Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jun 28 2013, 7:14 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DAVID W. STONE, IV GREGORY F. ZOELLER Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
LAYNE M. JEFFERSON, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 48A02-1211-CR-952 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT The Honorable David A. Happe, Judge Cause No. 48C04-1111-FD-2077
June 28, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FRIEDLANDER, Judge Layne M. Jefferson appeals the sentence he received following his conviction of theft
as a class D felony, which was entered upon his guilty plea. Jefferson presents the following
restated issues for review:
1. Did the trial court give an inadequate sentencing statement?
2. Was the sentence imposed by the trial court inappropriate in light of Jefferson’s character and the nature of his offense?
We affirm.
The facts of the underlying occurrence, as admitted by Jefferson at the guilty plea
hearing, are that on November 11, 2011, Jefferson shoplifted merchandise from a Dollar
General store in Madison County, Indiana. In conjunction with that incident, the State filed
an information charging Jefferson with one count of theft as a class D felony, two counts of
possession of a controlled substance, both as class D felonies, and one count of resisting law
enforcement as a class A misdemeanor. He eventually pled guilty to the theft charge, and the
State dropped the remaining charges. Sentencing was left to the trial court’s discretion.
Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Jefferson to three years in the
Department of Correction, with one year executed and to be served at a work-release facility,
and two years suspended to supervised probation.
1.
Jefferson contends the trial court abused its discretion by neglecting to give an
adequate sentencing statement. “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which
the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895
N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). Our Supreme Court has determined that the trial court must
2 enter a sentencing statement when imposing a felony sentence and “the [sentencing]
statement must include a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court’s reasons for
imposing a particular sentence.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007),
clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. In conducting our review, we may glean the trial court’s
intentions from either the written sentencing statement, the court’s comments during the
sentencing hearing, or both. See Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 631 (Ind. 2002) (“we are
not limited to the written sentencing statement but may consider the trial court’s comments in
the transcript of the sentencing proceedings”). The sentencing statement will be considered
adequate if it provides a sufficient basis for appellate review of the sentence. See Anglemyer
v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482.
Jefferson’s specific complaint on this issue is not centered upon the finding of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Rather, his claim of error is best described in the
following excerpt from his appellate brief: “At the sentencing hearing the trial court made
[sic] no reasons as to why the maximum sentence was imposed. The court merely said: ‘I do
have some serious concerns when I look through your [presentence investigation report] here
and see your relationship with alcohol and drugs.’” Appellant’s Brief at 4. He contends the
sentencing statement does not include a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court’s
reasoning.
To the contrary, the court directed lengthy comments to Jefferson explaining its
reasoning. The court first noted Jefferson’s extensive history of contacts with law
enforcement, culminating most notably in two felony convictions. It also observed that much
3 of Jefferson’s history of criminal behavior was attributable to drug use, either directly or
indirectly. The court expressed skepticism at Jefferson’s claim that he had conquered his
substance-abuse problems and expressed its view that he needed outside help in overcoming
his dependency. The court also noted the compelling need to address the issue in light of the
fact that Jefferson’s girlfriend was pregnant with his first child. Upon this rationale, the court
explained that its sentence would include Jefferson’s participation in a “very intensive” drug
treatment program. Transcript at 30. Although the court did impose the maximum three-
year sentence for a class D felony, it determined that the first year would be spent on work-
release, with the remainder suspended to probation. As conditions of probation, the court
ordered Jefferson to apply to the aforementioned drug program for evaluation and, if
accepted, to complete it.
The court’s sentencing statement does not suffer from the deficiency of which
Jefferson complains. The court’s lengthy and thoughtful comments to Jefferson in explaining
the sentence imposed provides a sufficient basis for our appellate review of the sentence. See
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482. Moreover, it easily constitutes “a reasonably detailed
recitation of the trial court’s reasons for imposing [this] particular sentence.” Id. at 490.
There is no error here.
2.
Jefferson contends his sentence was inappropriate in light of his character and the
nature of his offense. Article 7, section 4 of the Indiana Constitution grants our Supreme
Court the power to review and revise criminal sentences. Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 7,
4 the Supreme Court authorized this court to perform the same task. Cardwell v. State, 895
N.E.2d 1219. Per Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence “if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Wilkes v. State, 917
N.E.2d 675, 693 (Ind. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 414 (2010). “[S]entencing is principally
a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable
deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d at 1223. Jefferson bears the burden on appeal of
persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind.
2006).
The determination of whether we regard a sentence as appropriate “turns on our sense
of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and
myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219.
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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jun 28 2013, 7:14 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DAVID W. STONE, IV GREGORY F. ZOELLER Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
LAYNE M. JEFFERSON, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 48A02-1211-CR-952 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT The Honorable David A. Happe, Judge Cause No. 48C04-1111-FD-2077
June 28, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FRIEDLANDER, Judge Layne M. Jefferson appeals the sentence he received following his conviction of theft
as a class D felony, which was entered upon his guilty plea. Jefferson presents the following
restated issues for review:
1. Did the trial court give an inadequate sentencing statement?
2. Was the sentence imposed by the trial court inappropriate in light of Jefferson’s character and the nature of his offense?
We affirm.
The facts of the underlying occurrence, as admitted by Jefferson at the guilty plea
hearing, are that on November 11, 2011, Jefferson shoplifted merchandise from a Dollar
General store in Madison County, Indiana. In conjunction with that incident, the State filed
an information charging Jefferson with one count of theft as a class D felony, two counts of
possession of a controlled substance, both as class D felonies, and one count of resisting law
enforcement as a class A misdemeanor. He eventually pled guilty to the theft charge, and the
State dropped the remaining charges. Sentencing was left to the trial court’s discretion.
Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Jefferson to three years in the
Department of Correction, with one year executed and to be served at a work-release facility,
and two years suspended to supervised probation.
1.
Jefferson contends the trial court abused its discretion by neglecting to give an
adequate sentencing statement. “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which
the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895
N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). Our Supreme Court has determined that the trial court must
2 enter a sentencing statement when imposing a felony sentence and “the [sentencing]
statement must include a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court’s reasons for
imposing a particular sentence.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007),
clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. In conducting our review, we may glean the trial court’s
intentions from either the written sentencing statement, the court’s comments during the
sentencing hearing, or both. See Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 631 (Ind. 2002) (“we are
not limited to the written sentencing statement but may consider the trial court’s comments in
the transcript of the sentencing proceedings”). The sentencing statement will be considered
adequate if it provides a sufficient basis for appellate review of the sentence. See Anglemyer
v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482.
Jefferson’s specific complaint on this issue is not centered upon the finding of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Rather, his claim of error is best described in the
following excerpt from his appellate brief: “At the sentencing hearing the trial court made
[sic] no reasons as to why the maximum sentence was imposed. The court merely said: ‘I do
have some serious concerns when I look through your [presentence investigation report] here
and see your relationship with alcohol and drugs.’” Appellant’s Brief at 4. He contends the
sentencing statement does not include a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court’s
reasoning.
To the contrary, the court directed lengthy comments to Jefferson explaining its
reasoning. The court first noted Jefferson’s extensive history of contacts with law
enforcement, culminating most notably in two felony convictions. It also observed that much
3 of Jefferson’s history of criminal behavior was attributable to drug use, either directly or
indirectly. The court expressed skepticism at Jefferson’s claim that he had conquered his
substance-abuse problems and expressed its view that he needed outside help in overcoming
his dependency. The court also noted the compelling need to address the issue in light of the
fact that Jefferson’s girlfriend was pregnant with his first child. Upon this rationale, the court
explained that its sentence would include Jefferson’s participation in a “very intensive” drug
treatment program. Transcript at 30. Although the court did impose the maximum three-
year sentence for a class D felony, it determined that the first year would be spent on work-
release, with the remainder suspended to probation. As conditions of probation, the court
ordered Jefferson to apply to the aforementioned drug program for evaluation and, if
accepted, to complete it.
The court’s sentencing statement does not suffer from the deficiency of which
Jefferson complains. The court’s lengthy and thoughtful comments to Jefferson in explaining
the sentence imposed provides a sufficient basis for our appellate review of the sentence. See
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482. Moreover, it easily constitutes “a reasonably detailed
recitation of the trial court’s reasons for imposing [this] particular sentence.” Id. at 490.
There is no error here.
2.
Jefferson contends his sentence was inappropriate in light of his character and the
nature of his offense. Article 7, section 4 of the Indiana Constitution grants our Supreme
Court the power to review and revise criminal sentences. Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 7,
4 the Supreme Court authorized this court to perform the same task. Cardwell v. State, 895
N.E.2d 1219. Per Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence “if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Wilkes v. State, 917
N.E.2d 675, 693 (Ind. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 414 (2010). “[S]entencing is principally
a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable
deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d at 1223. Jefferson bears the burden on appeal of
persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind.
2006).
The determination of whether we regard a sentence as appropriate “turns on our sense
of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and
myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219.
Moreover, “[t]he principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the
outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with
improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each
case.” Id. at 1225. Accordingly, “the question under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether
another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is
inappropriate.” King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis in
original).
We begin by examining the nature of the offense. The State concedes there was
nothing particularly egregious about the nature of this offense, except perhaps for the fact
5 Jefferson admitted that he shoplifted from the Dollar General store while he was under the
influence of drugs. This is especially troubling in light of Jefferson’s criminal history. At
the time he committed the present offense, Jefferson had a prior felony conviction for
possession of a controlled substance (2006). In addition, he had misdemeanor convictions
for illegal consumption of alcohol (1998), operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in
the body (2012), and possession of marijuana (2011). He was also convicted of conversion
as a class A misdemeanor. All of these offenses are related in some manner to the present
offense.
As the trial court noted, Jefferson has a substance-abuse problem and is prone to
committing other offenses while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. He acknowledged
that his problem began when he was sixteen or seventeen years old and has continued ever
since. Despite the fact that it is a long-term problem, and despite the fact that Jefferson has
participated in a substance-abuse treatment program without success, he expressed the
opinion at the sentencing hearing that he could overcome his problem without outside help.
Moreover, he has not benefitted from previous leniency in sentencing. He has been on
probation several times in conjunction with his previous convictions and had three notices of
probation violation filed against him. On a fourth occasion, a warrant was issued for his
arrest when he violated orders of the court while he was under the supervision of the
Delaware County Community Corrections Drug and Alcohol Program in connection with the
2012 conviction of operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the body.
It is true that the trial court imposed the maximum sentence for a class D felony, in
6 terms of the length of the separate components of Jefferson’s sentence. Indeed, Jefferson’s
challenge upon appeal focuses exclusively upon the length of his sentence. Our Supreme
Court has noted, however, that the penal consequences for a convicted defendant extend
beyond merely the aggregate length of the sentence. See Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023
(Ind. 2010). “In imposing a sentence, trial judges may order, for example, suspension of the
sentence, probation, home detention, placement in a community corrections program,
executed time in a Department of Correction facility, or serving of sentences on multiple
convictions concurrently rather than consecutively.” Id. at 1025. The court may also levy
penalties such as restitution and fines. See Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023. Thus, the
Court has stated, App. R. 7 does not limit us to “consider only the appropriateness of the
aggregate length of the sentence without considering also whether a portion of the sentence is
ordered suspended or otherwise crafted using any of the variety of sentencing tools available
to the trial judge.” Id. at 1025.
Although Jefferson’s criminal history is not among the worst we have seen, and there
is nothing particularly egregious about this particular offense, the larger picture is troubling.
Jefferson has engaged in a long-term pattern of criminal behavior that is closely linked to his
substance-abuse problem. He is either incapable or unwilling to overcome his problem
without outside intervention. Worse still, he does not acknowledge this fact, but professes
belief in his ability to overcome this problem on his own. The particular sentence devised by
the trial court here seems especially well-suited to these circumstances. Jefferson must serve
a year of executed time, but can maintain employment while doing so. Following that, he
7 will be on probation for two years. One condition of probation is that he must participate in
and successfully complete a “very intensive” drug-treatment program specified by the court.
Transcript at 30. We conclude that this sentence is specifically tailored with Jefferson’s
particular history and rehabilitative issue in mind. As such, we cannot say it is inappropriate
in light of his character and the nature of his offense.
Judgment affirmed.
ROBB, C.J., and CRONE, J., concur.