MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Apr 28 2015, 6:52 am Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Chris Palmer Gregory F. Zoeller Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Larry D. Allen Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
L.C., April 28, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1410-JV-708 v. Appeal from the Marion County Superior Court The Honorable Marilyn Moores, State of Indiana, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither, Magistrate Cause No. 49D09-1406-JD-001475
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-JV-708 | April 28, 2015 Page 1 of 6 Case Summary [1] L.C. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for having committed an act that
would be Possession of Marijuana, as a Class A misdemeanor, 1 if committed by
an adult.2 He appeals the adjudication, presenting the sole issue of whether the
juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that was illegally
obtained. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] On May 9, 2014, Indiana State Police excise officers Harrison Rich and
Michelle Catterson were located at the parking lot of DNS Liquors in
Indianapolis, performing routine enforcement duties. They observed a young
woman exit her vehicle, enter the liquor store, return with two brown paper
bags, and hand the bags to her passengers. As the young woman drove away,
Officer Rich observed that the passengers appeared to be “well under the age of
twenty-one.” (Tr. 31.)
[3] The officers followed the vehicle as it travelled to and stopped in a nearby
Village Pantry parking lot. Officer Rich then activated his lights and
approached the vehicle. Upon request, the driver produced identification
1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11. The offense may now be a Class A or B misdemeanor or a Level 6 felony. We refer to the version of the statute in effect at the time of L.C.’s conduct. 2 The juvenile court also entered a true finding that L.C. had possessed alcohol. Indiana Code Section 7.1-5- 7-7 provides that possession of alcohol by a minor is a Class C misdemeanor. Indiana Code Section 7.1-1-3- 25 defines a minor as a person less than twenty-one years of age.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-JV-708 | April 28, 2015 Page 2 of 6 indicating that she was twenty-four years old. Officer Catterson approached the
front passenger side, where she detected the odor of marijuana. She alerted
Officer Rich, who went to the passenger side and also detected a marijuana
odor.
[4] The front seat passenger advised Officer Rich that he was a minor. Officer
Rich, who could see that the package at the passenger’s feet contained a brandy
bottle, advised the passenger that he was under arrest for possession of an
alcoholic beverage by a minor. A search of the passenger incident to arrest
yielded a small bag of marijuana.
[5] Officer Rich approached the back seat passenger, L.C., who was in proximity to
the second brown bag. L.C. provided information that he was fifteen years old.
Officer Rich ordered L.C. to exit the vehicle. When L.C. complied, Officer
Rich observed that L.C. had been sitting on a bag of marijuana.
[6] The State alleged L.C. to be delinquent. At the denial hearing, L.C. moved to
suppress evidence that he had possessed alcohol and marijuana, claiming that
the officers had detained him without reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.
The juvenile court denied the motion to suppress and entered a true finding on
each count alleged by the State. L.C. filed a motion to reconsider, which was
summarily denied at the dispositional hearing. L.C. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-JV-708 | April 28, 2015 Page 3 of 6 [7] A juvenile court has discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and its
decisions are reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion. C.L.M. v. State, 874
N.E.2d 386, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We reverse only when admission is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error
affects a party’s substantial rights. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind.
2013).
[8] L.C. argues that he was entitled to have the evidence against him suppressed
because it was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution. More specifically, L.C. claims that his detention was not
predicated upon reasonable suspicion.
[9] The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures. J.D. v. State, 902 N.E.2d 293, 295 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). However, an
officer may briefly stop a person for investigation if the officer has reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. Id. Reasonable suspicion exists when the facts
known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal
activity has or is about to occur. Id. at 295-96. Reasonable suspicion is
determined on a case-by-case examination of the totality of the circumstances,
and must be an objective determination that is something more than an
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. Id. at 296. A reasonable
suspicion amounts to less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-JV-708 | April 28, 2015 Page 4 of 6 [10] Here, the officers observed a young woman exit a liquor store and hand two
brown paper bags to her passengers. The passengers appeared to Officer Rich,
who had received extensive training as an excise officer, to be “well under the
age of twenty-one.” (Tr. 31.) We think this sufficient to cause an ordinarily
prudent person to believe that criminal activity was about to occur. We reject
the notion that Officer Rich could not intervene because another beverage could
have been purchased at the liquor store and packaged similarly. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (the Fourth Amendment was not violated where an
officer had observed individuals pacing, looking in a store window, and
conferring – conduct that could be either innocent or suspicious – and had
detained them to resolve the ambiguity). L.C.’s detention did not take place in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
[11] The Indiana Constitutional analysis is much like that under the Fourth
Amendment. J.D., 902 N.E.2d at 296. The rights of liberty, privacy, and free
movement are not absolute, but are balanced against society’s right to
protection. Id. The reasonableness of a search or seizure turns upon a
balancing of: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a
violation has occurred, (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or
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MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Apr 28 2015, 6:52 am Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Chris Palmer Gregory F. Zoeller Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Larry D. Allen Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
L.C., April 28, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1410-JV-708 v. Appeal from the Marion County Superior Court The Honorable Marilyn Moores, State of Indiana, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither, Magistrate Cause No. 49D09-1406-JD-001475
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-JV-708 | April 28, 2015 Page 1 of 6 Case Summary [1] L.C. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for having committed an act that
would be Possession of Marijuana, as a Class A misdemeanor, 1 if committed by
an adult.2 He appeals the adjudication, presenting the sole issue of whether the
juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that was illegally
obtained. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] On May 9, 2014, Indiana State Police excise officers Harrison Rich and
Michelle Catterson were located at the parking lot of DNS Liquors in
Indianapolis, performing routine enforcement duties. They observed a young
woman exit her vehicle, enter the liquor store, return with two brown paper
bags, and hand the bags to her passengers. As the young woman drove away,
Officer Rich observed that the passengers appeared to be “well under the age of
twenty-one.” (Tr. 31.)
[3] The officers followed the vehicle as it travelled to and stopped in a nearby
Village Pantry parking lot. Officer Rich then activated his lights and
approached the vehicle. Upon request, the driver produced identification
1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11. The offense may now be a Class A or B misdemeanor or a Level 6 felony. We refer to the version of the statute in effect at the time of L.C.’s conduct. 2 The juvenile court also entered a true finding that L.C. had possessed alcohol. Indiana Code Section 7.1-5- 7-7 provides that possession of alcohol by a minor is a Class C misdemeanor. Indiana Code Section 7.1-1-3- 25 defines a minor as a person less than twenty-one years of age.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-JV-708 | April 28, 2015 Page 2 of 6 indicating that she was twenty-four years old. Officer Catterson approached the
front passenger side, where she detected the odor of marijuana. She alerted
Officer Rich, who went to the passenger side and also detected a marijuana
odor.
[4] The front seat passenger advised Officer Rich that he was a minor. Officer
Rich, who could see that the package at the passenger’s feet contained a brandy
bottle, advised the passenger that he was under arrest for possession of an
alcoholic beverage by a minor. A search of the passenger incident to arrest
yielded a small bag of marijuana.
[5] Officer Rich approached the back seat passenger, L.C., who was in proximity to
the second brown bag. L.C. provided information that he was fifteen years old.
Officer Rich ordered L.C. to exit the vehicle. When L.C. complied, Officer
Rich observed that L.C. had been sitting on a bag of marijuana.
[6] The State alleged L.C. to be delinquent. At the denial hearing, L.C. moved to
suppress evidence that he had possessed alcohol and marijuana, claiming that
the officers had detained him without reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.
The juvenile court denied the motion to suppress and entered a true finding on
each count alleged by the State. L.C. filed a motion to reconsider, which was
summarily denied at the dispositional hearing. L.C. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-JV-708 | April 28, 2015 Page 3 of 6 [7] A juvenile court has discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and its
decisions are reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion. C.L.M. v. State, 874
N.E.2d 386, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We reverse only when admission is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error
affects a party’s substantial rights. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind.
2013).
[8] L.C. argues that he was entitled to have the evidence against him suppressed
because it was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution. More specifically, L.C. claims that his detention was not
predicated upon reasonable suspicion.
[9] The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures. J.D. v. State, 902 N.E.2d 293, 295 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). However, an
officer may briefly stop a person for investigation if the officer has reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. Id. Reasonable suspicion exists when the facts
known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal
activity has or is about to occur. Id. at 295-96. Reasonable suspicion is
determined on a case-by-case examination of the totality of the circumstances,
and must be an objective determination that is something more than an
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. Id. at 296. A reasonable
suspicion amounts to less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-JV-708 | April 28, 2015 Page 4 of 6 [10] Here, the officers observed a young woman exit a liquor store and hand two
brown paper bags to her passengers. The passengers appeared to Officer Rich,
who had received extensive training as an excise officer, to be “well under the
age of twenty-one.” (Tr. 31.) We think this sufficient to cause an ordinarily
prudent person to believe that criminal activity was about to occur. We reject
the notion that Officer Rich could not intervene because another beverage could
have been purchased at the liquor store and packaged similarly. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (the Fourth Amendment was not violated where an
officer had observed individuals pacing, looking in a store window, and
conferring – conduct that could be either innocent or suspicious – and had
detained them to resolve the ambiguity). L.C.’s detention did not take place in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
[11] The Indiana Constitutional analysis is much like that under the Fourth
Amendment. J.D., 902 N.E.2d at 296. The rights of liberty, privacy, and free
movement are not absolute, but are balanced against society’s right to
protection. Id. The reasonableness of a search or seizure turns upon a
balancing of: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a
violation has occurred, (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or
seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and (3) the extent of law
enforcement needs. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).
[12] As we have previously determined, Officers Rich and Catterson possessed
reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief detention for investigative purposes.
Having seen liquor store packages handed to youthful-appearing individuals,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-JV-708 | April 28, 2015 Page 5 of 6 the officers requested verification of the ages of those in possession of the
packages. The method employed, a brief detention of an already-stopped
vehicle and verbal request for age verification, presented a minimal intrusion
into daily activities. The need of law enforcement to prevent the consumption
of alcohol by minors is strong. Under these circumstances, L.C. has not shown
that evidence was obtained in violation of his rights under Article 1, Section 11
of the Indiana Constitution.
Conclusion [13] The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence obtained
during a detention of L.C. and his companions.
[14] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-JV-708 | April 28, 2015 Page 6 of 6