Le Jimmy, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board
This text of 433 A.2d 1090 (Le Jimmy, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This is an appeal from the denial by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board of an application for a class “C” retailer’s license. We reverse on the ground the Board’s findings in support of its decision were not supported by substantial evidence.
I
On August 6, 1979, petitioner applied to the ABC Board for a class “C” retailer’s license for a 50-seat restaurant already in operation at 3116 M Street, N.W. Petitions in support of and in opposition to the application were filed with the Board. On October 3,1979, a hearing was held at which the only individuals who testified were petitioner’s president, Jean-Paul Sam Amsellem, and James Haight, the president of a corporation holding a class “C” license at 3104 M Street, N.W., and intervenor in this proceeding. On January 30, 1980, the Board rendered a decision in which it found that issuance of the license sought would have an adverse impact on existing traffic and parking problems. Based on that finding, the Board concluded the subject premises were “not appropriate” 1 and therefore, petitioner’s application was denied. On February 15,1980, petitioner sought reconsideration or the opportunity for reargument before the Board. The request was granted on April 21,1980, and a hearing was set for May 28, 1980. Following that hearing, on August 14, 1980, the Board reaffirmed its decision of January 30, 1980. Petitioner then sought review in this court. On October 23, 1980, at the request of the Board, we remanded the record for a period of 20 days to permit the Board to “make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.” On November 12, 1980, the Board amended finding No. 29 of its January 30, 1980 decision, and the case was returned to this court.
After reviewing the entire record, and especially the Board’s amended finding No. 29, we are not persuaded the Board’s conclusion follows rationally from adequate findings based on substantial evidence. Therefore, we must vacate the decision de *1092 nying the application. However, the Board and not this court, is the body vested with the authority to issue the license, and we are reluctant to intrude upon the prerogatives of an administrative agency by ordering specific, affirmative relief, absent a showing of arbitrary and capricious conduct in the decision making process. See Jameson’s Liquors, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, D.C. App., 384 A.2d 412, 420 (1978). Therefore, we refrain at this time from mandating that the Board grant petitioner the license. We order only that in a further proceeding the Board consider the merits of petitioner’s application based on the evidence presented.
II
In reviewing decisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, this court’s role is not to substitute its own judgment for that of the Board, Clark's Liquors, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, D.C. App., 274 A.2d 414, 418 (1971); rather, our task is to determine if the Board has complied with the Code provisions pertaining to alcoholic beverages, D.C. Code 1973, § 25-101 et seq., and the requirements of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedures Act, D.C. Code 1973, § 1-1501 et seq. The narrower issue in this case is whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Board’s finding 2 that traffic and parking problems in the neighborhood would be exacerbated if petitioner’s application was approved. Vestry of Grace Parish v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, D.C.App., 366 A.2d 1110, 1115 (1976); Citizens Association of Georgetown, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, D.C.App., 316 A.2d 865 (1974); D.C. Code 1977 Supp., § 1-1510(3)(E). Substantial evidence means,
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
*1093 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938), quoted in Vestry of Grace Parish v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, supra, 366 A.2d at 1112.
The substantial evidence requirement is met with a minimal amount of evidence, given our deference to the Board’s informed judgment and special competence in the matters before it. Sophia’s Incorporated v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, D.C.App., 268 A.2d 799, 801 (1970). Nonetheless, the record of this proceeding is devoid of evidence that petitioner’s restaurant, which was already in operation, would be the source of an increase in Georgetown’s traffic and parking problems if permitted to serve liquor.
The gravamen of the opposition’s complaint was that a serious parking problem exists in Georgetown, in large part caused by the presence of too many alcoholic beverage licensees. However, that was not the issue before the Board, as the Board itself recognized in finding No. 28, which stated the contention that there were too many licenses in the area was more appropriately addressed to the City Council. Petitioner is not required to prove there is no parking problem in Georgetown in order to qualify for a license. That would be an impossible burden. The Board is permitted to consider the effect a prospective licensee will have on parking problems and traffic patterns, see, e. g., Citizens Association of Georgetown, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, D.C.App., 410 A.2d 197 (1979); Citizens Association of Georgetown, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, D.C.App., 268 A.2d 801 (1970), and, whenever a license is requested for a location in Georgetown, it is an obvious concern. However, every location is unique, and the Board must evaluate each application according to the particular circumstances involved. Sophia’s Incorporated v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, supra 268 A.2d at 801. In this case, petitioner was already operating a 50-seat restaurant serving ice cream, sandwiches, ome-lettes, salads and two daily specials. There was no entertainment and no separate bar area. The hours of operation were to be from 11:00 a. m. to 3:00 a. m. Petitioner’s president testified there were 12 parking spaces provided for employees.
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433 A.2d 1090, 1981 D.C. App. LEXIS 327, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/le-jimmy-inc-v-district-of-columbia-alcoholic-beverage-control-board-dc-1981.