Layfield v. Sanford

274 S.E.2d 450, 247 Ga. 92, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 608
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedJanuary 27, 1981
Docket36840
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 274 S.E.2d 450 (Layfield v. Sanford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Layfield v. Sanford, 274 S.E.2d 450, 247 Ga. 92, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 608 (Ga. 1981).

Opinion

Marshall, Justice.

This is a suit for reformation of a deed and damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, but the trial judge granted the defendants’ motion for judgment n.o.v. The plaintiffs appeal.

The plaintiffs are W. E. and Elizabeth E. Layfield, who are husband and wife. Defendant Albert A. Sanford is their nephew. Through a series of transactions, the plaintiffs acquired title to Lot 8 of Block A in Vincent Heights Subdivision in Milledgeville, Georgia. This property was the homeplace of Mary Ella and Albert F. Sanford, who were the defendant’s parents, Mary Sanford having been W. E. Layfield’s sister. Mary E. and Albert F. Sanford are now deceased, *93 and they left each of their four children a one-quarter interest in Lot 8.

The deed sought to be reformed in this case is from defendant Albert A. Sanford to the plaintiffs, and it conveys that defendant’s one-quarter interest in Lot 8 to the plaintiffs. The dispute concerns the boundary line between Lot 7 and Lot 8, the defendant being the sole owner of Lot 7. It is the plaintiffs’ contention that a chain link fence constitutes the boundary line between the two lots, and the plaintiffs seek to have the deed given them by the defendant reformed to reflect this. The plaintiffs also seek damages for expenses incurred by them in replacing the fence after it was removed by the defendant.

The trial judge granted the defendant’s motion for judgment n.o.v., on the following grounds: The deed sought to be reformed contemplates that the chain link fence lies on the defendant’s property and does not constitute the boundary line; the evidence is undisputed that the defendant made no representations to the plaintiffs that the chain link fence does constitute the boundary line; the evidence is also undisputed that the plaintiff husband did not exercise reasonable diligence in that he did not even read the deed, have any of the witnesses to the deed read it to him, have a lawyer explain the deed to him, or have the property surveyed. As noted by the trial judge, the evidence is conflicting on the question of whether W. E. Layfield can read. Held:

We agree with the trial judge’s view of the evidence, and we therefore affirm.

In order for equity to reform a written instrument on the ground of mutual mistake, it must, of course, be proved to be the mistake of both parties. Scurry v. Cook, 206 Ga. 876, 880 (59 SE2d 371) (1950) and cits. This is not the situation here. And, although equity will reform a written instrument for the unilateral mistake of one party accompanied by fraud or inequitable conduct on behalf of the other party (Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672 (2) (132 SE 442) (1925) and cits.), there is no evidence here of fraud or inequitable conduct by the defendant. In addition, due diligence must be shown by the complaining party before the instrument will be reformed. Green v. Johnson, 153 Ga. 738 (3) (113 SE 402) (1922). Here, the plaintiff husband testified, in effect, that he had not bothered to read the deed or have it read to him or have the property surveyed, because his sister had put the fence up when she owned the property and he assumed the fence was the property line.

What the evidence in this case thus shows is a unilateral mistake on the part of the complaining party, uncoupled by fraud or inequitable conduct exercised by the defendant. Under these *94 circumstances, reformation cannot be obtained. The trial judge did not err in granting the defendants a judgment n.o.v.

Decided January 27, 1981 Rehearing denied February 10, 1981. Eva L. Sloan, for appellants. HughP. Thompson, Gardner & Gardner, Milton F. Gardner, Jr., Gilmore, Waddell & Phillips, Thomas J. Phillips, Jr., for appellees.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur. Gregory, J., not participating.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

The Cline Drive Land Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
793 S.E.2d 550 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2016)
Haffner v. Davis
725 S.E.2d 286 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2012)
City of Lawrenceville v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc.
174 F. App'x 491 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
City of Lawrenceville v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc.
370 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Georgia, 2005)
Caudell v. Toccoa Inn, Inc.
582 S.E.2d 180 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2003)
Harbin v. Harbin
582 S.E.2d 131 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2003)
First Nat. Bank of Polk County v. Carr
579 S.E.2d 863 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2003)
Ready Trucking, Inc. v. BP Exploration & Oil Co.
548 S.E.2d 420 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2001)
Lee v. American Central Insurance
530 S.E.2d 727 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1999)
Bellamy v. Sunflower Properties, Inc.
523 S.E.2d 659 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1999)
Frame v. Hunter, MacLean, Exley & Dunn, P.C.
511 S.E.2d 585 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1999)
Anthony v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co.
487 S.E.2d 389 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1997)
Cotton States Mutual Insurance v. Woodruff
451 S.E.2d 106 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1994)
Fox v. Washburn
449 S.E.2d 513 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1994)
A. J. Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Richard O'Brien Equipment Sales, Inc.
353 S.E.2d 496 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1987)
White v. Lott
333 S.E.2d 118 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
274 S.E.2d 450, 247 Ga. 92, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 608, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/layfield-v-sanford-ga-1981.