Lazarre v. Wing

176 Misc. 2d 493, 672 N.Y.S.2d 644, 1998 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 139
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 11, 1998
StatusPublished

This text of 176 Misc. 2d 493 (Lazarre v. Wing) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lazarre v. Wing, 176 Misc. 2d 493, 672 N.Y.S.2d 644, 1998 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 139 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1998).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Herbert Kramer, J.

[494]*494Covenant House seeks an order placing petitioner, an 18-year-old Haitian refugee, into foster care. Since petitioner is currently too old for placement, Covenant House has petitioned for an order nunc pro tunc to August 13, 1997 when petitioner was 17 years of age.

In support of this petition it is alleged, inter alia, that the refusal of the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) to accept Mr. Olivier’s1 transfer of the care and custody of petitioner, immediately prior to his majority, was a violation of lawful procedure as set forth in Social Services Law § 384-a.

Section 384-a allows a parent or guardian to voluntarily transfer the care and custody of a child to an authorized agency. This transfer is accomplished by means of a written instrument which must include specified details. (Social Services Law § 384-a [2].) If placement is going to extend beyond a 30-day period, the Department of Social Services must seek the approval of a Judge of the Family Court by annexing the written instrument to a petition for a hearing pursuant to Social Services Law § 358-a.2

“One of the primary purposes of section 358-a is to assure judicial supervision over the voluntary placement of children in foster care as public charges. Both State and Federal funding to local agencies is conditioned on this judicial approval * * *

“It is apparent the Legislature feels that each placement should receive judicial perusal within this 30-day time period”. (Matter of Lydia H., 77 Misc 2d 807, 808 [Fam Ct, Kings County 1974].)

It is undisputed that Mr. Olivier never executed a written instrument voluntarily surrendering petitioner to the care and [495]*495custody of the agency.3 This course of action would have invoked the jurisdiction and supervision of the Family Court and, if timely, would have afforded petitioner an appropriate forum for and means to the end he now seeks.

In the absence of a duly executed and timely document of surrender, petitioner seeks a nunc pro tunc order in a rather transparent effort to circumvent the carefully legislative provisions governing the voluntary placement of children in foster care. Indeed, as petitioner himself correctly asserts, such order would have to be preceded by a finding that petitioner “was a destitute minor, eligible for foster care on August 13, 1997.”

This court, however, is not empowered to make such a finding after the fact because “ A court has no power to have a new order or ruling so entered, thus bringing into the record an element which did not previously exist. The facts must exist, and then if the record of them is imperfect or incomplete, it may be amended’ ”. (Mohrmann v Kob, 291 NY 181, 186 [1943].)

The petition is dismissed.

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Related

Mohrmann v. Kob
51 N.E.2d 921 (New York Court of Appeals, 1943)
In re Lydia H.
77 Misc. 2d 807 (NYC Family Court, 1974)

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Bluebook (online)
176 Misc. 2d 493, 672 N.Y.S.2d 644, 1998 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 139, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lazarre-v-wing-nysupct-1998.