Le N Tran v. United Airlines, Inc

CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedDecember 17, 2002
Docket2075024
StatusUnpublished

This text of Le N Tran v. United Airlines, Inc (Le N Tran v. United Airlines, Inc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Le N Tran v. United Airlines, Inc, (Va. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton

LE N. TRAN MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 2075-02-4 PER CURIAM DECEMBER 17, 2002 UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

(Kathleen G. Walsh, on brief), for appellant.

(Michael N. Salveson; Hunton & Williams, on brief), for appellee.

Le N. Tran (claimant) contends the Workers' Compensation

Commission erred in finding that she failed to prove she

sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course

of her employment on September 1, 2000. Upon reviewing the

record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that this appeal is

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the

commission's decision. Rule 5A:27.

"To be compensable as an injury by accident, a purely

psychological in jury must be causally related to a physical

injury or causally related to an obvious sudden shock or fright

arising in the course of employment." Chesterfield County v.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. Dunn, 9 Va. App. 475, 477, 389 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1990).

Moreover, purely psychological disability resulting from

"disagreements over managerial decisions and conflicts with

supervisory personnel that cause stressful consequences . . .

ordinarily are not compensable." Teasley v. Montgomery Ward &

Co., 14 Va. App. 45, 49, 415 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1992).

In holding that claimant failed to prove a compensable

injury by accident, the commission found as follows:

The deputy commissioner found that the claimant was not credible in stating that Ms. [Orawan] Tudor[, the lead worker,] struck her in the chest with her knuckles causing a bruise. Rather, the incident was essentially "a heated verbal exchange" and "perceived harassment." We agree. It is well established that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over stress and psychological damage resulting from supervisory actions and conflicts over working conditions.

As fact finder, the commission was entitled to reject

claimant's testimony that Tudor struck claimant's chest with her

knuckles and caused a bruise and to accept Tudor's testimony to

the contrary. It is well settled that credibility

determinations are within the fact finder's exclusive purview.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pierce, 5 Va. App. 374, 381, 363

S.E.2d 433, 437 (1987). Tudor's testimony was consistent with

the testimony of Todd Maffe and Stephanie Toporcer. Both Maffe

and Toporcer testified that when claimant discussed the incident

with them she never said Tudor struck or touched her. In

- 2 - addition, when interviewed by Maffe and Toporcer, claimant's

co-worker, Shing Lin, did not tell them that Tudor struck

claimant. Lin testified at the hearing that Tudor never struck

the claimant. This evidence supported the commission's

conclusions that Tudor did not touch or strike claimant and that

claimant did not sustain a physical injury as a result of the

incident.

Furthermore, Tudor's testimony supported the commission's

finding that the incident was "nothing more than a heated verbal

exchange" or "perceived harassment of one employee by another"

and the further finding that the incident was "neither shocking

nor sufficiently frightening to give rise to a claim of

psychological injury." Thus, the commission did not err in

concluding that claimant's psychological condition and

disability resulting from her verbal conflict with her

supervisor did not constitute a compensable injury by accident

arising out of and in the course of claimant's employment. See

Teasley, 14 Va. App. at 49, 415 S.E.2d at 598. Accordingly, we

cannot find as a matter of law that claimant's evidence

sustained her burden of proof. See Tomko v. Michael's

Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970).

For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.

Affirmed.

- 3 -

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Related

Tomko v. Michael's Plastering Co.
173 S.E.2d 833 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1970)
Chesterfield County/Fire Dept. v. Dunn
389 S.E.2d 180 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1990)
Teasley v. Montgomery Ward, Inc.
415 S.E.2d 596 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1992)
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pierce
363 S.E.2d 433 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1987)

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