Lawrence Traw v. Walden Town House Association, Inc.

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided July 31, 2025·No. 09-23-00247-CV·Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

NO. 09-23-00247-CV

LAWRENCE TRAW, Appellant

V.

WALDEN TOWN HOUSE ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the 457th District Court Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 21-12-16490-CV

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Appellant Lawrence Traw (“Traw”) appeals a declaratory judgment in a suit brought by Walden Town House Association, Inc. (the “Association”) that sought a declaration that Traw had no authority to exert any control over property within the Walden on Lake Conroe, Section 7 (the “Subdivision”) not owned by Traw, and that the Walden Section 7 Owners Organization, Inc. (“Owners Organization”) created by Traw had no authority to exert any control over or

authority to represent any property within the Subdivision. We affirm the trial court’s Final Judgment.

Background

In December 2021, the Association filed its Original Petition and Request for Declaratory Judgment against Traw and the Owners Organization. Traw serves or had served as a Director and President of the Owners Organization. In the suit, the Association, which is the established property owner’s association for the Subdivision, alleged that Traw and the Owners Organization erected bollards on the right-of-way and street easement for which the Association is responsible. Specifically, the bollards were erected across a driveway on property the Association alleged to exclusively control and that connected to an adjacent community. They were allegedly erected to prevent access to a dumpster used by the adjacent community. In addition to the cost for removal of the bollards, the Association requested that the trial court find: (1) that the Association has the vested authority to manage, maintain, and exert exclusive authority over the rights-of-way and street easements within the Subdivision, (2) that the Owners Organization does not have the authority to exert any control over or represent any properties within the Subdivision, and (3) that Traw has no authority as an owner to exert independent control over or authority to represent any properties in the Subdivision not owned by him. The Association attached as exhibits the Deed and Restrictions for the

Subdivision, the plat and legal description of the Subdivision, a photo of the erected bollards, a plat of where the bollards were located, the Owners Organization’s Certificate of Formation filed with the Texas Secretary of State, the Owners Organization’s Articles of Incorporation, and a complaint filed by the Owners Organization against Waste Management for an emergency temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction.

In February 2022, the Association filed a Motion for No Answer Default Judgment against the Owners Organization with supporting affidavits. The trial court later granted the Motion. After attempting unsuccessfully to serve Traw, the trial court granted the Association’s request for substitute service of process.

In March 2022, Traw, as a pro se litigant, filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Petition on behalf of himself and the Owners Organization. In the Motion, Traw and the Owners Organization argued that under the Property Code, the Association was required to notify the owner to cure the situation and requested that the Association be required to hold an open meeting with him.

A month later, the Owners Organization filed a Motion for New Trial that argued its failure to appear was not intentional, but that its registered agent failed to forward the Original Petition. The Owners Organization further argued that the Association has no standing to bring the action because the Association does not

own any rights to the private roads in Walden on Lake Conroe, Section 7. After a hearing, the trial court granted the Owners Organization’s Motion for New Trial.

In March 2023, the bench trial began. The Association called Michael Herminghaus, former President of the Association, as its first witness. Herminghaus testified that he owns a home in the Subdivision that he purchased in 2000. He acknowledges that the Subdivision is subject to Restrictive Covenants and that the restrictions run with the land within the Subdivision except certain Parking Reserves and Green Belt Reserves, which are only subject to restrictions in Article II, Section 7 of the Restrictive Covenants. Specifically, the Restrictive Covenants, which were admitted into evidence, state:

NOW, THEREFORE, Declarants hereby adopt, establish and impose upon WALDEN ON LAKE CONROE, SECTION SEVEN, and declare the following reservations, easements, restrictions, covenants and conditions, applicable thereto, all of which are for the purpose of enhancing and protecting the value, desirability and attractiveness of the land, which reservations, easements, covenants, restrictions and conditions shall run with the land and shall be binding upon all parties having or acquiring any right, title or interest therein, or any part thereof, and shall inure to the benefit of each owner thereof; save and except Parking Reserves “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, “5”, “6”, “7”, “8” and “9”

and Green Belt Reserves “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, “E”, “F”, “G”, “H”, “J”, “K”, “L”, “M”, “N”, “P”, “Q” and “R” which are not subject to these Restrictions, Covenants and Conditions, except as set out herein in Article II, Section 7.

Herminghaus testified that Article 11, Section 7 states that Green Belt Reserves and Parking Reserves, and all streets, except for Melville Drive, are

restricted for the use of the property owners of the Subdivision and their guests. The Restrictive Covenants state:

WALDEN ON LAKE CONROE SECTION SEVEN’S Green Belt Reserves “A” through “H” and “J”, “K”, “L”, “M”, “N”, “P”, “Q” and “R” and Parking Reserves “1” through “9”, inclusive and any other improvements therein and all streets except Melville Drive are restricted for use of property owners of WALDEN ON LAKE CONROE, SECTION SEVEN and their guests.

Herminghaus agreed that Article II, Section 7 did not create an easement right giving owners a right to use the Greenbelts, but it restricts what the owner of the Greenbelts is allowed to do with the property.

Herminghaus testified that Greenbelt Reserve R crosses over a driveway that provides access to an adjoining development called Harbour Village Condominiums (“Harbour Village”). Herminghaus agreed that a driveway provides access to the Harbour Village parking lot where a dumpster is also located. According to Herminghaus, a portion of the driveway is on Greenbelt Reserve R property, and the dumpster used to be partially on greenbelt reserve property and mostly on the Harbour Village property. Herminghaus acknowledged that the Association entered into a shared access and use agreement with Harbour Village to allow use of a road within the Subdivision to enter the Harbour Village parking lot.

Herminghaus further testified that a Special Warranty Deed recorded in 1982 indicates that the developers of the Subdivision conveyed ownership of Greenbelt Reserves A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, and R and Parking Reserves 1,

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 to the Association.1 The Special Warranty Deed was admitted as an exhibit.

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Lawrence Traw v. Walden Town House Association, Inc., (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

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