RENDERED: AUGUST 28, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0720-ME
L.C. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE TIFFANY YAHR, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-AD-00027
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; I.L.D.C., A MINOR CHILD; AND J.A.S. APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, EASTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: L.C. has appealed from the April 24, 2025, judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court, Family Division, terminating her parental rights to I.L.D.C. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
L.C. (Mother) is the biological mother of I.L.D.C. (Child), a male born in July 2023. Child’s father is J.A.S. (Father). Mother is our focus because Father chose not to participate in either the proceedings below or this appeal.
The Cabinet for Health and Family Services filed a juvenile dependency, neglect, or abuse (DNA) petition (Case No. 23-J-00601-001) on July 26, 2023, shortly after Child’s birth while he was still in the hospital, noting in the petition there was an open case involving Mother’s oldest child. As grounds for the petition, Cabinet social worker Nakia Walker stated:
This is a neglected child. This child was born [in July 2023] to [Mother]. [Mother] currently has an open CPS case with her oldest child who is in DCBS [Department for Community Based Services] custody. There is a pending TPR [Termination of Parental Rights] hearing set for August 30, 2023, regarding that child. [Mother] only has supervised contact with her oldest child. [Mother] has not successfully completed her case plan and still has pending charges regarding criminal abuse to her middle child, . . . who is in permanent relative custody. [The middle child] suffered severe injuries from being assaulted by [Mother].[1] [Mother] has had no contact with [the middle child]. [Mother] has mental health issues, and is unstable. Recently [Mother] had a plan to drive her car off a cliff/bridge while she was pregnant with [Child].
[Mother] was evaluated by Good Sam[aritan Hospital] and even though she had a plan to kill herself she was not admitted to the hospital. [Mother] has anger issues and can easily escalate when mad. [Mother] has lied about her
1 We note that later in the record, it appears that the oldest child’s father may have caused the middle child’s injuries.
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pregnancy to DCBS for months stating she was not pregnant and just gaining weight. This child is at risk with [Mother’s] ongoing mental health and her long history of suicidal ideations with a plan is dangerous to a newborn infant. [Mother] resides alone and [there are] no other adults in the home creating a bigger risk if this child is left alone with [Mother].
The family court placed Child in the emergency custody of the Cabinet that day.
Mother stipulated to neglect as noted at the subsequent temporary removal and adjudication hearings. Accordingly, the family court found Child was neglected or abused as defined in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 600.020(1)(a) because the parents “[c]reat[ed] or allow[ed] to be created a risk of physical or emotional injury . . . by other than accidental means” and ordered Child to remain in the temporary custody of the Cabinet. In the adjudication calendar order, the court ordered the Cabinet to negotiate a case plan with the family to address issues and concerns that led to the filing of the petition and to provide reasonable efforts to return the child to the parents’ custody.
The Cabinet filed a dispositional report in December 2023, in which Cabinet social worker Walker detailed Child’s current status in his foster home and Mother’s condition. By that time, the case had been open with the Cabinet for 48 months. Based on that length of time and Mother’s history of substance abuse and mental health issues, her lack of consistent progress on her case plan, and her agreements to voluntarily terminate her parental rights to her other two children,
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Walker stated this case had been “pre-perm” approved for a goal change to adoption. Walker recommended Child be committed to the Cabinet as neglected.
The family court held a disposition hearing the same month, after which it adopted the Cabinet’s report and recommendations. In the calendar order, the court stated, “[t]he Cabinet has provided a case plan and reasonable efforts for the safe reunification of the child with the parents. However, the parents have failed to timely complete said case plan, and the child remains at imminent risk of further neglect/abuse/dependency if returned to their custody.” Accordingly, the family court found that the goal change to adoption was in Child’s best interest to achieve permanency and entered an order to this effect.
In February 2024, the Cabinet filed a petition to terminate parental rights, alleging the required statutory basis. The family court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for Child and separate counsel for the parents. At the termination hearing, the Cabinet offered testimony from Walker and Licensed Clinical Psychologist Dr. Elizabeth Cravero. Mother also testified.
Walker became the ongoing caseworker for this family in September 2020 and testified in conformity with her affidavit in the DNA petition and dispositional report. The Cabinet had become involved via a referral in January 2020 regarding the older children after the middle child sustained numerous unexplained bruises and two fractures to his left leg that were caused by
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nonaccidental trauma. The Cabinet filed DNA petitions on the two older children, and Mother stipulated to risk of neglect. The middle child was ultimately placed in the permanent custody of his paternal grandmother, and Mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights as to the oldest child.
Walker testified extensively about Mother’s case plan, but she did not believe there were any additional services that could be offered that would result in reunification. Walker believed it was in Child’s best interest for termination of parental rights to be granted. Mother had an open case with the Cabinet for more than four years but failed to reunify with any of her children. She was given multiple case plans that continually identified the same needs/concerns and assessment recommendations, including mental health issues. Although she completed some of the assessments, the concern remained.
On cross-examination, Walker stated she conducted a home visit of Mother’s residence and concluded it was appropriate for Child. Mother provided clothes and hair items for the Child, but care was not consistent. She was paying child support.
Dr. Cravero testified about the results of Mother’s parental capacity evaluations at Feinberg & Associates in 2022 (for the oldest child) and 2024 (for Child). Regarding the 2022 evaluation, Dr. Cravero’s concerns with Mother’s parenting included some rather significant mental health issues not yet addressed.
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While she completed some tasks required of her by the Cabinet, it did not appear she had authentically engaged in those services because subsequent assessments and evaluations recommended further services were necessary.
Between the assessments, Dr. Cravero stated Mother completed some additional services and participated in another mental health assessment through Crossroads Counseling, and more were recommended. However, Mother declined to engage those necessary services. Although she completed Parent-Child Interaction Therapy (PCIT), Mother continued to have interpersonal issues and was unable to establish a support system.
As to the 2024 assessment, Dr. Cravero testified that Mother’s protective capacity issues and mental health challenges were still present and created a risk for any child in her care. Dr. Cravero observed signs of a strained attachment during an interaction between Mother and Child. Mother could not change the Child’s diaper despite several attempts because Child would cry. Child became fussy, and Mother’s attempts to soothe him had limited success.
Dr. Cravero testified that Mother still lacked the necessary capacity to safely and appropriately parent Child, and she did not recommend reunification. Based on the time Mother had worked with the Cabinet, the services that had been implemented and inauthentically completed, and her spotty compliance with those services, Dr. Cravero found Mother’s prognosis for improvement poor.
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Mother testified about her therapy and parenting classes, stating she was more mindful and learned skills from each parenting class, even though, at first, she did not think she needed parenting classes. She talked about her support system and how she addressed trauma from her own childhood (including abandonment) in therapy. She admitted she suffered depression. She had been working full-time at Amazon since October 2023 earning $22 per hour and had other side jobs shopping for people and delivering orders. She also had space for Child in her home and was exploring daycare and healthcare for him. Mother did not believe it was in Child’s best interest to terminate her parental rights.
The court asked Mother follow-up questions regarding her failure to obtain a psychiatric evaluation, her failure to give full and accurate information to the providers, and red flags with the father of her oldest child.
At the conclusion of testimony, the court permitted the GAL to argue her position. The GAL, who had served in this role for all three of Mother’s children from the beginning of the cases, still had significant concerns about Mother’s ability to parent. She did not believe the issues present in 2020 were resolved or that Mother could be an appropriate, stable parent. She had no reason to believe Child would be safe in her care. Despite Mother’s limited progress, she believed Child’s best interest would be served by terminating Mother’s parental rights.
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The court made several findings on the record, recognizing Mother experienced significant trauma that was not her fault and commending her on the limited success with her case plan. However, the court did not think Mother was honest or credible based on the inconsistencies between her story, what she reported during the Feinberg evaluations, and what she told the providers. The court believed there was too much risk to return Child to Mother’s care and concluded termination of her parental rights was appropriate.
In April 2025, the family court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which it incorporated its oral findings, as well as a judgment terminating the parental rights of both Mother and Father. Only Mother appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, this Court set forth the applicable standard of review in termination proceedings:
The trial court has a great deal of discretion in determining whether the child fits within the abused or neglected category and whether the abuse or neglect warrants termination. Department for Human Resources v. Moore, Ky. App., 552 S.W.2d 672, 675 (1977). This Court’s standard of review in a termination of parental rights action is confined to the clearly erroneous standard in [Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)] 52.01 based upon clear and convincing evidence, and the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed unless there exists no substantial evidence in the record to support its findings.
V.S. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, Ky. App., 706 S.W.2d 420, 424 (1986).
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“Clear and convincing proof does not necessarily mean uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if there is proof of a probative and substantial nature carrying the weight of evidence sufficient to convince ordinarily prudentminded people.” Rowland v. Holt, 253 Ky. 718, 726, 70 S.W.2d 5, 9 (1934).
979 S.W.2d 114, 116-17 (Ky. App. 1998). More recently, the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated:
“Pursuant to this standard, an appellate court is obligated to give a great deal of deference to the family court’s findings and should not interfere with those findings unless the record is devoid of substantial evidence to support them.” [Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. T.N.H., 302 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Ky. 2010)]. Due to the fact that “termination decisions are so factually sensitive, appellate courts are generally loathe to reverse them, regardless of the outcome.” [D.G.R. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 364 S.W.3d 106, 113 (Ky. 2012)].
Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. v. K.H., 423 S.W.3d 204, 211 (Ky. 2014). “[T]he Court will not disturb the trial court’s findings unless no substantial evidence exists on the record.” M.E.C. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 254 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Ky. App. 2008).
ANALYSIS
In K.H., supra, the Supreme Court of Kentucky discussed the fundamental interest a parent has to raise his or her child:
The involuntary termination of parental rights is a scrupulous undertaking that is of the utmost constitutional concern. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119-20, 117
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S. Ct. 555, 136 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1996). The U.S. Supreme Court has unequivocally held that a parent has a “fundamental liberty interest” in the care and custody of his or her child. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982). This fundamental interest “does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State . . . .” Id. at 754-55, 102 S. Ct. 1388. Therefore, “[w]hen the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.” Id.
423 S.W.3d at 209. The Court went on to describe how the required statutory elements in KRS 625.090 protect that right:
The Commonwealth’s TPR statute, found in KRS 625.090, attempts to ensure that parents receive the appropriate amount of due process protections. KRS 625.090 provides for a tripartite test which allows for parental rights to be involuntarily terminated only upon a finding, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the following three prongs are satisfied: (1) the child is found or has been adjudged to be an abused or neglected child as defined in KRS 600.020(1); (2) termination of the parent’s rights is in the child’s best interests; and (3) at least one of the termination grounds enumerated in KRS 625.090(2)(a)-(j) [now (k)] exists.
K.H., 423 S.W.3d at 209.
The first prong of the three-part test requires a finding that the child is or has been adjudged to be an abused or neglected child pursuant to KRS 625.090(1)(a), as defined in KRS 600.020(1). Mother conceded in her brief that Child had been adjudged abused or neglected by a court of competent jurisdiction in the juvenile action, KRS 625.090(1)(a)1.
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The second prong of the test required the court to determine whether the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interest. KRS 625.090(1)(c). In considering the best interest of a child (as well as the existence of a ground for termination), the family court must consider the factors set forth in KRS 625.090(3),2 which include:
(a) Mental illness as defined by KRS 202A.011(9), or an intellectual disability as defined by KRS 202B.010(9) of the parent as certified by a qualified mental health professional, which renders the parent consistently unable to care for the immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs of the child for extended periods of time;
(b) Acts of abuse or neglect as defined in KRS 600.020(1)
toward any child in the family;
(c) If the child has been placed with the cabinet, whether the cabinet has, prior to the filing of the petition made reasonable efforts as defined in KRS 620.020 to reunite the child with the parents unless one or more of the circumstances enumerated in KRS 610.127 for not requiring reasonable efforts have been substantiated in a written finding by the District Court;
(d) The efforts and adjustments the parent has made in his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child’s best interest to return him to his home within a reasonable period of time, considering the age of the child;
(e) The physical, emotional, and mental health of the child and the prospects for the improvement of the child’s welfare if termination is ordered; and
2 We note that this subsection was amended effective June 27, 2025. Therefore, we shall be referring to the version in effect from July 14, 2022, through June 26, 2025.
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(f) The payment or the failure to pay a reasonable portion of substitute physical care and maintenance if financially able to do so.
The family court meticulously examined each factor before finding termination to be in Child’s best interest, with only the subsection (f) factor being in Mother’s favor.
As for subsection (a), the family court looked to the 2024 Feinberg evaluation before stating “Mother demonstrated significant impairment in her emotional functioning, lacks insight into her maladaptive and reactionary behaviors which impact her ability to parent, and as a result, she continues to lack the capacity to parent.” There was also the evaluation’s conclusion that Mother’s “prognosis for change is highly guarded.” Furthermore, we note Walker’s testimony that Mother “did not grasp the seriousness of suicidal ideations and major depressive disorder.”
As to subsection (b), the court found multiple instances of Mother’s neglect of Child and her two other children. Regarding reunification efforts under subsection (c), the court noted the Cabinet’s development of Mother’s case plan in 2020, after her older children were removed, which recommended services and assessments, and updated that plan periodically. The family court concluded, “The Cabinet has given all the help it could possibly give, and there is simply nothing else the Cabinet can do.”
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The family court agreed with Mother that she made efforts in participating in various services the Cabinet provided, a consideration under subsection (d). However, “those efforts have not resulted in changed circumstances that would allow for a safe return of custody to her in a reasonable time.” Finally, as to subsection (e) regarding meeting the child’s needs while in the Cabinet’s custody, the family court found that Child was thriving, had bonded with and attached to his foster family, and was developmentally on target. This convinced the court that continuation in his current home was best for Child.
Based upon our review of the record, we hold these findings and conclusions are all supported by clear and convincing evidence of record and therefore shall not be disturbed. The family court did not abuse its discretion in finding that termination was in the child’s best interest.
The third prong requires the family court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of one or more grounds listed in KRS 625.090(2) related to parental unfitness. In this case, the family court found the existence of the following grounds:
(e) That the parent, for a period of not less than six (6)
months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or refused to provide or has been substantially incapable of providing essential parental care and protection for the child and that there is no reasonable expectation of improvement in parental care and protection, considering the age of the child;
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....
(g) That the parent, for reasons other than poverty alone, has continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or is incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or education reasonably necessary and available for the child’s well-being and that there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s conduct in the immediately foreseeable future, considering the age of the child[.]
KRS 625.090(2). The record contains clear and convincing evidence, as set forth in the judgment, that supports the family court’s findings under these subsections.
In addition, the family court found additional services were unlikely to bring about adjustments in Mother that would enable a return of Child within a reasonable time pursuant to KRS 625.090(4). And the family court found that Mother had not established that Child would not be abused or neglected if returned to her pursuant to KRS 625.090(5). The family court found that, even if persuaded the risk of abuse or neglect was lessened, it would still decline to exercise its discretion because of the length of time Child was in foster care. We again find no reason to reject these findings.
Based upon the family court’s thorough consideration of the evidence, we hold that clear and convincing evidence supports its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights and that the judgment was not clearly erroneous.
We also recognize Mother experienced significant trauma during her lifetime, commend her for her efforts and limited success, and express our hope
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she continues pursuing this work-in-progress for her own and others’ sakes. But these efforts were too little, too late to ameliorate the risks to Child of returning him to Mother’s care. We decline to disturb the family court’s decision.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette Family Court terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
Yavon L. Griffin SERVICES: Lexington, Kentucky Dilissa G. Milburn
Mayfield, Kentucky