STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION Docket No. CV-12-278 r; _-'(',):{\,- kc)t:.c ·- •· 1 - .I cr/ 1 l / i -7, ,;· ') . ;;__
SHARON LEBLANC, Plaintiff
ORDER ON MOTION TO v. DISMISS
MAINE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE ; . ..,, DISTRICT #61, Defendant
Pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6), Defendant Maine School
Administrative District #61 moves to dismiss Plaintiff Sharon Le Blanc's "Motion to
Compel Enforcement" of the collective bargaining agreement between the District and
the Lake Region Educational Support Personnel Association.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are contained in Plaintiffs "Motion to Compel Enforcement
of Collective Bargaining Agreement" (the complaint). 1 Plaintiff Sharon LeBlanc (Ms.
Le Blanc) was employed as an educational support technician in Maine School
Administrative District #61 (the District) between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2011.
(Compl. '1!'1!1-2.) As such, she was a member ofthe Lake Region Educational Suppmi
Personnel Association (the Association). (Compl. 't[2.) At all relevant times, the District
1 The District argues that the captioning violates Maine Rules of Civil Procedure 3 and 7(a), which require the filing of a "complaint" in order to commence a civil action. However, the Court construes the "motion" as an initial complaint given its purpose and function. Construing the action as one for breach of contract, the allegation therein is Blanc a Level Three Board hearing concerning the termination decision.
1 and the Association were bound by a collective bargaining agreement (the CBA), which
laid out. among other things, certain "grievance procedures." (Compl. ,-r 3; Ex. A.)
In May 2011, Ms. Le Blanc became aware that there was a disciplinary matter
against her pending before the District's Superintendent, Patrick Phillips. (Compl. ,-r,-r 4-
5.) Ms. LeBlanc retained Attorney Glen Niemy to represent her. (Compl. ,-r 5.) On June
20, 2011, Ms. LeBlanc and Attorney Niemy met with Superintendent Phillips. (Compl.
,-r 7.) Ms. LeBlanc alleges that Superintendent Phillips did not issue a formal decision,
but, rather, informed her that he was "leaning toward" dismissing her. (Compl. ,-r 8.) On
June 30, 2011, Superintendent Phillips left his post with the District. (Compl. ,-r 10.)
On July 18, 2011, Acting Superintendent Katherine Beecher sent a letter to
Attorney Niemy that explained the basis for the termination. According to the
Complaint, this was the first time Attorney Niemy was informed ofthe District's decision
to terminate his client. (Compl. ,-r 11; Ex. C.) That letter stated: "If we receive notice of a
grievance on behalf of Ms. LeBlanc and a request for a meeting with the School Board,
we will send you the names of any witnesses that may appear with the District
administration." (Ex. C.)
The next day, on July 19, 2011, Attorney Niemy sent a letter to Board
Chairwoman Jody Gray and indicated his intent to appeal the Superintendent's decision
terminating Ms. LeBlanc's employment to the Board of Directors (the Board). (Compl.
,-r 12; Ex. B.) On December 13, 2011, counsel for the District sent Ms. LeBlanc a letter
she construes as the District's "formal refusal" to grant her a hearing before the Board. 2
2 This letter states that her July 19 request for review was untimely, and, to the extent that
she sought review by the Board, she should have sought review by the Superintendent.
2 (Compl. ~ 13; Ex. D.) Ms. LeBlanc complains that she is entitled to review by the Board
pursuant to the grievance procedures in section 6.4 of the CBA.
Under the CBA. a grievance is defined as "a claim by an employee, employees or
Association that there has been a violation of any express provision in this Agreement."
CBA § 6.4(B)(l). Section 6.4 includes four levels offormal grievance procedure. At
Level One, the grievant may present her claim before the school principal. At Level
Two, a grievant dissatisfied with the principal's decision may file the grievance with the
Superintendent. The Superintendent shall meet with the employee and render a written
decision within 5 days of meeting. At Level Three, a grievant dissatisfied with the
Superintendent's decision may appeal to the Board of Directors within 5 days ofthe
Superintendent's response. At Level Four: "Any grievance which has been deemed
meritorious by the Association may be appealed to arbitration by the Association within
fifteen (15) days of the Board's response by serving written notice of its intent to appeal
on the Board."
Article 6 establishes that no employee shall be discharged without "just cause."
CBA § 6.1 (A). A grievance pe1iaining to employee rights or grievance procedures may
be initiated at Level Two with the Superintendent. CBA § 6.l(D).
Here, Ms. LeBlanc claims that she was entitled to appeal the Superintendent's
termination decision- which she alleges was contained in the July 18 letter- to the
Board pursuant to Level Three of the CBA. Ms. Le Blanc filed the current complaint on
June 21, 2012, which asked the Court to order the District to comply with the CBA. In
(Ex. D). The letter also references communications of August 24, 2011 and October 13, 2011 where col.msel for the District earlier refused to allow review by the Board.
3 the current motion to dismiss. however. the District presents the preliminary issue of
whether the Superior Court even has authority to reach the merits at this stage.
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
When deciding a motion to dismiss, the court must assess the complaint "in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets fo1ih elements of a cause
of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal
theory." Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm 'n, 2004 ME 20, ~ 7, 843 A.2d 43. As
part of this determination, the court may consider "documents that are central to the
plaintiffs claim, and documents referred to in the complaint" without converting the
motion into one for summary judgment. !d. ~ 10. In this case, the complaint contained
the CBA and the correspondence referenced above, all of which is central to Ms. Le
Blanc's claim.
There may very well be genuine disputes as to the nature of certain
communications- specifically, when Ms. LeBlanc learned of her termination and when
she or Attorney Niemy learned that the Board refused to hear her appeal- but the Court
at this stage takes the dates and facts in the complaint as true.
DISCUSSION
It is unclear from the CBA exactly how an employee is meant to appeal a
disciplinary decision rendered by the Superintendent on the merits. However, the initial
question presented by the motion to dismiss is whether this Court has authority to
interpret the CBA to determine the correct appeals process, or whether this determination
must also be accomplished through the Article 6 grievance procedures.
4 The District argues in its motion that the grievance procedures, which conclude
with Level Four binding arbitration, are the exclusive mechanism by which Ms. Le Blanc
may contest the District's refusal to grant her a Board hearing. "This is an allegation of
breach of contract, for which the exclusive remedy is arbitration, and the motion must be
dismissed on that basis." (Mot.
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION Docket No. CV-12-278 r; _-'(',):{\,- kc)t:.c ·- •· 1 - .I cr/ 1 l / i -7, ,;· ') . ;;__
SHARON LEBLANC, Plaintiff
ORDER ON MOTION TO v. DISMISS
MAINE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE ; . ..,, DISTRICT #61, Defendant
Pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6), Defendant Maine School
Administrative District #61 moves to dismiss Plaintiff Sharon Le Blanc's "Motion to
Compel Enforcement" of the collective bargaining agreement between the District and
the Lake Region Educational Support Personnel Association.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are contained in Plaintiffs "Motion to Compel Enforcement
of Collective Bargaining Agreement" (the complaint). 1 Plaintiff Sharon LeBlanc (Ms.
Le Blanc) was employed as an educational support technician in Maine School
Administrative District #61 (the District) between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2011.
(Compl. '1!'1!1-2.) As such, she was a member ofthe Lake Region Educational Suppmi
Personnel Association (the Association). (Compl. 't[2.) At all relevant times, the District
1 The District argues that the captioning violates Maine Rules of Civil Procedure 3 and 7(a), which require the filing of a "complaint" in order to commence a civil action. However, the Court construes the "motion" as an initial complaint given its purpose and function. Construing the action as one for breach of contract, the allegation therein is Blanc a Level Three Board hearing concerning the termination decision.
1 and the Association were bound by a collective bargaining agreement (the CBA), which
laid out. among other things, certain "grievance procedures." (Compl. ,-r 3; Ex. A.)
In May 2011, Ms. Le Blanc became aware that there was a disciplinary matter
against her pending before the District's Superintendent, Patrick Phillips. (Compl. ,-r,-r 4-
5.) Ms. LeBlanc retained Attorney Glen Niemy to represent her. (Compl. ,-r 5.) On June
20, 2011, Ms. LeBlanc and Attorney Niemy met with Superintendent Phillips. (Compl.
,-r 7.) Ms. LeBlanc alleges that Superintendent Phillips did not issue a formal decision,
but, rather, informed her that he was "leaning toward" dismissing her. (Compl. ,-r 8.) On
June 30, 2011, Superintendent Phillips left his post with the District. (Compl. ,-r 10.)
On July 18, 2011, Acting Superintendent Katherine Beecher sent a letter to
Attorney Niemy that explained the basis for the termination. According to the
Complaint, this was the first time Attorney Niemy was informed ofthe District's decision
to terminate his client. (Compl. ,-r 11; Ex. C.) That letter stated: "If we receive notice of a
grievance on behalf of Ms. LeBlanc and a request for a meeting with the School Board,
we will send you the names of any witnesses that may appear with the District
administration." (Ex. C.)
The next day, on July 19, 2011, Attorney Niemy sent a letter to Board
Chairwoman Jody Gray and indicated his intent to appeal the Superintendent's decision
terminating Ms. LeBlanc's employment to the Board of Directors (the Board). (Compl.
,-r 12; Ex. B.) On December 13, 2011, counsel for the District sent Ms. LeBlanc a letter
she construes as the District's "formal refusal" to grant her a hearing before the Board. 2
2 This letter states that her July 19 request for review was untimely, and, to the extent that
she sought review by the Board, she should have sought review by the Superintendent.
2 (Compl. ~ 13; Ex. D.) Ms. LeBlanc complains that she is entitled to review by the Board
pursuant to the grievance procedures in section 6.4 of the CBA.
Under the CBA. a grievance is defined as "a claim by an employee, employees or
Association that there has been a violation of any express provision in this Agreement."
CBA § 6.4(B)(l). Section 6.4 includes four levels offormal grievance procedure. At
Level One, the grievant may present her claim before the school principal. At Level
Two, a grievant dissatisfied with the principal's decision may file the grievance with the
Superintendent. The Superintendent shall meet with the employee and render a written
decision within 5 days of meeting. At Level Three, a grievant dissatisfied with the
Superintendent's decision may appeal to the Board of Directors within 5 days ofthe
Superintendent's response. At Level Four: "Any grievance which has been deemed
meritorious by the Association may be appealed to arbitration by the Association within
fifteen (15) days of the Board's response by serving written notice of its intent to appeal
on the Board."
Article 6 establishes that no employee shall be discharged without "just cause."
CBA § 6.1 (A). A grievance pe1iaining to employee rights or grievance procedures may
be initiated at Level Two with the Superintendent. CBA § 6.l(D).
Here, Ms. LeBlanc claims that she was entitled to appeal the Superintendent's
termination decision- which she alleges was contained in the July 18 letter- to the
Board pursuant to Level Three of the CBA. Ms. Le Blanc filed the current complaint on
June 21, 2012, which asked the Court to order the District to comply with the CBA. In
(Ex. D). The letter also references communications of August 24, 2011 and October 13, 2011 where col.msel for the District earlier refused to allow review by the Board.
3 the current motion to dismiss. however. the District presents the preliminary issue of
whether the Superior Court even has authority to reach the merits at this stage.
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
When deciding a motion to dismiss, the court must assess the complaint "in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets fo1ih elements of a cause
of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal
theory." Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm 'n, 2004 ME 20, ~ 7, 843 A.2d 43. As
part of this determination, the court may consider "documents that are central to the
plaintiffs claim, and documents referred to in the complaint" without converting the
motion into one for summary judgment. !d. ~ 10. In this case, the complaint contained
the CBA and the correspondence referenced above, all of which is central to Ms. Le
Blanc's claim.
There may very well be genuine disputes as to the nature of certain
communications- specifically, when Ms. LeBlanc learned of her termination and when
she or Attorney Niemy learned that the Board refused to hear her appeal- but the Court
at this stage takes the dates and facts in the complaint as true.
DISCUSSION
It is unclear from the CBA exactly how an employee is meant to appeal a
disciplinary decision rendered by the Superintendent on the merits. However, the initial
question presented by the motion to dismiss is whether this Court has authority to
interpret the CBA to determine the correct appeals process, or whether this determination
must also be accomplished through the Article 6 grievance procedures.
4 The District argues in its motion that the grievance procedures, which conclude
with Level Four binding arbitration, are the exclusive mechanism by which Ms. Le Blanc
may contest the District's refusal to grant her a Board hearing. "This is an allegation of
breach of contract, for which the exclusive remedy is arbitration, and the motion must be
dismissed on that basis." (Mot. Dismiss 4.) The District's position appears to be that Ms.
LeBlanc should have initiated a nevv grievance with the Superintendent (skipping Level
One due to § 6.1 (D)). Presumably, this grievance would concern whether, under the
CBA, the Board was compelled to hear the merits of the termination decision.
Arguably, Ms. LeBlanc's complaint is a separate "grievance" under§ 6.4(B)(l)
because it is a claim by an employee that "there has been a violation of [an] express
provision of [the CBA]" (i.e., the Board's refusal violates the four step grievance
procedures of the CBA). Therefore, Ms. LeBlanc failed to exhaust her contractual
remedies at the time she filed suit in this Comi. However, the Law Court has recognized
certain limited situations where an employee may obtain direct judicial review of a claim
against an employer, even when she is bound by contractual grievance procedures up to
and including arbitration. Hughes v. Univ. ofMe., 652 A.2d 97, 99 (Me. 1995) (citing
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967)). One such situation arises when "the conduct of
the employer amounts to a repudiation of [the] contractual procedures" that would
otherwise be required. !d. "In such a situation ... the employer is estopped by his own
conduct to rely on the unexhausted grievance and arbitration procedures as a defense to
the employee's cause of action." Vaca, 386 U.S. at 185.
Here, the District unequivocally denied Ms. LeBlanc's ability to obtain review of
the termination decision by rejecting the appeal. The December 13 letter is evidence of
5 this repudiation. It would be illogical to require Ms. LeBlanc tore-initiate the grievance
process through the same channels that had just rejected her appeal. Obviously, the
parties differ as to whether the Board's reasons for denying the appeal were sound, and
the Court does not evaluate these at this stage. The issue remains open as to whether Ms.
LeBlanc's July 19 Board appeal was the proper course and whether it was timely. The
Court holds only that it has authority to interpret the CBA in order to ultimately
determine the correct process for an employee to appeal a disciplinary decision rendered
by the Superintendent.
The District has also raised a standing issue in general terms, based on the fact
that the Association is not a plaintiff in the suit. The Court will not decide standing at
this point, but directs Ms. Le Blanc to move for leave to amend her complaint in proper
conformance with Rule 15, ifthat is her intent, within 10 days ofthe date ofthis order.
The entry will be:
The Court DENIES the Defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has 10 days from
the date of this order to file a motion for leave to amend her c
intent.
:D~t41 U?tv DATE
6 To exit this option, select the EXIT KEY. prod/1.3.1b13/prd11 MAINE JUDICIAL INFORMATION SYSTEM 12/17/2012 gmerritt CUMBERLAND COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT mjxxi013 PAGE A - ATTORNEY BY CASE VIEW SHARON LE BLANC VS MAINE ADMINISTRATIVE SCHOOL DISTRICT 61 UTN:AOCSsr -2012-0059141 CASE #:PORSC-CV-2012-00278
01 0000000829 NIEMY GLEN PO BOX 764 BRIDGTON ME 04009 F SHARON LE BLANC PL RTND 06/21/2012
02 0000002987 SMITH, BRUCE 84 MARGINAL WAY SUITE 600 PORTLAND ME 04101-2480 F MAINE ADMINISTRATIVE SCHOOL DISTRICT 61 DEF RTND 06/18/2012
03 0000004751 MILLER ELEK A 84 MARGINAL WAY SUITE 600 PORTLAND ME 04101-2480 F MAINE ADMINISTRATIVE SCHOOL DISTRICT 61 DEF RTND 06/18/2012