Lawrence v. Sebor

2 Cai. Cas. 203
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 15, 1804
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2 Cai. Cas. 203 (Lawrence v. Sebor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lawrence v. Sebor, 2 Cai. Cas. 203 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1804).

Opinion

Livingston', J.

This is ah attempt to recover as for a total loss, under a pretence that the assurance was effected for the plaintiff’s separate interest, and was intended t<B [205]*205cover nothing more than his proportion of the joint prop-perty. There can be no doubt that such an insurance may be made, and then, as in the case of Lawrence & Whitney v. Vanhorn & Clarkson, (Vol. 1. p. 276,) the partner, who thus insures his particular interest, will be permitted to recover accordingly; but there it appeared that- Lawrence & Whitney had no right to insure for-the other parties concerned in the voyage, and that it was well understood that the policy was to extend to their share only. But every thing forbids such a conclusion here. The plaintiff was at. Gaudaloupe, and to him was committed the entire management of the voyage. He made-the purchases; he loaded the vessel. To him it was left, and thence it became his duty to make insurances. The shipment was made on the joint account (and so expressed in *-the bills of lading and invoices) of him and Gault, and amounted, with charges, to 9,922 dollars. On the 23rd of June, 1801, the plaintiff directs-his agents iu Hew-York to make insurance for 5,000 dollars. In this letter he speaks of Gault, and of his loading the sloop Hope on their joint account; and there is nothing in it from which it can be inferred that he intended to confine the insurance to his own proportion of the adventure. Five days after the plaintiff writes another letter, directing an additional insurance to be made on the same shipment, for 4,500 dollars, which would have covered all the property on board. After this, no doubt can be harbored of the plaintiff’s intention. But it is said that these letters, not being commu-, nicated to the underwriters, ought not to be received to explain the meaning of the parties. This may generally be right; but if any doubt arise on the written contract, I think the acts of the assured, although not known to the assurers, may be examined to show that his intentions were different from what afterwards he pretends was the case. If he had designed to restrain .the insurance to his interest in the cargo, it was easy to have used apt words for that purpose. If this had not been doue, and there be any corn [206]*206troversy as to its extent, and this has been occasioned by what may be deemed a neglect in the plaintiff himself, his acts, however desirous he may be to keep them from our view, must surely be good evidence, if they militate against the construction he now sets up, or if they have a tendency to show that it is foreign from what he intended at the time, and contrary to his own written instructions. But there is no necessity to travel out of the contract, which is always dangerous, to ascertain the meaning of the parties to it. The insurance is not only for Lawrence, but for “ every other person to whom the property doth, may, or shall appertain, in part or in whole.” After this we must do violence to the plain import of these terms, to confine this indemnity to the goods of Lawrence alone, or to the amount of his interest in the joint property. This is the usual way of making insurances on a joint interest for a particular voyage, where no general partnership exists. One of the concern is intrusted with the conduct of the voyage, and in making insurance. Ordinarily he discloses his own name only, but under such contract the other partners will be permitted to recover for a loss of their interest also. The words for account of Richard M. Lawrence,” being in writing, is of no moment, for as they do not contradict, there is no reason*wby they should control, the printed clauses of the instrument. It may be be subjoined, that no one can doubt the plaintiff may charge Gault with his proportion of the premium of insurance, and that the latter may compel him to carry to his credit whatever is recovered in this suit. If so, it is another reason for regarding this, as it was most certainly intended to be, an insurance of the joint property. The French law has been referred to as settling this, point in favor of the plaintiff; but on looking into Emerigon and Yalin, we shall find them at variance. The former being of opinion that an assurance by one partner, without a specification of the interest he means to cover, is valid, only for his proportion of the adventure, while Yalin, however, with several writers [207]*207cited bj him, consider it as extending to the whole cargo ; quia id quod commune esi, nostrum esse dicitur. This is especially so, says Yalin, if the insurance be made by the chef de la societe, or acting partner, as was the case here. It should be observed also, that Emerigon, in giving his opinion on a question which he admits to have been much agitated, makes use of .expressions not only very guarded, but which cannot be applied to the present policy. If partnership effects are loaded, says he, for my account and that of others, an insurance which is made for my sole account, (pour mon compte seule,) will only protect my interest, because nothing more has been covered. 1 Emer. 294; 2 Yal. 34. But is that the case here ? When the policy is as general as our language can make it, shall we call it an insurance “on the sole account” of Lawrence? Emerigon also admits that a judgment has been rendered in Erance, contrary to the opinion he entertains. Something was said of a misrepresentation as to the time of the vessel’s sailing, but this objection was abandoned on the argument.

As to the lateness of the abandonment., this is a point I consider as settled by this court, in the case of Earle v. Shaw. It was there determined, that an abandonment, is never too late, provided the loss continue total to the time of making it.

Being, then, well satisfied that the plaintiff meant to insure the property of Gault as well as his own, and that the terms of the policy comport with this intention, he can recover a partial loss only. Judgment must therefore be entered for 366 dollars and 60 cents.

SpenceR and Tompkins, Justices, concurred,

Kent, Oh. J.

Upon this case, the question is, whether the plaintiff shall recover the moiety of the sum insured, or the "'whole ? There is no dispute but that the plaintiff’s individual interest was sufficient to cover the whole policy.

[208]*208The time of abandonment is not material, since, if the amount insured is to enure to the plaintiff, the loss remained total when the abandonment was made. This court has repeatedly decided that abandonment is not essential to enable the insured to recover a total loss, if the loss be actually total, and continue so to the bringing of the suit. Earle v. Lefferts; Earle v. Shaw, April, 1800; Roget v. Thurston, April, 1801; Page v. Fry, 2 Bos. & Pul. 240; 1 Caines’ Rep. 284.

There can be no doubt, also, but that a partner has such an interest in the entirety of the cargo as to enable him separately to insure it; and that an averment that he had an interest in the property to the amount of the insurance is.supported by proof of a partnership interest in him to that amount.

The important inquiry in the case is, what was the intent of the parties in the present case ? /Was the insurance intended for the separate interest of the plaintiff, or for the joint interest of him and Gault ? if the latter, then it appears that only a moiety of the sum insured has been lost.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Irving v. Excelsior Fire Insurance
1 Bosw. 507 (The Superior Court of New York City, 1857)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2 Cai. Cas. 203, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lawrence-v-sebor-nysupct-1804.