was the letter of employment and the plaintiff’s. The defendant swore one witness, but his testimony made no issue. The plaintiff testified he worked for the defendant six months from September to February, both inclusive; that he was paid his expenses and $70 over them; that he was due, therefore, $530. The only contention the defendant makes is that the plaintiff’s “contract of service ended automatically when the meeting of stockholders of October, 1913, failed to authorize the issuing of stock referred to.” We think that construction of the letter is not warranted by the words of it, or by the conduct of the writers thereafter.

We shall not advert to those sometimes capricious rules which Courts have laid down for the construction of written instruments; sometimes they are like bridges across chasms which shrewd men may bestride. The proof is uncontradicted that the plaintiff did work for the defendant, with defendant’s knowledge, of course, from September 1st to *237 March 1st; and the proof is uncontradicted that there was at the start, and confessedly for two months, a contract for service between them. The plain inference is that the plaintiff was working under the contract.

The letter by the use of the word “until” manifestly contemplated not so much an automatic ending of one contract of service as the beginning of another and different contract of service between the parties. The performance of the other contract was not entered upon by the parties. The letter contains no express words to end the first service, which service was begun by express words. An implied intent to end it will not be inferred.

We think the Circuit Court was right, and the judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Fraser took no part in the consideration of this case.

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The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Gage.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for $530, alleged to be due to the plaintiff for personal service. The Court directed a verdict for the plaintiff for that amount, and the defendant has appealed.

The contract betwixt the parties is evidenced by a letter from the defendant to the plaintiff, which will be reported. Thu. plaintiff sued on that, and stated for a second cause of action an implied agreement by the defendant to pay the plaintiff that which the plaintiff’s services were worth. During the trial the second cause of action was withdrawn, and the recovery was had on the written contract. The appeal involves only one question, and that is the meaning of the letter of employment.

Confessedly the plaintiff began his service September 1, 1913, and confessedly he was to be paid “$100 per month and expenses.” The only testimony was the letter of employment and the plaintiff’s. The defendant swore one witness, but his testimony made no issue. The plaintiff testified he worked for the defendant six months from September to February, both inclusive; that he was paid his expenses and $70 over them; that he was due, therefore, $530. The only contention the defendant makes is that the plaintiff’s “contract of service ended automatically when the meeting of stockholders of October, 1913, failed to authorize the issuing of stock referred to.” We think that construction of the letter is not warranted by the words of it, or by the conduct of the writers thereafter.

We shall not advert to those sometimes capricious rules which Courts have laid down for the construction of written instruments; sometimes they are like bridges across chasms which shrewd men may bestride. The proof is uncontradicted that the plaintiff did work for the defendant, with defendant’s knowledge, of course, from September 1st to *237 March 1st; and the proof is uncontradicted that there was at the start, and confessedly for two months, a contract for service between them. The plain inference is that the plaintiff was working under the contract.

The letter by the use of the word “until” manifestly contemplated not so much an automatic ending of one contract of service as the beginning of another and different contract of service between the parties. The performance of the other contract was not entered upon by the parties. The letter contains no express words to end the first service, which service was begun by express words. An implied intent to end it will not be inferred.

We think the Circuit Court was right, and the judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Fraser took no part in the consideration of this case.

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Bluebook (online)

88 S.E. 530, 104 S.C. 234, 1916 S.C. LEXIS 113, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lea-v-south-atlantic-pecan-co-sc-1916.