Lawrence H. Balogh v. Honorable Raymond Charron, the 26th District Court Judge, and Individually

Sixth Circuit

Lawrence H. Balogh v. Honorable Raymond Charron, the 26th District Court Judge, and Individually

855 F.2d 356

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

DecidedOctober 14, 1988

Docket87-1910

StatusPublished

Cited by26 cases

This text of 855 F.2d 356 (Lawrence H. Balogh v. Honorable Raymond Charron, the 26th District Court Judge, and Individually) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lawrence H. Balogh v. Honorable Raymond Charron, the 26th District Court Judge, and Individually, 855 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1988).

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Opinion

MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

A discharged court officer exclusively assigned to an elected Michigan trial judge as bailiff sues the judge on the theory that his discharge for political reasons violates the First Amendment principles enunciated in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), and Avery v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233 (6th Cir.1986). He asserts that he was discharged as the judge’s court officer or bailiff because he supported the judge’s opponent in a recently concluded judicial election. We agree with the decision of District Judge Avern Cohn, reported at 666 F.Supp. 987 (E.D.Mich.1987), that the bailiff to the judge, like an administrative or legislative aide to a legislator, is a confidential employee. As a judicial aide, his confidential relationship arises because he handles sensitive communications for the judge, acts as his bodyguard and may discuss and learn about the outcome of cases pending before the judge before the decision is announced to the public.

The test of confidential employment does not depend on the subjective view of the employee concerning the trust the judge reposes in him, nor does it depend on the subjective view of the judge concerning the need for intimacy or trust. It is a more objective standard. It depends on the function of the job. Judicial aides who work in chambers and are assigned to one judge as court officer, bodyguard and general assistant normally handle sensitive information about cases of a confidential nature, information which is not public information. Judges must be able to rely on the *357 confidentiality of the relationship with such aides, just as they must rely on the confidentiality of their relationship with their private secretaries and law clerks. The need for confidentiality between a judge and the staff in his immediate chambers is no less necessary than the need for confidentiality between legislators and their aides.

For these reasons and the reasons more fully set out in Judge Cohn’s opinion in the court below, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

A discharged court officer exclusively assigned to an elected Michigan trial judge as bailiff sues the judge on the theory that his discharge for political reasons violates the First Amendment principles enunciated in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), and Avery v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233 (6th Cir.1986). He asserts that he was discharged as the judge’s court officer or bailiff because he supported the judge’s opponent in a recently concluded judicial election. We agree with the decision of District Judge Avern Cohn, reported at 666 F.Supp. 987 (E.D.Mich.1987), that the bailiff to the judge, like an administrative or legislative aide to a legislator, is a confidential employee. As a judicial aide, his confidential relationship arises because he handles sensitive communications for the judge, acts as his bodyguard and may discuss and learn about the outcome of cases pending before the judge before the decision is announced to the public.

The test of confidential employment does not depend on the subjective view of the employee concerning the trust the judge reposes in him, nor does it depend on the subjective view of the judge concerning the need for intimacy or trust. It is a more objective standard. It depends on the function of the job. Judicial aides who work in chambers and are assigned to one judge as court officer, bodyguard and general assistant normally handle sensitive information about cases of a confidential nature, information which is not public information. Judges must be able to rely on the *357 confidentiality of the relationship with such aides, just as they must rely on the confidentiality of their relationship with their private secretaries and law clerks. The need for confidentiality between a judge and the staff in his immediate chambers is no less necessary than the need for confidentiality between legislators and their aides.

For these reasons and the reasons more fully set out in Judge Cohn’s opinion in the court below, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Ralph Dunaway James Butler Woodrow Marbry Danny Campbell v. Joe D. Moore, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of Highways, McNairy County, Tennessee McNairy County, Tennessee, Houston Thrasher, Individually and as County Executive of McNairy County, Tennessee Ronald Henry Gladys Robertson Jerry Sullivan Jimmy Phillips Coleman Smith Fred Templeton Gayle Brooks Anthony E. Knight Patrick Landreth Guy Wayne Cox Glenn Maness Tim Derryberry Sue Johnson James P. Prather Wilburn Gene Ashe Charles E. Ellis Gail Forsythe John R. Morgan Grover Rickman Effie Woods Jim Richman, All as County Commissioners of McNairy County, Tennessee

78 F.3d 584 (Sixth Circuit, 1996)

Roberson v. Voinovich

917 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Ohio, 1996)

Judy Baker Mary Allison and Bonnie Johnson v. Pat Hadley, Columbiana County Auditor

72 F.3d 129 (Sixth Circuit, 1995)

Gregorich v. Lund

54 F.3d 410 (Seventh Circuit, 1995)

David M. Mumford v. Joseph Zieba, Judge, in His Official and Individual Capacities Lorain County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division

4 F.3d 429 (Sixth Circuit, 1993)

Mineer v. Call

993 F.2d 1547 (Sixth Circuit, 1993)

Paul W. Cagle Guy R. Epperson Steven A. McCullom Terry Norwood and Jeffrey L. Parker v. Dan Gilley

957 F.2d 1347 (Sixth Circuit, 1992)

Mumford v. Zieba

788 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Ohio, 1992)

Barbara Faughender v. City of North Olmsted, Ohio and M. Yvonne Petragic, Mayor of the City of North Olmsted

927 F.2d 909 (Sixth Circuit, 1991)

Rose Walton and John Walton v. State of Michigan, State Judicial Council, and Judge Adam A. Shakoor

918 F.2d 958 (Sixth Circuit, 1990)

Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois

497 U.S. 62 (Supreme Court, 1990)

Esly B. Williams v. City of River Rouge, Daniel Cooney, Michael Bowdler, Danny Stevens, and Charles Prather

909 F.2d 151 (Sixth Circuit, 1990)

James D. Thomas v. John Carpenter

881 F.2d 828 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)

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855 F.2d 356, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lawrence-h-balogh-v-honorable-raymond-charron-the-26th-district-court-ca6-1988.

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