LAWSON v. CITIZEN ENERGY II

2021 OK CIV APP 1, 481 P.3d 287
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedApril 7, 2020
StatusPublished

This text of 2021 OK CIV APP 1 (LAWSON v. CITIZEN ENERGY II) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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LAWSON v. CITIZEN ENERGY II, 2021 OK CIV APP 1, 481 P.3d 287 (Okla. Ct. App. 2020).

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LAWSON v. CITIZEN ENERGY II
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LAWSON v. CITIZEN ENERGY II
2021 OK CIV APP 1
481 P.3d 287
Case Number: 117799
Decided: 04/07/2020
Mandate Issued: 01/07/2021
DIVISION I
THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DIVISION I


Cite as: 2021 OK CIV APP 1, 481 P.3d 287

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION BY THE SUPREME COURT.


HAROLD LAWSON, TRUSTEE OF THE HAROLD LAWSON LIVING TRUST, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
CITIZEN ENERGY II, LLC, AN OKLAHOMA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND ROAN RESOURCES, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, Defendants/Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
CANADIAN COUNTY, OKLAHOMA

HONORABLE PAUL HESSE, TRIAL JUDGE

AFFIRMED

A. Gabriel Bass, Jana L. Knott, BASS LAW, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant,

Travis P. Brown, John Paul Albert, Lincoln C. Hatfield, MAHAFFEY & GORE, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees.

BRIAN JACK GOREE, JUDGE:

¶1 Harold Lawson, Trustee of the Harold Lawson Living Trust, Plaintiff/Appellant, (Owner) appeals summary judgment granted in favor of Citizen Energy II, LLC, and Roan Resources, LLC, Defendants/Appellees. (Operator). Owner seeks to quiet title in certain property that is the subject of an oil and gas lease. The parties dispute whether the lease expired.

I. Background

¶2 On June 9, 2014, Harold Lawson entered an oil and gas lease covering approximately 320 acres in the NW/4 and SE/4 of Section 11, Township North, Range 6 West (Lawson Lease). The Corporation Commission spaced Section 11, the governmental section consisting of 640 acres more or less, as a horizontal drilling and spacing unit.1 Later, the Lawson Lease was pooled with other acreage in Section 11 to create a 640-acre horizontal drilling and spacing unit.2 On the same date by different Commission Order, Section 14, the governmental section immediately south of Section 11, was pooled as a separate horizontal drilling and spacing unit.3 Pursuant to 52 O.S.Supp.2014 §87.8(C) and Commission rules, Operator filed its application for a multi-unit horizontal well with the completion interval in two units, Section 11 and Section 14. The application provided for the determination of the surface location at a later date. In May 2017, the Commission granted Operator's application for the multi-unit horizontal well.

¶3 Operator commenced to drill a well, the McWhirther 1H-14-11, from a surface location in the southeast quarter of Section 14 intending to drill a horizontal lateral from south to north, eventually penetrating Section 11. The lateral did not penetrate the Section 11 unit until after the expiration of the Lawson Lease's primary term, three (3) years. However, commencement operations for the drilling of the McWhirther well occurred on the Section 14 unit before the expiration of the Lawson Lease's primary term.

¶4 The parties dispute whether these operations in the Section 14 unit satisfied the commencement of drilling clause in the Lawson Lease. On review, we must determine whether Operator is entitled to summary judgment, that is, whether Owner's leased acreage included in the Section 11 unit was extended into its secondary term as a matter of law by commencement activities off-unit in Section 14. This requires interpretation of the Lawson Lease, the relevant statutes, and administrative rules.

II. Standard of Review

¶5 The appellate standard of review for summary judgment is de novo. Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, ¶2, 914 P.2d 1051, 1053. De novo review involves a plenary, independent and non-deferential examination of the trial court's rulings of law. In re Estate of Bell-Levine, 2012 OK 112, ¶5, 293 P.3d 964. Further, questions concerning statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to do novo review. Fulsom v. Fulsom, 2003 OK 96, ¶2, 81 P.3d 652. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and to apply the intent of the Legislature that enacted the statue. Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶13, 33 P.3d 302. It is presumed that the Legislature expressed its intent in the statute's language and that it intended what it so expressed. McClure v. ConocoPhillips Co., 2006 OK 42, ¶12, 142 P.3d 390.

III. Analysis

¶6 Oil and gas leases are contracts and are interpreted to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 1960 OK 118, ¶¶4-5, 352 P.2d 396, 398. Words in a contract are generally understood in their ordinary sense and not the strict legal meaning. Id., ¶8. Additionally, "the right of the legislative branch to act under the police power is part of the existing law at the time of the execution of every contract, and as such becomes in contemplation of law a part of the contract." Edmondson v. Pearce, 2004 OK 23, ¶28, 91 P.3d 605. Well-spacing regulations are a valid exercise of the State's police power in interest of conservation and protection of the correlative rights of owners in a common source of supply. Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 1938 OK 138, ¶¶14-15, 77 P.2d 83, 87-88.

¶7 Owner takes the position that the literal terms of the Lawson Lease must be satisfied in order to perpetuate the lease into the secondary term. The lease provides that the lessee must "commence to drill a well . . . within the term of the lease . . . or on acreage pooled therewith." Owner contends Operator must physically enter and commence drilling on the leased premises or acreage pooled therewith within the primary term of the lease.

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Related

Cronkhite v. Falkenstein
1960 OK 118 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1960)
Carmichael v. Beller
1996 OK 48 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1996)
Oklahoma Natural Gas Company v. Long
1965 OK 153 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1965)
Kuykendall v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc.
741 P.2d 869 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1987)
A & M OIL, INC. v. Miller
715 P.2d 1295 (Court of Appeals of Kansas, 1986)
Edmondson v. Pearce
2004 OK 23 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2004)
Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund
2001 OK 71 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2001)
McClure v. ConocoPhillips Co.
2006 OK 42 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2006)
Fulsom v. Fulsom
2003 OK 96 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2003)
Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.
1938 OK 138 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1938)
Cromwell v. Lewis
1923 OK 1028 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1923)
Estate of Bell-Levine v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission
2012 OK 112 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2012)
Neuhard v. Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC
29 F. Supp. 3d 461 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
2021 OK CIV APP 1, 481 P.3d 287, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lawson-v-citizen-energy-ii-oklacivapp-2020.