Lay v. Gibbons

14 Iowa 377
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedDecember 24, 1862
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 14 Iowa 377 (Lay v. Gibbons) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lay v. Gibbons, 14 Iowa 377 (iowa 1862).

Opinion

"Wright, J.

Whether the subsequent mortgagors were necessary parties to the bill of complainant to foreclose; whether such foreclosure and sale barred them of all right to redeem; whether the execution of the mortgage by the wife cut off all claim on her part of dower or other interest in the land; whether she not being a party to the original action, could to this plead usury, the homestead exemption, or other like defenses; we say whatever answer might be given to these and other important questions raised by counsel, we should still feel constrained to affirm this t decree.

It will be observed that the Court set aside the sale under the special execution and ordered the premises to be re-exposed, and from the proceeds complainant is to be first paid his entire demand (as also the costs of foreclosure), the surplus, if any, going to the junior mortgagees. And the complainant having asked the Court to quiet his title, and respondents by their cross-bills having prayed affirmative relief, it was entirely competent for the Court to order such re-sale, for two reasons. First. The property was sold “ in a lump ” and not in parcels, Boyd v. Ellis, 11 Iowa, 97, and [379]*379the cases there cited; Singleton v. Scott, Id., 589; Grapengether v. Fejervary, 9 Id., 163; Bradford v. Limpus, 13 Id., 424. Second. A portion, of the property sold was the 'homestead of the mortgagors, and as such it should not, in the language of the law, have been sold, “ except to supply the deficiency remaining after exhausting the other property of the debtor, which is (was) liable to execution,” Revision of 1860, § 2281. Whether complainant’s title would have been vitiated for this reason, in an action of right, or any collateral proceeding, we need not, of course, determine. As the record stands (under the cross-bill), this is a direct proceeding to set aside the sale. And that the Court did not err in ordering a resale, under the circumstances, is to our minds quite clear.

Affirmed.

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Related

Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Westfall
260 N.W. 344 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1935)
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180 Iowa 1166 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1917)
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128 N.W. 373 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1910)
Axman v. Smith
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Johnson v. Hovey
9 Kan. 61 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1872)

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Bluebook (online)
14 Iowa 377, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lay-v-gibbons-iowa-1862.