Lawrence Yaple v. County of Riverside

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedDecember 11, 2023
Docket5:23-cv-01478
StatusUnknown

This text of Lawrence Yaple v. County of Riverside (Lawrence Yaple v. County of Riverside) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lawrence Yaple v. County of Riverside, (C.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 LAWRENCE YAPLE, an individual, Case No. 5:23-cv-01478-ODW (PDx) and TRACY YAPLE, an individual, [Hon. Otis D. Wright, II, Dist. Judge; 13 Hon. Patricia Donahue, M. Judge] Plaintiffs, 14 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE vs. ORDER1 15 CITY OF DESERT HOT SPRINGS, a 16 public entity, OFFICER JASON KUPKA, an individual, OFFICER 17 CHRISTOPHER SAUCIER, an individual, OFFICER GUSTAVO 18 RAMIREZ, an individual, OFFICER CHRISTOPHER TOOTH, an 19 individual, COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, a public entity, and DOES 1-20, 20 Defendants. FPTC Date: 01/06/25 21 Trial Date: 02/11/25

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27 1 This Stipulated Protective Order is substantially based on the model protective order provided under Magistrate Judge Patricia Donahue’s Procedures. 1 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 2 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 3 proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public 4 disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be 5 warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter 6 the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order 7 does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and 8 that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the 9 limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the 10 applicable legal principles. 11 B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 12 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 13 protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace officer 14 personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for the 15 following reasons. 16 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy 17 in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is 18 underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure 19 of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 20 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12- 21 13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based 22 discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is 23 consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] 24 privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 25 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights 26 [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code 27 §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants further contend that 1 non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 2 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies 3 have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information 4 privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege 5 (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace 6 officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain 7 critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or 8 communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – 9 potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal 10 Affairs type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records 11 or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of 12 obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa 13 Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 14 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 15 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); 16 Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. 17 v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants 18 further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the 19 public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that 20 uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; 21 impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements 22 and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of 23 open and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged 24 misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement 25 any remedial measures that may be required. 26 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights 27 as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the 1 compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 2 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 3 Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing 4 such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially 5 impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, 6 frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, preserving 7 the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace officers’ 8 families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, and 9 preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by 10 publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as can and often does 11 result in litigation. 12 Plaintiffs do not agree with and do not stipulate to Defendants’ contentions 13 stated above. Plaintiffs agree, however, that there is good cause for a Protective Order 14 so as to preserve the respective interests of the parties. Plaintiffs recognize that, absent 15 this Stipulated Protective Order, the parties' respective privilege interests may be 16 impaired or harmed, and that this Stipulated Protective Order may mitigate such harm 17 by permitting the parties to facilitate discovery with reduced risk that confidential 18 information will become matters of public record. 19 Because of these sensitive interests, a Court Order should address these 20 documents rather than a private agreement between the parties. 21 C. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING UNDER SEAL 22 The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this 23 Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information 24 under seal; Local Civil Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and 25 the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to 26 file material under seal. 27 There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial 1 good cause must be shown to support a filing under seal. See Kamakana v. City and 2 County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006), Phillips v. Gen. Motors 3 Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002), Makar-Welbon v. Sony Electrics, 4 Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Wis.

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Makar-Wellbon v. Sony Electronics, Inc.
187 F.R.D. 576 (E.D. Wisconsin, 1999)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
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162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)
Tuite v. Henry
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