Laycock v. State

805 N.E.2d 796, 2004 Ind. LEXIS 228, 2004 WL 434820
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 10, 2004
Docket11S04-0403-PC-117, 45S03-0403-PC-116, 49S02-0403-PC-115
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 805 N.E.2d 796 (Laycock v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Laycock v. State, 805 N.E.2d 796, 2004 Ind. LEXIS 228, 2004 WL 434820 (Ind. 2004).

Opinion

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER FROM THE INDIANA COURT OF APPEALS; NOS. 11A04-0805-PC-245, 45A083-0805-PC-198, 49A02-0807-PC-686.

DICKSON, Justice.

We address these three cases in a single consolidated opinion because of their procedural similarity and because they present the same issue. Defendants Floyd F. Laycock, Teodoro V. Garcia, and James F. Glass each seek transfer from an order of the Court of Appeals dismissing their respective appeals. Each appeal sought to challenge the denial of a motion to correct sentence, challenging the trial court's failure to designate on the abstract of judgment the amount of credit time earned for pre-sentence confinement. In each of these cases, the defendants had previously completed a post-conviction proceeding. Treating the motions to correct sentence as successive petitions for post-conviction relief, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals on grounds that the defendants each failed to comply with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(12), which permits the filing of such successive petitions only upon prior authorization by the court. As to each case, we grant transfer and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

As we hold today in Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 2004 WL 434202 *798 (Ind.2004), a motion to correct sentence pursuant to Indiana Code § 85-88-1-1 asserting a claim that is susceptible to determination from the face of the sentencing judgment is not in the nature of a post-conviction proceeding and is not subject to the requirement for prior authorization in P-C R. 1(2). Id. at 786-87. The defendants' appeals are not subject to dismissal on this ground.

Each of these appeals is grounded upon the claim that the trial court's entries on the Department of Correction's abstract of judgment form violated Indiana Code § 35-38-3-2(a) which requires the sentencing judgment to include the time spent in pre-sentence confinement and also the amount of credit time earned for said confinement. Each defendant's appeal complains only of this omission in the abstract of judgment and does not allege any omission in the trial court's sentencing judgment. Entries in the abstract of judgment may not be challenged by a motion to correct sentence. Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d at 798-95. For this reason, the trial courts did not err in rejecting the motion to correct sentence filed by each of these defendants

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in each case.

SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.

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Related

Apt v. State
858 N.E.2d 1072 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2006)
Portee v. State
806 N.E.2d 358 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2004)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
805 N.E.2d 796, 2004 Ind. LEXIS 228, 2004 WL 434820, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/laycock-v-state-ind-2004.