IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ERIE DIVISION LAWRENCE REDMAN, ) ) Plaintiff ) 1:24-CV-00310-RAL ) vs. ) RICHARD A. LANZILLO ) Chief United States Magistrate Judge RANDY IRWIN, et al., ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ON Defendants ) DEFENDANTS’ PENDING MOTIONS ) IN RE: ) ECF NO. 54 ) ECF NO. 56 ) ECF NO. 63 ) ECF NO. 65 ) ECF NO. 67 ) ECF NO. 69 ) ECF NO. 71 ) ECF NO. 78
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Background and Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff Lawrence Redman is an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”). At all times relevant to this action, he was
housed at the DOC’s State Correctional Institution at Forest (“SCI-Forest”). He
commenced this action against SClI-Forest Superintendent Randy Irwin, two
physicians associated with Wellpath, LLC (“Wellpath”)!—Dr. Mary Howick and Dr. Rhoederick Manhattan?, and Dr. David Smith, Jr. and his employer, Clarion Hospital. Redman claims that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his ruptured right Achilles tendon injury and related medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. He seeks redress of this violation under 42 U.S.C. §1983. He also asserts medical malpractice claims under Pennsylvania state law against Drs. Howick, Manhattan, and Smith. Redman’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 62) is the operative pleading before the Court.
Eight related motions are pending before the Court: Defendant Clarion
Hospital’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Certificate of Merit (ECF No. 54) and Motion
to Dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No 63), Defendant
Smith’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Certificate of Merit (ECF No. 56) and Motion to
Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 71), Defendants Manhattan and Howick’s
Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 65)3, Motion to Strike Plaintiffs
Certificate of Merit (ECF No. 67), and Motion to Dismiss based on discharge or
1 At all times relevant to this action, the DOC had a contract with Wellpath to provide medical services at its state correctional institutions. See ECF No. 62, 11. Wellpath is not a party to this action although the Amended Complaint includes numerous allegations regarding Wellpath and its policies. See id., {J 14-29. 2 Redman alleges that Defendant Manhattan is a physician while Manhattan’s filings identify him as a physician’s assistant. For purposes of the pending motions, the Court will refer to him as “Dr. Manhattan,” consistent with Redman’s Amended Complaint. 3 This motion was incorrectly docketed as a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of J urisdiction.
release in bankruptcy (ECF No. 78), and Defendant Irwin’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 69).
For the reasons explained below, the motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint will be granted in part and denied in part, and the motions to strike or dismiss Redman’s certificate of merit will be denied as moot.*
Il. Material Facts Alleged in the Amended Complaint
In 2021, Redman sustained a ruptured right Achilles tendon. ECF No. 62, 9/46. He reported the injury to prison nursing staff who misdiagnosed the condition as a
high ankle sprain and provided him with an ankle sleeve and an order for ibuprofen and aspirin. Id., 447-48. Over the next few months, Redman repeatedly reported to the “nursing staff’ that something was wrong with his Achilles tendon. Id., 49. At one point, Nurse Rankin asked Redman why he was still limping, and he
responded, “my Achilles tendon is not going to heal itself.” Id.
On September 1, 2022, Redman filled out a sick call slip and handed it to Jamie
Fardasco, a medical department supervisor. Id., (50. A radiologist at SCI-Forest
later performed an x-ray of Redman’s ankle, but he advised Redman that the x-ray would not show a torn Achilles tendon. It did, however, show a right heel bone spur. Id., 951. The radiologist advised Redman that an MRI would be necessary to reveal
an Achilles tendon injury. Jd. Redman was later seen by Nurse Practitioner Darian
who tried multiple times to get him on the list for an MRI at an outside hospital, “but
4 All parties have consulted to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge in this action.
the DOC kept denying those requests.” Id., The DOC ultimately approved Redman for an MRI, but only after Nurse Practitioner Darian entered his injury in the computer as a shoulder injury. Id., 453. While Redman was at Clarion Hospital for the shoulder MRI, he had the opportunity to consult with Dr. Smith and show him his Achilles tendon tear. Id., (54. Dr. Smith put Redman’s “shoulder surgery on hold” and ordered an MRI of his Achilles tendon. Id., §55. Redman was later returned to Clarion Hospital for the MRI. Thereafter, he was informed that “his Achilles tendon in his right leg was ruptured and was hanging on by a thread, the
rest of the tendon was rolled up the leg to the calf because of the long delay in bring[ing] [him] to the hospital, which at that time was a full year before [his] injury got addressed.” Id., {56. Dr. Smith advised Redman that he should have been seen
within 24 to 72 hours of his injury. Id., (56-57.
Redman underwent surgery at Clarion Hospital to repair his ruptured Achilles
tendon on November 28, 2022.5 Id., 58. In or around late February 2023, Redman’s surgical incision started producing heavy drainage. He showed his surgical incision
to “Nurse Kate,” who immediately called for approval to send him to Clarion Hospital. Id., {59. Redman was seen by Dr. Smith who ordered an MRI and IV treatments. Id., 60. One of Dr. Smith’s colleagues visited Redman’s hospital room and told him
that the surgery to his Achilles tendon had failed and had become infected, that he
was not the surgeon who performed the surgery, and that Dr. Smith would be in to
5 The Amended Complaint does not specifically allege who performed Redman’s initial tendon repair surgery but based on his other submissions and those of the Defendants, it appears Dr. Smith performed the surgery.
explain the plan of action. Id., (61. Dr. Smith later visited Redman and told him that the surgery did not fail and that his colleague did not know what he was talking about. Id., {62. Dr. Smith ordered the continuation of IV antibiotics every six hours and then released Redman to return to SCI-Forest. Id., (63. Redman believes Dr. Smith “misdiagnosed the failed Achilles tendon surgery because later at the prison the Achilles tendon repair started to deteriorate. Id.,
On February 21, 2024, around a year after Redman last saw Dr. Smith, Redman’s sutures started pushing out though his skin “with plastic screws that fell
out into Nurse Detter’s hands during a bandage change.” Id., (65. Three days later,
on February 24, plastic anchors started pushing their way out through open wounds and heavy drainage. Id., (66. Redman suffered with swelling and pain before he
received corrective surgery by a different surgeon at Grove City Hospital on April 15, 2024. Id., ]67. This corrective surgery revealed that Redman’s Achilles tendon “was
left shredded and there was softening of the heel bone.” Jd., 68. Redman alleges that these conditions show that Dr. Smith’s “choice to not perform surgery was
deliberately indifferent to [his] serious medical needs ... by not performing surgery immediately upon diagnosis of infection and the MRI results.” Id., [69. Even after
the corrective surgery on April 15, 2024, “doctors at SCI Forest” allowed “sutures just hanging” out of Redman’s leg for months. Id., 4/71. Redman was placed in the
restricted housing unit ((RHU”) where his infection worsened because he was housed
next to a mentally ill inmate who threw fecal matter outside his cell. Id., 478. Redman submitted sick call slips requesting removal of his sutures, but Dr.
Manhattan ignored them for months. Id., 474. After Redman filed a grievance, Dry. Manhattan came to the RHU, trimmed back the sutures, and instructed a nurse to inject him with Rocephin,® which caused his “incision to blow wide open.” Id., 475. Redman has continued to suffer open wounds, swelling, drainage, and pain during the two years since his surgery on November 28, 2022. Id., (76. Redman continued
to be housed in the RHU despite recommendations by Dr. Stein that he be housed in
the infirmary where he could receive appropriate wound care with proper equipment. Id., 77. On November 8, 2024, Dr. Manhattan had to stop using the “wound vac” to
treat Redman because it was not being maintained properly and was causing excess
moisture and tissue breakdown. Id., §78. On November 10, 2024, another suture
popped out of Redman’s skin, and he was sent out to Dr. Stein’s office to have it
removed. Id., 79. During Redman’s consultation with Dr. Stein on November 19,
2024, he again recommended that Redman be transferred from the RHU to the
infirmary, but that recommendation was denied by “the administration and Brad
Aveneli.” Id., (80. On January 6, 2025, Redman was sent to a hospital in
Philadelphia where he underwent a series of surgeries to irrigate and debride
Redman’s leg, scrape infection off the bone, and repair a hole in his bone from screws
that have broken off. Id., [83.
Redman claims broadly that all Defendants acted with deliberate indifference
to his serious medical conditions and needs and that their actions and omissions were
6 According to the Mayo Clinic, Rocephin belongs to the class of medicines known as cephalosporin antibiotics used to treat bacterial infections in many parts of the body. It works by killing bacteria or preventing their growth. See https://www.may oclinic.org/drugs-supplements/ceftriaxone-injection- route/description/drg-20073123/last visited on March 9, 2026.
pursuant to policies and customs of the DOC, Defendant Irwin, and Wellpath, including policies that caused delays and deficiencies in his medical care for nonmedical reasons. He also claims that the care and treatment provided by each medical provider Defendant fell below the standard of care and constituted medical malpractice. Id., 84-92.
III. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 188 (8d Cir. 1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all factual allegations of the complaint and view them in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (8d Cir. 2002). The court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice, and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36
(3d ed. 2004)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a
motion to dismiss, it must provide more than labels and conclusions. See id., 550 US.
at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
(citing Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not
accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as explained in the complaint. See California Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept
as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Finally, because Redman is proceeding pro se, his complaint will be held to
“less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read his pro se
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it will do so despite his
failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and
sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141
F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969).
IV. Discussion and Analysis A. All motions to dismiss Redman’s state law medical malpractice claims against Dr. Smith, Clarion Hospital, Dr. Manhattan, and Dr. Howick will be denied to the extent they are based on Redman’s failure to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1043.3. Dr. Smith, Clarion Hospital, Dr. Manhattan, and Dr. Howick all argue that
Redman’s medical malpractice claims against them must be dismissed because he
has failed to comply with the “certificate of merit” requirement of 231 Pa. Code Rule
1042.3.7 See ECF Nos. 64, p. 7; 67, p. 14; 72, p. 8. When Defendants filed their motions, their position was supported by controlling precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit holding that Rule 1042.3 is a substantive rule of law that federal courts must apply when presented with a professional negligence claim under Pennsylvania law. See Schmigel v. Uchal, 800 F.3d 113, 118 (8d Cir.
2015); Liggon-Redding v. Est. of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2011). But
the continued validity of this precedent became suspect when the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Berk v. Choy, No. 24-440, U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 546 (Jan. 20, 2026). In Berk, the plaintiff sued a hospital and physician for medical malpractice under Delaware law in federal court based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs medical malpractice claim because he
failed to comply with a provision of Delaware law that prohibited a plaintiff from
suing for “medical malpractice unless an affidavit of merit ‘accompanie[s]’ the
complaint.” Id., 146 S. Ct. at 551 (quoting Del. Code, Tit. 18, § 6853(a)(1) (2025)). The
Delaware statute specifies that the affidavit must be signed by a medical professional and state that there are “reasonable grounds to believe that there has been health-
care medical negligence committed by each defendant.” Id. (quoting Del. Code, Tit.
18, § 6853(a)(1)). The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Delaware law was
substantive and that federal courts were therefore required to apply it to malpractice
1 These Defendants have also moved to strike or dismiss Redman’s certificate of merit (ECF No. 53) on the grounds that it does not comply with Rule 1042.3. See ECF Nos. 54, 56, 57.
claims under Delaware law. Id. (citing Berk v. Choy, 2024 WL 3534482, at *4 (3d Cir. July 25, 2024)).
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court first noted that when a provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs a particular procedural question, any contrary state rules of procedure are displaced and may not be enforced in federal
court. Id. at 552-53 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-74 (1965); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 398, 398 (2010)). The
Court then held that the Delaware law conflicted with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2), which “requires only a short and plain statement of the claim” for a complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)). As the Court explained, Rule 8 “sets a ceiling on the
information that plaintiffs can be required to provide about the merits of their claims”
at the pleading stage. Id. The filing of an affidavit of merit as a condition to bringing
a medical malpractice claim exceeded the requirements of Rule 8 and therefore did
not apply in federal court. Id.
Rule 1042.3 is similar in application to the Delaware law at issue in Berk. It
requires a plaintiff pursuing a malpractice or professional negligence claim under
Pennsylvania law to file a certificate of merit as a condition to proceeding with the
claim. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.3(a). The certificate of merit must state that “an
appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement that there exists
a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in
the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm” or that “expert testimony of an appropriate licensed professional is
unnecessary for prosecution of the claim.” Jd. at (a)(1)-(8). The plaintiff must file a certificate of merit for each professional defendant named in the action. Jd. at (b)(1). Every district court to address the issue since the Supreme Court decided Berk has
held that Berk abrogated Schmigel, 800 F.3d at 118 and Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at
264-65, and that the certificate-of-merit requirement of Rule 1042.3 no longer applies in professional negligence and malpractice actions in federal court. See Allen v.
Voorstad, 2026 WL 184276, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2026); Aycock v. Malhi, 2026 WL
312724, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2026); Ruzbacki v. Newhaven Ct. at Clearview, 2026
WL 380968, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2026) (Stickman, J.).
Defendants urge this Court to reach a different result, arguing that Rule
1042.3 is distinguishable from the Delaware law because the latter requires the
affidavit of merit to be filed with the complaint, while Rule 1042.3(a) requires the
certificate of merit to be filed “with the complaint or within sixty days after the filing of the complaint.” See e.g., ECF No. 108, pp. 4-5. This sixty-day window for
compliance, however, still maintains the certificate-of-merit requirement as a
threshold pleading obligation beyond the “short and plain statement” required by Rule 8(a). This is evident from each medical professional Defendant’s assertion that
Redman’s failure to comply with Rule 1042.3 means that his Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for medical malpractice and is subject to dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6). Finally, the Court notes that the Delaware “affidavit of merit” law also allows for a “60-day extension for the time of filing the affidavit of merit.” Del. Code, Tit. 18, § 6853(a)(2). This 60-day allowance for filing the affidavit of merit did not
negate the conflict between the law and Rule 8(a) as determined by the Supreme Court in Berk. This Court reaches the same conclusion regarding the 60-day window for filing a certificate of merit under Rule 1042.3(a).
Pennsylvania’s requirement of a certificate of merit as a condition to
maintaining a professional negligence or malpractice claim does not apply in federal
court. The Court will therefore deny Defendants’ motions to dismiss Redman’s medical malpractice claims to the extend they are based on this requirement and
deny as moot Defendants’ motions to strike Redman’s certificate of merit.
B. The Amended Complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim against Dr. Smith and Clarion Hospital because it does not allege facts to support that either acted under color of state law. To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that
each defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51
F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). “The color of state law element is a threshold issue; there is no liability under § 1983 for those not acting under color of law.” Groman v.
Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638-39 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see also
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (8d Cir. 2009) (§ 1983 authorizes a claim for
deprivation “of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.”) (emphasis added).
Dr. Smith is not an employee of the DOC or otherwise an agent of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Similarly, Clarion Hospital is a private entity. Private entities and individuals can qualify as state actors only in “a few limited circumstances.” Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 809 (2019). These circumstances include (i) “when the private entity performs a traditional, exclusive public function, (ii) when the government compels the private entity to take
a particular action, or (ii1) when the government acts jointly with the private entity.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Recognizing the narrow circumstances under which
a private individual or entity can be considered a state actor, courts have held that
physician at a private hospital is not a ‘state actor’ for purposes of a section 1983
claim simply because that physician treats incarcerated individuals,” Mobley v.
Sahota, 2014 WL 13133639, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 16, 2014), and that “[a] private action is not converted into one under color of state law merely by some tenuous
connection to state action.” Groman, 47 F.3d at 638-89. “The issue is not whether
the state was involved in some way in the relevant events, but whether the action
taken can be fairly attributed to the state itself.” Id. (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
Redman does not allege that Dr. Smith is a government official, or that Clarion
Hospital is a Commonwealth agency or other Commonwealth entity; nor does he
allege facts to support that such a close nexus exists “between the State and the
challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint support only that Dr. Smith and Clarion Hospital acted as private actors who provided medical services to Redman as they would have provided to any patient. As such, neither can
be liable under § 1983. See Kartorie v. Dunham, 108 Fed. Appx. 694, 699 (8d Cir.
2004) (doctor who performed Accu-Chek test on inmate not a state official because he
was under no contract with the state and did not act in a manner chargeable to the
state); Carver v. Plyer, 115 Fed. Appx. 532, 537 (3d Cir. 2004) (“we hold that St. Luke’s
is not a state actor for purposes of section 1983 under any of the possible tests used
to determine whether one’s conduct is attributable to the state.”); Pinnock v. Univ. of Pa. Hosp., 2025 WL 2901060, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2025) (dismissing claims brought under § 1983 against a hospital and doctors because the plaintiff failed to plead facts
to support that they were state actors); compare West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (defendant found to be state actor when he provided health care to prisoners, in the
prison, pursuant to a contract with the facility). Accordingly, Redman’s Eighth Amendment claims against Dr. Smith and Clarion Hospital under § 1983 will be
dismissed.
C. The Amended Complaint fails to state a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Smith or Clarion Hospital. To support a prima facie case of medical malpractice under Pennsylvania law,
the plaintiff must allege facts to support “(1) a duty owed by the physician to the
patient, (2) a breach of duty from the physician to the patient, (8) that the breach of
duty was the proximate cause of, or a substantial factor in, bringing about the harm
suffered by the patient, and (4) damages suffered by the patient that were a direct
result of that harm.” Mitzelfelt v. Kamrin, 526 Pa. 54, 62, 584 A.2d 888, 891 (1990) (citing Morena v. South Hills Health System, 501 Pa. 634, 462 A.2d 680 (1983)); see
also Prosser, Law of Torts, Section 30 at 143 (4th ed. 1971); Bishop v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., 2019 WL 6311491, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2019)). The Amended Complaint supports the existence of a physician-patient relationship between Dr.
Smith and Redman. Therefore, under Pennsylvania law, Dr. Smith had a duty to
adhere to “generally accepted standards of medical practice” in the care he provided to Redman. Greene v. United States, 540 F. Supp. 3d 467, 477 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (citing Toogood v. Owen J. Rogal, D.D.S., P.C., 573 Pa. 245, 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (2008)). The existence of an injury or adverse medical outcome, however, does not alone
demonstrate a doctor’s breach of this duty. Mitchell v. Shikora, 653 Pa. 103, 209 A.3d
307, 315 (2019) (citations omitted).
Redman’s allegations against Dr. Smith relate to multiple aspects of his
medical care, beginning with his initial surgery to repair his ruptured Achilles
tendon. He alleges that the surgery was unsuccessful but, this allegation, standing
alone, is insufficient to support an inference that Dr. Smith was negligent. Id.
Redman further claims that he was later returned to Clarion Hospital with signs of
a post-operative infection and that another doctor told him that the Achilles tendon
repair surgery had failed. Dr. Smith later told Redman that he disagreed with his
colleague’s conclusion and ordered the continuation of IV antibiotics every six hours
for Redman’s infection. Redman believes Dr. Smith “misdiagnosed the failed Achilles
tendon surgery because later at the prison the Achilles tendon repair started to
deteriorate.” Id., 64. About a year after the repair surgery, Redman experienced severe complications, including hardware protruding from or around the incision site. Finally, Redman alleges that he had a further surgery performed by another doctor
on April 15, 2024, and that this surgery revealed his Achilles tendon to be in a “shredded” condition.
Redman does not allege that Dr. Smith improperly performed the initial repair of his Achilles tendon, only that Redman began to experience complications after the
surgery. The alleged comment by Dr. Smith’s colleague indicates that Dr. Smith may have received some indication that the surgery was unsuccessful, but this allegation is too vague and isolated to support a plausible inference that Dr. Smith was
negligent, even when considered with complications that followed the surgery. An
inference that Redman’s complications were due to negligence by Dr. Smith would
require pure speculation. The Amended Complaint simply does not allege any failure
by Dr. Smith to perform a necessary or prudent diagnostic test or procedure or any deviation from generally accepted medical practice in his performance of Redman’s
initial surgery or his post-operative care. Absent such allegations, the Amended
Complaint fails to state a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Smith.
The Amended Complaint also fails to state a medical malpractice claim against Clarion Hospital. Redman alleges that Clarion Hospital directly employed Dr. Smith.
While somewhat conclusory, the allegation is sufficient at this stage of the case to
support Clarion Hospital’s vicarious liability for any negligence of Dr. Smith. See
McLaughlin v. Nahata, 298 A.3d 384, 412 (Pa. 2023) (hospital may be held vicariously
liable for negligence of a physician where hospital directly employs physician or independent contractor physician was an ostensible agent of hospital). But, as discussed above, the Amended Complaint falls short of stating a claim against Dr. Smith and, therefore, it also fails to state a vicarious liability claim against Clarion Hospital. In addition, the Amended Complaint also includes no allegations to support
an inference that Clarion Hospital was independently negligent in its care of
Redman. Accordingly, the medical malpractice claim against Clarion Hospital also
will be dismissed.
D. Drs. Howick and Manhattan’s Motion to Dismiss based on Release in Bankruptcy will be denied without prejudice pending Redman’s submission of evidence that he opted out of the Third-Party Release in the Wellpath Bankruptcy. Drs. Howick and Manhattan have filed a separate motion to dismiss all claims
against them based on the release of claims included in the First Amended Joint
Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Wellpath Holdings, Inc. and Certain of its
Debtor Affiliates to the Plan of Reorganization (“Plan”) confirmed by the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston, Texas (the “Bankruptcy Court”). See ECF No. 78. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
will deny this motion without prejudice.
The Court takes judicial notice of the follow facts: On November 11, 2024 (the “Petition Date”), the Debtors, including Wellpath Holdings, Inc. and its affilated
companies, filed petitions in the Bankruptcy Court under Chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Cases”). The Bankruptcy Cases were
jointly administered under case number 24-90533 in the Southern District of Texas. 17
Redman’s Amended Complaint alleges that both Dr. Howick and Dr. Manhattan are employed by Wellpath, the company the DOC contracted to provide medical services
to inmates at SCI-Forest and other state correctional institution during the relevant time here. See ECF No. 62, 7. Wellpath is an affiliated Debtor in the Bankruptcy Case.
On May 9, 2025 (the “Effective Date”), the Debtors filed Notice of (1) Entry of Confirmation Order, (II) Occurrence of Effective Date, and (III) Administrative Claims Bar Date [ECF No. 2680, Case No. 24-90533] giving notice that the Plan was effective. Under the Plan and Confirmation Order, all claims and causes of action (as defined in the Plan) against Wellpath Holdings, Inc. and its affiliated Debtors have
been discharged and holders of such claims and causes of action are permanently enjoined from, among other things, commencing or continuing any proceeding of any kind in connection with such claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (a) (‘A discharge in a case
under this title . . . (2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or
continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or
offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor....”). Because Wellpath is not
named as a defendant in Redman’s lawsuit, its discharge in bankruptcy is not at
issue.
The Plan, however, also includes a Third-Party Release relating to claims
against current and former employees of the Debtors, including employees of
Wellpath. Article IX of the Plan required plaintiffs such as Redman to “opt out” of
the Third-Party Release if they wish to preserve their claims against such employees.
' 18
Article IX.F of the Plan provides that holders of claims subject to the Third-Party Release who did not opt out are permanently enjoined from “commencing or continuing any action or proceeding of any kind on account of or in connection with
or with respect of’ any released claims. The deadline to exercise this opt-out right has long-since passed.
Drs. Howick and Manhattan’s motion alleges that Redman did not opt out of
the Third-Party Release before the deadline. ECF No. 78, 15. The Court directed Redman to file a response to the motion. ECF No. 82. Redman complied by filing a
response, but the response was comprised of legal argument and did not address
whether he had opted out of the Third-Party Release under the Plan. See ECF No.
90. Although the Court could regard his failure to respond to the Defendants’
assertion as an admission, the Court declines to do so. Instead, the Court will deny Drs. Howick and Manhattan’s motion to dismiss based on the Third-Party Release
without prejudice and direct Redman within thirty (30) days to file evidence with the
Court that he has opted out of the Third-Party Release. If Redman fails to file such
evidence (or if he acknowledges that he did not opt out), the Court will reconsider the
order on Drs. Howick and Manhattan’s motion at ECF No. 78, and enter an order
dismissing all claims against them, with prejudice.®
8 Other plaintiffs whose claims have been determined to be barred by failing to opt out of the Third- Party Release have argued that they did not receive proper notice of the Bankruptcy confirmation order. See e.g., Windom v. Malhi, 2026 WL 523081, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2026). This Court agrees with the District Court in Windom that any such “argument must be asserted in the bankruptcy court.” Id. “{T]he Bankruptcy Court retains jurisdiction over all matters arising out of, or relating to, the Chapter 11 cases and the Plan pursuant to sections 105(a) and 1142 of the Bankruptcy Code in accordance with the Plan, including Article XII.” Id. (citing Plan and Guggenheimer v. Wellpath, LLC, 2025 WL 3008148, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2025) (finding that this provision of the plan requires 19
E. The Amended Complaint fails to allege facts to support that Dr. Howick or Dr. Manhattan acted with deliberate indifference to Redman’s serious medical needs or negligently in connection with his care. Because the Court has denied Drs. Howick and Dr. Manhattan’s motion to dismiss based on release in the Bankruptcy case, albeit without prejudice, it will address their earlier motion challenging the sufficiency of allegations against them
to state a claim. The Amended Complaint alleges that Redman sustained his torn Achilles tendon sometime in 2021 and that he reported the injury to “Nurse
Practitioner Gena,” who diagnosed the injury as a “high ankle sprain and gave [him] a{n] ankle sleeve and ibuprofen and aspirin.” ECF No 62, (9146-48. The Amended
Complaint goes on to allege that between this initial injury report until his surgery
on November 28, 2022, he complained to various medical staff that something was
wrong with his Achilles tendon, but no one responded to his complaints. But he
alleges no facts to support that Dr. Howick or Dr. Manhattan was the recipient of any such complaint or in any way involved in his care between his initial report and his
surgery.
As to Dr. Howick, the Amended Complaint alleges only that she was “employed by the DOC by and [through] Wellpath, is licensed by the Board of Medicine of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a physician and surgeon, and responsible for
plaintiffs asserting lack of notice to pursue that argument in the bankruptcy court)). If this Court dismisses the claims against Drs. Howick and Manhattan based on Redman’s failure to opt out, and the Bankruptcy Court subsequently finds that his claims are properly reopened based on a lack of notice, Redman may assert this in a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 or a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60.
“overseeing all medical care provide[d] to individuals incarcerated in the SCI-Forest,” and “reviewing, revising and drafting policies, governing the provision of medical care in the prison, monitoring the medical care provided by physicians employed by Wellpath to ensure they are providing appropriate care..., overseeing the clinical
aspects of Wellpath’s contract with the DOC and reviewing complaints and
grievances regarding medical care.” ECF No. 62, {7. The Amended Complaint includes no other allegations regarding Dr. Howick. It does not allege that she examined or treated Redman or otherwise participated in his care. It does not allege that she approved, disapproved, or modified any recommendation concerning his
care. Instead, Redman casts Dr. Howick as a supervisor or administrator with
supervisory responsibilities. Such allegations do not support a claim under § 1983
because they do not demonstrate Dr. Howick’s personal involvement in any violation
of Redman’s constitutional rights.
Under § 1983, each named defendant “must have [had] personal involvement
in the alleged wrongs to be liable,” and no defendant can be “held responsible for a
constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved.” Mack
v. Clark, 2022 WL 2669510, at *5 (W.D. Pa. July 11, 2022) (quoting Saisi v. Murray, 822 Fed. Appx. 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) and Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007)). As to each defendant, the plaintiff must allege facts to support that he
or she was “personal[ly] involve[d]’ in depriving him of his rights.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2006) and Evancho
v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (8d Cir. 2006)). Such allegations must describe the
defendant’s participation in conduct at issue and, to the extent possible, the date, time, and location of that participation. See Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354.
Although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional violations, “a
supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and
discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her
subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 1383 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v.
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990). Rather, a supervisor may be liable
only for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy
or custom that directly caused the constitutional harm; or (2) participated in violating
the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had
knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex
rel. JM.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).
Furthermore, an official’s review and disposition of grievances lodged after the
complained of conduct is not personal involvement in such conduct. See Brooks v.
Beard, 167 Fed. Appx. 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (responding “inappropriately to
[plaintiffs] later-filed grievances about his medical treatment” does not “establish
[defendants’] involvement in the treatment itself’? and therefore does not support a
claim); Rogers v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 2d 472, 488 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“Tf a
grievance official’s only involvement is investigating and/or ruling on an inmate's
grievance after the incident giving rise to the grievance has already occurred, there
is no personal involvement on the part of that official.”).
Although Redman describes Dr. Howick as a high-level supervisor with policymaking authority, he does not connect her to any policy or custom that allegedly resulted in his receipt of deficient care. He does not allege any facts to support that she adopted a policy or accepted a custom that resulted in others providing deliberately indifferent care to him. And he does not allege that she was on notice
that he was receiving deficient care and responded to that notice with deliberate indifference. Because Redman has failed to allege facts to support any direct
involvement of Dr. Howick’s in his care or any basis for supervisory liability, his
§ 1983 claim against her will be dismissed.
Redman’s Pennsylvania law medical malpractice claim against Dr. Howick is
also subject to dismissal. Redman is essentially advancing a “captain of the ship” theory of vicarious liability against Dr. Howick. In certain circumstances, the captain of the ship doctrine holds responsible the surgeon or other physician in charge of an
operative or other procedure for the negligence of persons also involved in the
plaintiffs care. See Karas v. Jackson, 582 F. Supp. 43, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (citing Thomas v. Hutchinson, 442 Pa. 118, 124-25, 275 A.2d 23, 26-27 (1971); Collins v.
Hand, 431 Pa. 378, 391-93, 246 A.2d 398, 405-06 (1968); Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa.
28, 39, 153 A.2d 255, 259-60 (1959); Grubb v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 255
Pa.Super. 381, 395, 387 A.2d 480, 487 (1978). “Vicarious liability under the captain of the ship doctrine attaches only if the physician in question has the right to exercise
control over the work to be done and the manner of performance.” Id. (citing Collins,
431 Pa. at 394, 246 A.2d at 406). “The mere right to supervise, even as to the work
and the manner of performance, is not sufficient to create an agency relationship or
to extend captain of the ship liability.” Id. (citing Yorston, 397 Pa. at 39, 153 A.2d at 260). Although Redman alleges that Dr. Howick had significant supervisory authority, the facts alleged do not support that she had the right to intervene in and control the care and treatment decisions of the healthcare providers directly involved
in his care. In fact, Redman does not identify any healthcare provider or providers who Dr. Howick had the right to, and failed to, control. Accordingly, Redman’s medical malpractice claim against Dr. Howick also will be dismissed.
Although the Amended Complaint includes a few more factual allegations against Dr. Manhattan than Dr. Howick, they are likewise insufficient to state an
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim or a state law medical malpractice claim. Like Dr. Howick, the Amended Complaint describes Dr. Manhattan as a
physician employed by the DOC through Wellpath who possessed significant supervisory authority over medical personnel and policy at SCI-Forest. ECF No. 62,
7. Redman further alleges that after Redman’s second surgery on April 15, 2024, he “put in a sick call to get his sutures removed by Doctor Manhattan which was
ignored for months.” Id., (74. It is unclear whether this delay was the fault of Dr.
Manhattan or another person who reviewed Redman’s sick call slip, but for purposes of the pending motion, the Court will assume Dr. Manhattan bore some
responsibility. Redman next alleges that after he filed a grievance, Dr. Manhattan
“came to the RHU and trimmed back the sutures and had the nurse [administer a
shot of the antibiotic Rocephin to Redman,] which caused [his] incision to blow wide
open.” Id., Redman does not allege that Dr. Manhattan’s decision to direct the administration of the antibiotic injection was contraindicated or otherwise medically inappropriate. And he does not allege that Dr. Manhattan failed to respond or responded unreasonably to Redman’s adverse reaction. In addition, while Redman also complains about the failure of prison staff to transfer him from the RHU to the infirmary after his second corrective surgery, he does not attribute this refusal to Dr. Manhattan or any other Defendant. In fact, he attributes the decision to “Brad Avenali,” a nonparty. Id., {80. Finally, Redman complains that Dr. Manhattan had
to stop a procedure using a device he describes as a “wound vac” because the device
“was not being maintained properly and it was causing too much moisture and tissue breakdown.” Id., 78. But Redman does not allege that Dr. Manhattan was involved
in the maintenance of the device or that he engaged in any misconduct or neglect in
connection with this incident. Thus, except for the delay in removing or trimming back Redman’s sutures after his second surgery, the Amended Complaint does not
allege that Dr. Manhattan neglected or responded improperly to his medical
condition. And beyond annoyance, Redman does not allege that he suffered any adverse medical consequence because of the delay in trimming his sutures.
The Amended Complaint supports a plausible inference that errors and
possible neglect may have occurred in connection the care Redman received at SCI-
Forest, but it fails to support a plausible inference that any error or meaningful neglect can be attributed to Dr. Manhattan. This leaves the pleading short of stating
an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim or a negligence claim against Dr. Manhattan. Therefore, the Court will also dismiss these claims.
F. The Amended Complaint fails to allege facts to support Superintendent Irwin’s personal involvement in any violation of Redman’s rights. Redman identifies Irwin as the Superintendent of SCI-Forest and alleges that
he “is responsible for the oversight and operations of the prison, including responding to inmate grievance appeals and ensuring that incarcerated individuals received (sic)
necessary medical care.” ECF No. 62, 6. The Amended Complaint includes no other
substantive allegations against Irwin. Like Drs. Howick and Manhattan, Irwin’s
status as a supervisor and his involvement in the grievance process do not support his personal involvement in any violation of Redman’s rights. They therefore also fail
to support a claim under § 1983. See Chinchello, 805 F.2d at 133; Brown, 922 F.2d at
1120; Brooks, 167 Fed. Appx. at 925.
The Court also notes that the obligations of nonmedical personnel such as
prison administrators and corrections officers differ from those of medical personnel. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (8d Cir. 2004) (standard for deliberate
indifference for claim of denial of proper medical care under the Eighth Amendment
claims varies depending on whether the defendant is a medical defendant or a
nonmedical defendant); Miller v. Nowakowski, 2025 WL 1938692, at *6 (W.D. Pa.
July 14, 2025) (the duties owed to inmates by nonmedical personnel do not include a
state law duty of reasonable care because no medical provider-patient relationship exists). Nonmedical prison personnel will not be deemed to have acted with deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs of an inmate under the Eighth Amendment “absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their
assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” Jd. Furthermore, a nonmedical prison administrator “cannot be deemed deliberately indifferent simply because the lay administrator did not challenge the physician’s care or respond directly to a prisoner’s request for more or different treatment.” Chambers v. Adams, 2023 WL 9100640, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 31, 2023) (quoting Judge v. Medical Dep’t at
SCI Greene, 2007 WL 1576400, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 31, 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, Redman has not alleged any facts to support a plausible inference
that Irwin, with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and
maintained a policy or custom that directly caused him to suffer constitutional harm.
Nor has he alleged facts to support that Irwin participated in violating his rights, directed others to violate them, or was the person in charge of his medical care and
had knowledge of and acquiesced in deliberately indifferent care by medical
personnel. The Court will therefore dismiss the claims against Irwin.
V. Summary and Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will enter an order granting in part and
denying in part the pending motions as follows:
a. denying as moot Defendant Clarion Hospital’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs
Certificate of Merit (ECF No. 54), Defendant Smith’s Motion to Dismiss
27 .
Plaintiffs Certificate of Merit (ECF No. 56), and Defendants Howick and Manhattan’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Certificate of Merit (ECF No. 67); b. denying without prejudice Defendants Manhattan and Howick’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claims based on release in Bankruptcy (ECF No. 78) subject to reconsideration if Plaintiff fails, within thirty (30) days, to file proof that he opted out of the Third-Party Release in the Wellpath Bankruptcy Case; and
c. granting Defendants Howick and Manhattan’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No 68), Defendant Smith’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 71), Defendant Clarion Hospital’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No 63), and Defendant Irwin’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 69). VI. Leave to Amend
When dismissing claims under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court should generally provide a pro se plaintiff like Redman leave to file a curative amendment unless doing
so would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview St. Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). And “in civil rights cases, district courts must offer amendment— irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a case for failure to state a
claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.” F letcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote
Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007). In this case, amendment would be legally futile as to Redman’s § 1983 claims against Dr. Smith and Clarion
Hospital because neither is a “state actor.” The Court will therefore dismiss these
claims with prejudice. All other claims designated herein for dismissal will be dismissed without prejudice and with leave granted to Redman to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of filing of the Court’s Order.
A separate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE