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CONCLUSION 81,7('67$7(6&28572)$33($/6 6LQFHWKH³XQLTXHFLUFXPVWDQFHV´UXOHGRHVQRWDSSO\ZH GHFOLQH WR KHDU /DZUHQFH¶V DSSHDO LQDVPXFK DV /DZUHQFH )257+(6,;7+&,5&8,7 ILOHGKLVQRWLFHRIDSSHDOWZRGD\VODWH:H$)),50WKH BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB GLVWULFWFRXUW¶VGHQLDORI/DZUHQFH¶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
/DZUHQFHY,QW¶O%KG 1R 1R /DZUHQFHY,QW¶O%KG RI7HDPVWHUVHWDO RI7HDPVWHUVHWDO
$SSHDOIURPWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV'LVWULFW&RXUW Hollins. See Frazier v. United States, No. 97-6338, 2000 WL IRUWKH1RUWKHUQ'LVWULFWRI2KLRDW7ROHGR 658072 (6th Cir. May 9, 2000). In Frazier, we dismissed an 1R ²-DPHV*&DUU'LVWULFW-XGJH attempt by counsel to blame the tardiness of his client’s habeas petition on a clerk who allegedly provided the attorney $UJXHG -DQXDU\ with improper filing information. Id. at *1. As we explained, "this court has not subscribed to the Eleventh Circuit’s lenient 'HFLGHGDQG)LOHG )HEUXDU\ interpretation of the ‘unique circumstances’ exception." Id. %HIRUH 1(/621DQG&/$<&LUFXLW-XGJHV +$<1(6 Second, prior to Osternak, we interpreted Thomson’s 'LVWULFW-XGJH holding this way: "[An] appeal would be considered timely because the appellant had done something which would have BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB extended the time for appeal if properly done, and relied on the district court's statement that it was done properly." &2816(/ Denley v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 733 F.2d 39, 42 (6th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). Although one could attempt to $5*8(' 7HUU\ / +RUG $GD 2KLR IRU $SSHOODQW interpret "district court" very broadly, to do so would strain )UHGHULFN * &ORSSHUW -U &/233(57 /$7$1,&. the meaning of "district court." Clerks and court personnel 6$87(5 :$6+%851 &ROXPEXV 2KLR 'LDQD 6 work for the district court, they are not the district court. %URZQ/2*27+(7,63(1&( '2//'D\WRQ2KLRIRU $SSHOOHHV 21 %5,() 7HUU\ / +RUG $GD 2KLR IRU Third, the Supreme Court has only applied the "unique $SSHOODQW )UHGHULFN * &ORSSHUW -U &/233(57 circumstances" doctrine in four cases. See Osternak, 489 /$7$1,&.6$87(5 :$6+%851&ROXPEXV2KLR U.S. 169, Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203 (1964); 'LDQD6%URZQ-RKQ5'ROO/2*27+(7,63(1&( Thompson, 375 U.S. 384; Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry '2//'D\WRQ2KLRIRU$SSHOOHHV Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215 (1962). Each of these cases BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB involved mistaken court rulings or orders rather than poor advice from a court clerk. See Osternak, 489 U.S. at 178; 23,1,21 Wolfsohn, 376 U.S. at 203-04; Thompson, 375 U.S. at 385-87; BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB Harris Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 216-17.
&/$<&LUFXLW-XGJH3ODLQWLII&DUO/DZUHQFHDSSHDOVWKH Fourth, limiting the phrase "judicial officer" to judges GHQLDORIKLVUHTXHVWIRUUHOLHIIURPMXGJPHQWSXUVXDQWWR)HG makes sense because "a formal order or ruling (1) generates 5&LY3 E IROORZLQJDQRUGHURIVXPPDU\MXGJPHQW the highest level of justifiable reliance, and (2) raises virtually DJDLQVW/DZUHQFHLQKLVEUHDFKRIGXW\RIIDLUUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ no possibility of evidentiary problems for appellate courts FODLPDULVLQJXQGHU 86&:H$)),50 faced with applying the exception." Moore, 100 F.3d at 164. Thus, policy and precedent each point strongly against the lenient "unique circumstances" rule that Lawrence would have this Court adopt.
7KH +RQRUDEOH :LOOLDP - +D\QHV -U 8QLWHG 6WDWHV 'LVWULFW -XGJH IRU WKH 0LGGOH 'LVWULFW RI 7HQQHVVHH VLWWLQJ E\ GHVLJQDWLRQ /DZUHQFHY,QW¶O%KG 1R 1R /DZUHQFHY,QW¶O%KG RI7HDPVWHUVHWDO RI7HDPVWHUVHWDO
only where a party has performed an act which, if properly %$&.*5281' done, would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that this /DZUHQFHZRUNHGDVDWUXFNGULYHUIRU'XII7UXFN/LQH act has been properly done." Osterneck v. Ernst & Whitney, ,QF DQG LWV VXFFHVVRU 2. 7UXFNLQJ &RPSDQ\ ³2.´ 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989). IURP WKURXJK ,QHDUO\ 2.ZDVVROGWR :LQW]3DUFHO'ULYHUV ³:LQW]´ /DZUHQFHY,QW¶O%KGRI With one exception, every circuit to have considered the 7HDPVWHUV,1R 86$SS/(;,6DW issue has found that the phrase "judicial officer" in Osterneck WK&LU-DQ 7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO%URWKHUKRRG refers only to judges. See, e.g. Rezzonico v. H & R Block, RI 7HDPVWHUV &KDXIIHXUV :DUHKRXVHPHQ DQG +HOSHUV RI Inc., 182 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[S]tatements by a $PHULFD ³,%7´ DQG LWV /RFDO ZHUH WKH H[FOXVLYH member of the clerk's office staff are not official judicial EDUJDLQLQJDJHQWVIRUHPSOR\HHVRI2.7UXFNLQJ,GDW assurances that qualify as unique circumstances."); Moore v. ,Q -DQXDU\ /DZUHQFH EHJDQ ILOLQJ JULHYDQFHV ZLWK South Carolina Labor Bd., 100 F.3d 162, 164 (D.C. Cir. /RFDO DOOHJLQJWKDW2.IDLOHGWRIROORZWKHFROOHFWLYH 1996) ("This case does not qualify for application of the EDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQW ³&%$´ ,G/DZUHQFHDOVRFODLPHG unique circumstances doctrine because although the WKDW:LQW]GLVFKDUJHGKLPLQYLRODWLRQRIWKH&%$ZKLFK statements made by the clerk's office staff may constitute UHPDLQHGLQIRUFHDIWHU:LQW]SXUFKDVHG2.,G/DZUHQFH specific assurances, they cannot fairly be characterized as GHPDQGHG WKDW 'HIHQGDQWV SURFHVV WKH JULHYDQFHV RQ KLV official judicial action."); United States v. Heller, 957 F.2d EHKDOIDQGVHFXUHKLVUHLQVWDWHPHQWDORQJZLWKEDFNSD\DQG 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1992) ("We understand the term ‘judicial EHQHILWV,G,QKLVFRPSODLQW/DZUHQFHFODLPHG'HIHQGDQWV officer’ in this context to mean a judge, not an employee in OHGKLPWREHOLHYHWKH\ZHUHSURFHVVLQJKLVJULHYDQFHVZKHQ the office of the clerk."); Sonicraft, Inc. v. NLRB, 814 F.2d LQUHDOLW\WKH\WRRNQRDFWLRQ,GDW 385, 387 (7th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that "judicial officers" must mean judges because "subordinate employees of the 2Q'HFHPEHU /DZUHQFHILOHGDFRPSODLQWLQWKH judiciary have no authority to waive congressional limitations &RXUWRI&RPPRQ3OHDVLQ$OOHQ&RXQW\2KLRDOOHJLQJWKDW on judicial power").
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CONCLUSION 81,7('67$7(6&28572)$33($/6 6LQFHWKH³XQLTXHFLUFXPVWDQFHV´UXOHGRHVQRWDSSO\ZH GHFOLQH WR KHDU /DZUHQFH¶V DSSHDO LQDVPXFK DV /DZUHQFH )257+(6,;7+&,5&8,7 ILOHGKLVQRWLFHRIDSSHDOWZRGD\VODWH:H$)),50WKH BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB GLVWULFWFRXUW¶VGHQLDORI/DZUHQFH¶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$SSHDOIURPWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV'LVWULFW&RXUW Hollins. See Frazier v. United States, No. 97-6338, 2000 WL IRUWKH1RUWKHUQ'LVWULFWRI2KLRDW7ROHGR 658072 (6th Cir. May 9, 2000). In Frazier, we dismissed an 1R ²-DPHV*&DUU'LVWULFW-XGJH attempt by counsel to blame the tardiness of his client’s habeas petition on a clerk who allegedly provided the attorney $UJXHG -DQXDU\ with improper filing information. Id. at *1. As we explained, "this court has not subscribed to the Eleventh Circuit’s lenient 'HFLGHGDQG)LOHG )HEUXDU\ interpretation of the ‘unique circumstances’ exception." Id. %HIRUH 1(/621DQG&/$<&LUFXLW-XGJHV +$<1(6 Second, prior to Osternak, we interpreted Thomson’s 'LVWULFW-XGJH holding this way: "[An] appeal would be considered timely because the appellant had done something which would have BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB extended the time for appeal if properly done, and relied on the district court's statement that it was done properly." &2816(/ Denley v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 733 F.2d 39, 42 (6th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). Although one could attempt to $5*8(' 7HUU\ / +RUG $GD 2KLR IRU $SSHOODQW interpret "district court" very broadly, to do so would strain )UHGHULFN * &ORSSHUW -U &/233(57 /$7$1,&. the meaning of "district court." Clerks and court personnel 6$87(5 :$6+%851 &ROXPEXV 2KLR 'LDQD 6 work for the district court, they are not the district court. %URZQ/2*27+(7,63(1&( '2//'D\WRQ2KLRIRU $SSHOOHHV 21 %5,() 7HUU\ / +RUG $GD 2KLR IRU Third, the Supreme Court has only applied the "unique $SSHOODQW )UHGHULFN * &ORSSHUW -U &/233(57 circumstances" doctrine in four cases. See Osternak, 489 /$7$1,&.6$87(5 :$6+%851&ROXPEXV2KLR U.S. 169, Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203 (1964); 'LDQD6%URZQ-RKQ5'ROO/2*27+(7,63(1&( Thompson, 375 U.S. 384; Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry '2//'D\WRQ2KLRIRU$SSHOOHHV Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215 (1962). Each of these cases BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB involved mistaken court rulings or orders rather than poor advice from a court clerk. See Osternak, 489 U.S. at 178; 23,1,21 Wolfsohn, 376 U.S. at 203-04; Thompson, 375 U.S. at 385-87; BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB Harris Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 216-17.
&/$<&LUFXLW-XGJH3ODLQWLII&DUO/DZUHQFHDSSHDOVWKH Fourth, limiting the phrase "judicial officer" to judges GHQLDORIKLVUHTXHVWIRUUHOLHIIURPMXGJPHQWSXUVXDQWWR)HG makes sense because "a formal order or ruling (1) generates 5&LY3 E IROORZLQJDQRUGHURIVXPPDU\MXGJPHQW the highest level of justifiable reliance, and (2) raises virtually DJDLQVW/DZUHQFHLQKLVEUHDFKRIGXW\RIIDLUUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ no possibility of evidentiary problems for appellate courts FODLPDULVLQJXQGHU 86&:H$)),50 faced with applying the exception." Moore, 100 F.3d at 164. Thus, policy and precedent each point strongly against the lenient "unique circumstances" rule that Lawrence would have this Court adopt.
7KH +RQRUDEOH :LOOLDP - +D\QHV -U 8QLWHG 6WDWHV 'LVWULFW -XGJH IRU WKH 0LGGOH 'LVWULFW RI 7HQQHVVHH VLWWLQJ E\ GHVLJQDWLRQ /DZUHQFHY,QW¶O%KG 1R 1R /DZUHQFHY,QW¶O%KG RI7HDPVWHUVHWDO RI7HDPVWHUVHWDO
only where a party has performed an act which, if properly %$&.*5281' done, would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that this /DZUHQFHZRUNHGDVDWUXFNGULYHUIRU'XII7UXFN/LQH act has been properly done." Osterneck v. Ernst & Whitney, ,QF DQG LWV VXFFHVVRU 2. 7UXFNLQJ &RPSDQ\ ³2.´ 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989). IURP WKURXJK ,QHDUO\ 2.ZDVVROGWR :LQW]3DUFHO'ULYHUV ³:LQW]´ /DZUHQFHY,QW¶O%KGRI With one exception, every circuit to have considered the 7HDPVWHUV,1R 86$SS/(;,6DW issue has found that the phrase "judicial officer" in Osterneck WK&LU-DQ 7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO%URWKHUKRRG refers only to judges. See, e.g. Rezzonico v. H & R Block, RI 7HDPVWHUV &KDXIIHXUV :DUHKRXVHPHQ DQG +HOSHUV RI Inc., 182 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[S]tatements by a $PHULFD ³,%7´ DQG LWV /RFDO ZHUH WKH H[FOXVLYH member of the clerk's office staff are not official judicial EDUJDLQLQJDJHQWVIRUHPSOR\HHVRI2.7UXFNLQJ,GDW assurances that qualify as unique circumstances."); Moore v. ,Q -DQXDU\ /DZUHQFH EHJDQ ILOLQJ JULHYDQFHV ZLWK South Carolina Labor Bd., 100 F.3d 162, 164 (D.C. Cir. /RFDO DOOHJLQJWKDW2.IDLOHGWRIROORZWKHFROOHFWLYH 1996) ("This case does not qualify for application of the EDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQW ³&%$´ ,G/DZUHQFHDOVRFODLPHG unique circumstances doctrine because although the WKDW:LQW]GLVFKDUJHGKLPLQYLRODWLRQRIWKH&%$ZKLFK statements made by the clerk's office staff may constitute UHPDLQHGLQIRUFHDIWHU:LQW]SXUFKDVHG2.,G/DZUHQFH specific assurances, they cannot fairly be characterized as GHPDQGHG WKDW 'HIHQGDQWV SURFHVV WKH JULHYDQFHV RQ KLV official judicial action."); United States v. Heller, 957 F.2d EHKDOIDQGVHFXUHKLVUHLQVWDWHPHQWDORQJZLWKEDFNSD\DQG 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1992) ("We understand the term ‘judicial EHQHILWV,G,QKLVFRPSODLQW/DZUHQFHFODLPHG'HIHQGDQWV officer’ in this context to mean a judge, not an employee in OHGKLPWREHOLHYHWKH\ZHUHSURFHVVLQJKLVJULHYDQFHVZKHQ the office of the clerk."); Sonicraft, Inc. v. NLRB, 814 F.2d LQUHDOLW\WKH\WRRNQRDFWLRQ,GDW 385, 387 (7th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that "judicial officers" must mean judges because "subordinate employees of the 2Q'HFHPEHU /DZUHQFHILOHGDFRPSODLQWLQWKH judiciary have no authority to waive congressional limitations &RXUWRI&RPPRQ3OHDVLQ$OOHQ&RXQW\2KLRDOOHJLQJWKDW on judicial power"). WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO %URWKHUKRRG RI 7HDPVWHUV &KDXIIHXUV :DUHKRXVHPHQDQG+HOSHUVRI$PHULFD ,%7 VRPHRILWV In contrast to the weight of the authority, the Eleventh LQGLYLGXDO RIILFHUV DQG 6WHYHQ :DLWPDQ 3UHVLGHQW RI Circuit has "decided that the unique circumstances doctrine 7HDPVWHUV /RFDO 8QLRQ 1R PLVKDQGOHG HOHYHQ may apply where the appellant is lulled by assurances from JULHYDQFHV/DZUHQFHILOHGDJDLQVWKLVHPSOR\HU'HIHQGDQWV the clerk’s office instead of the district court itself." Hollins UHPRYHG WKH FDVH WR IHGHUDO FRXUW 2Q -XO\ WKH v. Dep’t of Corr., 191 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999). In GLVWULFW FRXUW JUDQWHG 'HIHQGDQWV¶ PRWLRQV WR GLVPLVV Hollins, counsel relied on a clerk’s office electronic docket /DZUHQFH ILOHG D WLPHO\ DSSHDO RQ $XJXVW 7KLV &RXUW DIILUPHG WKH ORZHU FRXUW¶V UXOLQJ DV WR IRXU RI WKH system to determine, incorrectly, that the court had not yet JULHYDQFHV EXW UHYHUVHG DV WR WKH UHPDLQLQJ VHYHQ 6HH filed a final order. Id. /DZUHQFH,86/(;,6 Even assuming Hollins did not reflect an extreme minority 2Q-XO\WKHGLVWULFWFRXUWRUGHUHGWKDWLWZRXOG position, there are four reasons to firmly conclude that the QRWDFFHSWKDUGFRSLHVRISOHDGLQJVXQOHVVSURYLGHGIRULQLWV "unique circumstances" doctrine does not apply here. First, (OHFWURQLF3ROLFLHVDQG3URFHGXUHV0DQXDO7KHUHDIWHUWKH albeit in an unpublished opinion, we have already rejected /DZUHQFHY,QW¶O%KG 1R 1R /DZUHQFHY,QW¶O%KG RI7HDPVWHUVHWDO RI7HDPVWHUVHWDO
SDUWLHV FRQGXFWHG GLVFRYHU\ DQG 'HIHQGDQWV PRYHG IRU ',6&866,21 VXPPDU\MXGJPHQW ZKLFKWKHFRXUWJUDQWHGRQ0DUFK 7KLV &RXUW ZLOO QRW UHYHUVH D GLVWULFW FRXUW¶V GHQLDO RI D PRWLRQIRUUHOLHIIURPMXGJPHQWSXUVXDQWWR E XQOHVVLW (YLGHQWO\ GHIHQVH FRXQVHO KDG QHYHU ILOHG SDSHUV ILQGVDQDEXVHRIGLVFUHWLRQ-LQNVY$OOLHG6LJQDO,QF HOHFWURQLFDOO\SULRUWRWKLVOLWLJDWLRQ$IWHUWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW )G WK &LU FLWLQJ 7KRPVRQ Y $P +RPH JUDQWHG'HIHQGDQWVVXPPDU\MXGJPHQWRQ0DUFK $VVXUDQFH&R )G WK&LU :H GHIHQVH FRXQVHO FRQWDFWHG WKH FRXUW WR ILQG RXW ZKHQ KH ILQGQRDEXVHRIGLVFUHWLRQKHUH QHHGHGWRHOHFWURQLFDOO\ILOHKLVQRWLFHRIDSSHDO &RXQVHO FODLPVWKDWZKHQKHDVNHGZKHWKHU$SULOZDVWKH $ 7KH³8QLTXH&LUFXPVWDQFHV´'RFWULQH'HILQHG ODVWGD\WRILOHDQDSSHDODFOHUNDJUHHG ,Q7KRPSVRQY,1686 WKHSODLQWLIIILOHG $SDUW\PXVWILOHDQRWLFHRIDSSHDOZLWKLQWKLUW\GD\VRI DQXQWLPHO\PRWLRQIRUDQHZWULDO,GDW7KHGHIHQGDQW HQWU\ RI WKH MXGJPHQW EHLQJ DSSHDOHG )HG 5 $SS 3 GLG QRW REMHFW WR WKH XQWLPHO\ PRWLRQ DQG WKH WULDO FRXUW D ,QFDOFXODWLQJWKHWKLUW\GD\VWKHGD\RQZKLFKWKH DVVHUWHG WKDW WKH SODLQWLII KDG PDGH WKH PRWLRQ ³LQ DPSOH MXGJPHQWZDVHQWHUHGLVH[FOXGHGEXWWKHODVWGD\LVLQFOXGHG WLPH´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¶V VWLOO SHQGLQJ /DZUHQFH PRYHG WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW IRU UHOLHI HUURU LQ ILQGLQJ WKH PRWLRQ IRU D QHZ WULDO WLPHO\ DQG WKH IURPMXGJPHQWSXUVXDQWWR)HG5&LY3 E 7KHFRXUW SODLQWLII¶VMXVWLILDEOHUHOLDQFHRQWKDWILQGLQJWKDWFDXVHGWKH GHQLHG WKH E UHTXHVW RQ $XJXVW 2Q SODLQWLIIWRDSSHDORXWVLGHWKHWLPHOLPLW,GDW8QGHU 6HSWHPEHU/DZUHQFHWLPHO\DSSHDOHGWKDWGHQLDO WKHVH³XQLTXHFLUFXPVWDQFHV´WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWUHPDQGHG WKHFDVHWRWKH6HYHQWK&LUFXLWZLWKLQVWUXFWLRQVWRFRQVLGHU :H WKHQ GLVPLVVHG WKH ILUVW DSSHDO DV XQWLPHO\ RQ WKHPHULWVRIWKHSODLQWLII¶VDSSHDO,G 6HSWHPEHU /DZUHQFHY,QW¶O%KGRI7HDPVWHUV 1R VOLS RS WK &LU 6HSW RUGHU /DZUHQFHQRZDUJXHVWKDWWKLV&RXUWIROORZLQJ7KRPSVRQ GLVPLVVLQJFDVHDVXQWLPHO\ILOHG VKRXOG UHYHUVH WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW¶V GHQLDO RI WKH PRWLRQ IRU UHOLHIIURPMXGJPHQWZKLFKZRXOGDOORZWKHORZHUFRXUWWR HQWHU D QHZ MXGJPHQW DQG FRUUHVSRQGLQJO\ WR JUDQW /DZUHQFHDGGLWLRQDOWLPHWRSHUIHFWKLVDSSHDO % 7KH³8QLTXH&LUFXPVWDQFHV´5XOHLV,QDSSOLFDEOH 7KLV WUDFNV WKH SURFHGXUH WKLV &RXUW RXWOLQHG LQ Lewis v. Alexander, )G WK &LU WKDW DWWRUQH\V VKRXOG IROORZ ZKHQ WKH\ 7KRPSVRQ LV GLVWLQJXLVKDEOH 7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW GLVFRYHU DIWHU ILOLQJ DQ DSSHDO WKDW WKH DSSHDO LV XQWLPHO\ VXEVHTXHQWO\H[SODLQHGWKDW"[b]y its terms, Thompson applies