Layne Dredging Co. v. Regus, Inc.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Layne Dredging Co. v. Regus, Inc.

622 So. 2d 7, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 5877, 1993 WL 179453

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMay 26, 1993

DocketNo. 93-00946

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 622 So. 2d 7 (Layne Dredging Co. v. Regus, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Layne Dredging Co. v. Regus, Inc., 622 So. 2d 7, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 5877, 1993 WL 179453 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Layne Dredging Company (Layne), seeks review of the trial court’s determination to enter orders after the complaint was voluntarily dismissed. We treat this proceeding, initiated with a petition for writ of prohibition,¹ as one seeking certiorari relief. See Tinsley v. McDonald, 378 So.2d 816 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

The plaintiff in this action, The CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. (CIT), filed suit against several parties including Layne and the respondent, Regus, Inc. (Re-gus). After Regus answered the complaint, it served a motion to amend its answer to assert a crossclaim against Layne. A copy of the proposed crossclaim was not attached, nor were its contents described. CIT then served a notice of voluntary dismissal of its complaint pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1)(A). The core problem in this case arose long after the voluntary dismissal was achieved, when the trial court entered an order permitting the filing of Re-gus’ crossclaim against Layne.

Our research has failed to disclose any authority which would sustain the trial [8]*8court’s actions. Any purpose the defendant Regus may have had to transfer its liability through a crossclaim to Layne was nullified at the moment when CIT accomplished the voluntary termination of its lawsuit.

Finally, Gull Construction Co. v. Hendrie, 271 So.2d 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), and Our Gang, Inc. v. Commvest Securities, Inc., 608 So.2d 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), are wholly inapposite. Those cases focused upon the survivability of counterclaims in the context of voluntary dismissals. A counterclaim, however, unlike a crossclaim, is not extinguished by a voluntary dismissal of the complaint. See Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.420(a)(2).

Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the orders entered after the voluntary dismissal.

RYDER, A.C.J., and DANAHY and FRANK, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Layne Dredging Company (Layne), seeks review of the trial court’s determination to enter orders after the complaint was voluntarily dismissed. We treat this proceeding, initiated with a petition for writ of prohibition,¹ as one seeking certiorari relief. See Tinsley v. McDonald, 378 So.2d 816 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

The plaintiff in this action, The CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. (CIT), filed suit against several parties including Layne and the respondent, Regus, Inc. (Re-gus). After Regus answered the complaint, it served a motion to amend its answer to assert a crossclaim against Layne. A copy of the proposed crossclaim was not attached, nor were its contents described. CIT then served a notice of voluntary dismissal of its complaint pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1)(A). The core problem in this case arose long after the voluntary dismissal was achieved, when the trial court entered an order permitting the filing of Re-gus’ crossclaim against Layne.

Our research has failed to disclose any authority which would sustain the trial [8]*8court’s actions. Any purpose the defendant Regus may have had to transfer its liability through a crossclaim to Layne was nullified at the moment when CIT accomplished the voluntary termination of its lawsuit.

Finally, Gull Construction Co. v. Hendrie, 271 So.2d 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), and Our Gang, Inc. v. Commvest Securities, Inc., 608 So.2d 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), are wholly inapposite. Those cases focused upon the survivability of counterclaims in the context of voluntary dismissals. A counterclaim, however, unlike a crossclaim, is not extinguished by a voluntary dismissal of the complaint. See Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.420(a)(2).

Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the orders entered after the voluntary dismissal.

RYDER, A.C.J., and DANAHY and FRANK, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

622 So. 2d 7, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 5877, 1993 WL 179453, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/layne-dredging-co-v-regus-inc-fladistctapp-1993.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack