Lawyer Stanley, Jr. v. State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: February 4, 2026
• Docket: 3D2024-1769
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed February 4, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-1769 Lower Tribunal No. F15-23920 ________________

Lawyer Stanley, Jr., Appellant,

vs.

State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Marisa Tinkler Mendez, Judge.

Law Office of W. Charles Fletcher, and W. Charles Fletcher (Jacksonville), for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Linda Katz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SCALES, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and MILLER, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)

(noting that to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

convicted defendant must show that both: (1) “counsel’s performance was

deficient” which “requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that

counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by

the Sixth Amendment;” and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense” which “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as

to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable”);

Muhammad v. State, 603 So. 2d 488, 489 (Fla. 1992) (concluding

defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was “procedurally

barred” because “the issue was already raised and rejected on direct

appeal”); Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla. 2004) (“That a witness

would have been available to testify at trial is integral to the prejudice

allegations. If a witness would not have been available to testify at trial, then

the defendant will not be able to establish deficient performance or prejudice

from counsel’s failure to call, interview, or investigate that witness.”); State v.

Torres, 304 So. 3d 781, 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (“Even when messages

are not obtained directly from the sender’s phone, electronic

communications, like other traditional communications, ‘may be

authenticated by appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or

2 other distinctive characteristics taken in conjunction with the circumstances.’”

(quoting State v. Love, 691 So. 2d 620, 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997))).