Lawson, Julie v. COSTAR GROUP, INC., COSTAR REALTY INFORMATION, INC

2024 TN WC 72
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedOctober 1, 2024
Docket2024-60-0333
StatusPublished

This text of 2024 TN WC 72 (Lawson, Julie v. COSTAR GROUP, INC., COSTAR REALTY INFORMATION, INC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lawson, Julie v. COSTAR GROUP, INC., COSTAR REALTY INFORMATION, INC, 2024 TN WC 72 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2024).

Opinion

FILED Oct 01, 2024 07:00 AM(CT) TENNESSEE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT NASHVILLE

JULIE LAWSON, ) Docket No. 2024-60-0333 ) Employee, ) ) v. ) COSTAR GROUP, INC., COSTAR ) State File No. 26221-2023 REALTY INFORMATION, INC. ) Employer, ) ) BERKLEY NATIONAL INS. CO., ) Judge Joshua Davis Baker Carrier.

COMPENSATION ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On September 17, the Court heard CoStar’s Motion for Summary Judgment. CoStar argued Ms. Lawson’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of her mental-injury claim and summary judgment is appropriate. For the reasons below, the Court grants summary judgment to CoStar and dismisses this claim with prejudice. 1

Claim History

Ms. Lawson has pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder and alleged the circumstances of a work evaluation on February 28, 2023, exacerbated her mental condition. CoStar filed a statement of undisputed material facts to which Ms. Lawson responded. The following facts are not disputed:

During a meeting that morning, a colleague inadvertently used the word “kidnapped.” Although the word was not directed to or about Ms. Lawson, it reminded her of a past traumatic event from 2002.

1 This decision renders Ms. Lawson’s “Objection and Motion to Compel Employer to Produce Audio” and “Open Letter to the Court” moot. A couple of hours later, Ms. Lawson received her annual evaluation results from two male supervisors, Colton Frame and Michael Upchurch, who met with her to discuss them.

However, Mr. Frame and Mr. Upchurch had permitted another supervisor, Fred Bidel, to write the evaluation, even though Mr. Bidel was under a Human Resources investigation for his alleged misconduct toward Ms. Lawson during the timeframe covered by her evaluation.

While Ms. Lawson agreed with the above statements of undisputed material facts, she responded that several other statements were wrong, inaccurate, or incomplete. She offered the following response, from her previously filed affidavit, as an accurate accounting of what caused her injury:

She further explained in her affidavit that “[w]hat Mr. Frame, Mr. Upchurch, and Mr. Bidel did, in essence, overwhelmingly recreated parts of a personal traumatic event from 2002 that had been brought to mind that very morning when a colleague randomly used the word ‘kidnapped’ in a team meeting.”

Law and Analysis

Before addressing the motion’s merits, the Court first considers this claim’s procedural posture and CoStar’s compliance with applicable rules.

The Court should not entertain a motion for summary judgment until a scheduling order is entered. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.18(1)(b) (December 2023). Here, a scheduling order was entered and later suspended. However, the scheduling order’s suspension did not impede discovery or otherwise affect Ms. Lawson’s ability to respond to summary judgment.

Additionally, CoStar allowed sufficient response time and sent Ms. Lawson a copy of applicable rules, complying with both Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04 and Rules 0800-02-21-.18(1)(a) and (c) of the Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations. Therefore, this claim is procedurally ripe for summary judgment.

Turning to the merits, summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 (2023).

To prevail, CoStar must do one of two things: (1) submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of Ms. Lawson’s claim, or (2) demonstrate that her evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of her claim. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 (2024); see also Rye v. Women's Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015).

When viewing the material facts in a light favorable to Ms. Lawson, the Court finds that CoStar has demonstrated her evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of her claim: that the work event resulted in a stimulus that would constitute a viable claim for a mental injury.

Under Workers’ Compensation Law, a mental injury that is not accompanied by a physical injury must arise primarily out of “an identifiable work related event resulting in a sudden or unusual stimulus, and shall not include a psychological or psychiatric response due to the loss of employment or employment opportunities.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 102(15).

Tennessee courts apply a two-part test to determine if an injury caused by mental or emotional stimulus is compensable. First, the injury must stem from “an identifiable stressful, work-related event producing a sudden mental stimulus such as fright, shock, or excessive unexpected anxiety.” Second, “the event must be extraordinary in comparison to the stress ordinarily experienced by an employee in the same type of duty.” Edwards v. Fred’s Pharmacy, 2018 TN Work. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 9, at *7 (Feb. 14, 2018).

The parties do not dispute the material facts—only how the law applies to them. Ms. Lawson argues an identifiable work event (the “evaluation-during-investigation”) resulted in a sudden or unusual stimulus for her. Her analysis requires using a subjective standard that incorporates her pre-existing mental or psychological condition to explain how the stressful work event produced a sudden and unusual stimulus for her when it would not have for someone else.

That subjective standard “is not the law in Tennessee.” Ireton v. Horizon Mental Health Mgmt., LLC, No. E2015-00296-SC-R3-WC, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 3, at *28 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 19, 2016). Rather, “our Supreme Court has mandated the application of an objective test for this determination.” An “objective standard is required . . . even [when] medical experts have opined that the Employee suffered PTSD stemming out of the particular event or stress.” Id. at *28-29.

Notably, applying an objective standard “is not inconsistent with the principle under Tennessee law that an employer takes an employee as it finds him[,]” for the following reason:

[I]t is only after the court first determines that an event or stress was abnormal, extraordinary, or unusual under the objective standard that the court then applies the principle that the employer takes the employee as it finds him to the determination of whether the abnormal, extraordinary, or unusual event or stress was, in fact, the medical/psychological cause of the employee’s injuries.”

Id. at *30-31.

This “objective standard . . . is consistent with the Court’s recognition that the workers’ compensation system does not embrace every stress or strain of daily living or every undesirable experience encountered” during employment. Id. (citations omitted).

So, CoStar has shown that although Ms. Lawson has identified a work event, her claim is missing an essential element: “a sudden or unusual stimulus” under an objective standard that “shall not include a psychological or psychiatric response due to the loss of employment or employment opportunities.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(15).

Ms.

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Related

Goodloe v. State
36 S.W.3d 62 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2001)
Michelle RYE Et Al. v. WOMEN’S CARE CENTER OF MEMPHIS, MPLLC Et Al.
477 S.W.3d 235 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2015)

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2024 TN WC 72, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lawson-julie-v-costar-group-inc-costar-realty-information-inc-tennworkcompcl-2024.