Hoke, J.,
after stating the case: It may be well, to note that the petitioner, Elsie Lawrence, has recovered judgment against the other heirs at law of James Lawrence, deceased, for the' ratable portion of her interest paid to each of the other heirs, and her appeal is from the refusal to make this recovery efficient by declaring same a lien on the property and ordering a resale of 'same, should this be necessary to accomplish the desired purpose. This being true, and the formal requirements of the law as to publication of notice for unknown parties having been properly complied with, we are of opinion that the petitioner has been regularly made a party to the proceedings, and that, so far as the purchaser -is concerned, her claim to any interest in the property itself is barred by the decree in the cause and the sale and deed had and made pursuant to same.
Our statute on the subject (Revisal 1905, sec. 2490) clearly-contemplates and provides that in proceedings for partition by sale, or otherwise, publication may be made “for persons interested in the premises whose names are unknown to and cannot,
after due diligence, be ascertained by tbe petitioner.” And, while tbe hardship of some particular case has not infrequently provoked judges of ability and repute to strong expressions of condemnation, the decisions as to such legislation, and in proceedings of this character,
i. e., in rem
or
quasi in rem,
have generally upheld it, and always when the necessity for it was made to appear, and the notice provided was such as to render it reasonably probable that the parties concerned would be apprised of the proceeding and afforded an opportunity to appear and protect their interest.
Shepherd v. Ware,
46 Minn., 174;
Pile v. Bratney,
15 Ill., 314;
Nash v. Church,
10 Wis., 303;
Foster v. Paschal,
8 Mass., 596;
Cook v. Allen,
2 Mass., 462;
Foxcroft v. Barnes,
29 Me., 128.
In
Shepherd v. Ware, supra,
it was held: “The Legislature may by statute authorize proceedings by action against unknown claimants, and bind 'them by constructive or substituted service or notice, in actions to determine adverse claims to real property. Such action is in the nature of a proceeding
in rem;
its object is an adjudication of the state of the title, and the judgment can go no further. The Legislature may by statute provide for constructive or substituted service of process, in actions to determine adverse claims to land, as against unknown claimants, or in cases of necessity or where personal service is impracticable, in actions where the controversy relates to property within the jurisdiction of the court, and with a reasonable exercise of legislative discretion in such matters the courts will not interfere. Such statutes must be strictly construed and followed to preserve the distinction between known and unknown claimants.” And, delivering the opinion, the Court further said: “It is a case, then, where constructive or substituted service of notice upon adverse claimants may be made. Under the Constitution, legal proceedings in the courts are under the direction of the Legislature, subject, of course, to, the fundamental provisions of the bill of rights. But the guaranty of ‘due process of law’ does not necessarily require personal service of notice upon parties resident or nonresident. The Legislature may in its discretion provide for substituted service in case of necessity or where personal notice is for any reason impracticable, in an action where the controversy relates to property which is within the jurisdiction of the court; and with a reasonable exercise of such legislative discretion the courts will not assume to interfere.”
The .writer does not recall a case in this jurisdiction where the validity of a decree has been questioned by reason of constructive service of process “on persons unknown.” But the general power of our courts, following the'provisions of the statute; to acquire
jurisdiction and make decrees affecting the status and condition and ownership of real property situate within the State has been frequently recognized and declared
(Vick v. Flournoy,
147 N. C., 209;
Bernhardt v. Brown,
118 N. C., 701) ; and, under the statute applicable, we are of opinion, as stated, that jurisdiction has been properly acquired over the petitioner, so far as her interest in the land is concerned, and she is conclusively bound by the decree and the deed conveying the title to the purchaser.
A court dealing with the matter should always be properly careful of the rights and interests of the parties who are only so by reason of constructive service. If such rights are questioned or assailed, the statute provides that some disinterested person may be appointed to represent them and look after their interests, and this should in most' instances be done. If these interests are known to exist, or there is good reason to believe that they do, a sufficient amount of the fund should be retained to satisfy such claims and be invested or settled so that it may be forthcoming when called for. This the statute expressly requires (Revisal, sec. 2516), and, if there is promise of success, further effort can and should be made to ascertain and notify the rightful owner; but the policy of the law is, and has always been, that our lands shall pass into the possession of home owners, and with assured and unencumbered title, and this wise and beneficial purpose should not be prevented or seriously hindered because "in rare and exceptional instances a wrong may be possible.
In the case before* us the deceased seems to have had no lineal descendants or near kinsmen, and his lands descended to numerous relatives, distant in degree, whose names and placing are not all known. So far as appears, if this claim is allowed, there is no assurance that the end is reached; and the facts present a case where a general notice by publication is the only feasible method by which the property can be sold for anything like its value and a true title assured. In his carefully prepared and learned argument the counsel for the petitioner further insisted that no one was appointed by the court to represent these unknown parties and no part of the fund has been retained or invested, as required by the law, and that, owing to these defects, the proceedings are void, at least to the extent necessary to secure the petitioner her interest in the property; but we do not think this position can be maintained. The statute (section 2490) expressly refers this matter of appointing some disinterested person to look after the absent owner’s interest to the discretion of the court; and, conceding that we have the power to review the discretion of the lower e'ourt in this respect, we are
not prepared to say that it should be done in this instance, and certainly not to the prejudice of an innocent purchaser. Our law is properly solicitous of the rights of such a purchaser; and, while they are affected by the existence of certain defects apparent in the record, numerous and well-considered decisions with us sustain the position that only those defects which are jurisdictional in their nature are available as against his title.
Yarborough v. Moore,
at this term;
Harrison v.
Hargrove, 120 N. C., 97;
Herbin v.
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Hoke, J.,
after stating the case: It may be well, to note that the petitioner, Elsie Lawrence, has recovered judgment against the other heirs at law of James Lawrence, deceased, for the' ratable portion of her interest paid to each of the other heirs, and her appeal is from the refusal to make this recovery efficient by declaring same a lien on the property and ordering a resale of 'same, should this be necessary to accomplish the desired purpose. This being true, and the formal requirements of the law as to publication of notice for unknown parties having been properly complied with, we are of opinion that the petitioner has been regularly made a party to the proceedings, and that, so far as the purchaser -is concerned, her claim to any interest in the property itself is barred by the decree in the cause and the sale and deed had and made pursuant to same.
Our statute on the subject (Revisal 1905, sec. 2490) clearly-contemplates and provides that in proceedings for partition by sale, or otherwise, publication may be made “for persons interested in the premises whose names are unknown to and cannot,
after due diligence, be ascertained by tbe petitioner.” And, while tbe hardship of some particular case has not infrequently provoked judges of ability and repute to strong expressions of condemnation, the decisions as to such legislation, and in proceedings of this character,
i. e., in rem
or
quasi in rem,
have generally upheld it, and always when the necessity for it was made to appear, and the notice provided was such as to render it reasonably probable that the parties concerned would be apprised of the proceeding and afforded an opportunity to appear and protect their interest.
Shepherd v. Ware,
46 Minn., 174;
Pile v. Bratney,
15 Ill., 314;
Nash v. Church,
10 Wis., 303;
Foster v. Paschal,
8 Mass., 596;
Cook v. Allen,
2 Mass., 462;
Foxcroft v. Barnes,
29 Me., 128.
In
Shepherd v. Ware, supra,
it was held: “The Legislature may by statute authorize proceedings by action against unknown claimants, and bind 'them by constructive or substituted service or notice, in actions to determine adverse claims to real property. Such action is in the nature of a proceeding
in rem;
its object is an adjudication of the state of the title, and the judgment can go no further. The Legislature may by statute provide for constructive or substituted service of process, in actions to determine adverse claims to land, as against unknown claimants, or in cases of necessity or where personal service is impracticable, in actions where the controversy relates to property within the jurisdiction of the court, and with a reasonable exercise of legislative discretion in such matters the courts will not interfere. Such statutes must be strictly construed and followed to preserve the distinction between known and unknown claimants.” And, delivering the opinion, the Court further said: “It is a case, then, where constructive or substituted service of notice upon adverse claimants may be made. Under the Constitution, legal proceedings in the courts are under the direction of the Legislature, subject, of course, to, the fundamental provisions of the bill of rights. But the guaranty of ‘due process of law’ does not necessarily require personal service of notice upon parties resident or nonresident. The Legislature may in its discretion provide for substituted service in case of necessity or where personal notice is for any reason impracticable, in an action where the controversy relates to property which is within the jurisdiction of the court; and with a reasonable exercise of such legislative discretion the courts will not assume to interfere.”
The .writer does not recall a case in this jurisdiction where the validity of a decree has been questioned by reason of constructive service of process “on persons unknown.” But the general power of our courts, following the'provisions of the statute; to acquire
jurisdiction and make decrees affecting the status and condition and ownership of real property situate within the State has been frequently recognized and declared
(Vick v. Flournoy,
147 N. C., 209;
Bernhardt v. Brown,
118 N. C., 701) ; and, under the statute applicable, we are of opinion, as stated, that jurisdiction has been properly acquired over the petitioner, so far as her interest in the land is concerned, and she is conclusively bound by the decree and the deed conveying the title to the purchaser.
A court dealing with the matter should always be properly careful of the rights and interests of the parties who are only so by reason of constructive service. If such rights are questioned or assailed, the statute provides that some disinterested person may be appointed to represent them and look after their interests, and this should in most' instances be done. If these interests are known to exist, or there is good reason to believe that they do, a sufficient amount of the fund should be retained to satisfy such claims and be invested or settled so that it may be forthcoming when called for. This the statute expressly requires (Revisal, sec. 2516), and, if there is promise of success, further effort can and should be made to ascertain and notify the rightful owner; but the policy of the law is, and has always been, that our lands shall pass into the possession of home owners, and with assured and unencumbered title, and this wise and beneficial purpose should not be prevented or seriously hindered because "in rare and exceptional instances a wrong may be possible.
In the case before* us the deceased seems to have had no lineal descendants or near kinsmen, and his lands descended to numerous relatives, distant in degree, whose names and placing are not all known. So far as appears, if this claim is allowed, there is no assurance that the end is reached; and the facts present a case where a general notice by publication is the only feasible method by which the property can be sold for anything like its value and a true title assured. In his carefully prepared and learned argument the counsel for the petitioner further insisted that no one was appointed by the court to represent these unknown parties and no part of the fund has been retained or invested, as required by the law, and that, owing to these defects, the proceedings are void, at least to the extent necessary to secure the petitioner her interest in the property; but we do not think this position can be maintained. The statute (section 2490) expressly refers this matter of appointing some disinterested person to look after the absent owner’s interest to the discretion of the court; and, conceding that we have the power to review the discretion of the lower e'ourt in this respect, we are
not prepared to say that it should be done in this instance, and certainly not to the prejudice of an innocent purchaser. Our law is properly solicitous of the rights of such a purchaser; and, while they are affected by the existence of certain defects apparent in the record, numerous and well-considered decisions with us sustain the position that only those defects which are jurisdictional in their nature are available as against his title.
Yarborough v. Moore,
at this term;
Harrison v.
Hargrove, 120 N. C., 97;
Herbin v. Wagoner,
118 N. C., 657;
England v. Garner,
90 N. C., 197;
Sutton v. Schonwald,
86 N. C., 198. Nor is the second defect one which should be allowed in any way to affect the purchaser, that no part of the fund has been retained and invested for the rightful owner as the statute directs. This refers to the action of the court concerning the' proceeds and to arise necessarily after the sale. It does not in any way relate or profess to relate to the jurisdiction of the court over the cause or the parties, and is a matter that the purchaser could in no way influence or control.
Under section 449, Eevisal, a defendant, known or unknown, when there has been constructive service of process, is allowed, upon good cause shown, to defend after judgment rendered at any time within one year after notice and within five years from its rendition, and on such terms as may be just; and if the' defense be successful and the judgment, or any.part thereof, shall have been collected or otherwise enforced, such restitution may thereupon be compelled as the court may direct. The section, however, contains this additional provision: “But title to property sold under this judgment to a purchaser in good faith shall not be thereby affected.” Under the liberal provisions of the former portion of this section, the petitioner has been allowed to appear and to recover judgment against each of the heirs the amount of her interest which has been paid them; and, under the last clause of the section, the title to the purchaser has been properly assured and confirmed.
There is no error in the judgment entered, and the same is
Affirmed.