UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
LAWRENCE EDMISTON, Case No. 1:25-cv-00051-DCN Plaintiff, SUCCESSIVE REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE
KYLE WAGNER,
Defendant.
Plaintiff Lawrence Edmiston is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action. The Court previously reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, determined that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and allowed Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Initial Review Order, Dkt. 6. Plaintiff has now filed an Amended Complaint. Dkt. 7. The Court retains its screening authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Having reviewed the Amended Complaint, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to remedy the deficiencies in the initial complaint, and the Court will dismiss this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. 1. Motion for Appointment of Counsel Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel. Dkt. 8. Unlike criminal defendants, prisoners and indigents in civil actions have no constitutional right to counsel unless their
physical liberty is at stake. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Whether a court appoints counsel for indigent litigants is within the court’s discretion. Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). In civil cases, counsel should be appointed only in “exceptional circumstances.” Id. To determine whether exceptional circumstances exist, the court should evaluate two
factors: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits of the case, and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to articulate the claims pro se in light of the complexity of legal issues involved. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). Neither factor is dispositive, and both must be evaluated together. Id. Further, an attorney cannot be forced to represent an indigent litigant in a civil case—rather, the attorney can only be “appointed” if she
voluntarily accepts the appointment. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989) (holding that the appointment of counsel provision in § 1915, formerly found in subsection (d), does not “authorize[] a federal court to require an unwilling attorney to represent an indigent litigant in a civil case”); Veenstra v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., Case No. 1:15-cv-00270-EJL (D. Idaho May 4, 2017) (“[The Court] does not
have inherent authority to compel an attorney to represent Plaintiffs pro bono.”). The legal issues in this matter are not complex, and Plaintiff has been able to file documents with the Court and protect Plaintiff’s interests to date. In addition, as explained below, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; therefore, Plaintiff does not have a likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 2. Screening Requirement and Pleading Standard
The Court must dismiss a prisoner or in forma pauperis complaint—or any portion thereof—that states a frivolous or malicious claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but a plaintiff must offer “more than … unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” the complaint has not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 3. Discussion
Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The entire factual basis of Plaintiff’s claims, as set forth in the Amended Complaint, is as follows: Kyle Wagner and Dr. Campbell of medical Centurion has [sic] unlawfully denied me the gender affirming surgery. I have in the past tried to remove my genitals in order to get rid of my penis since the state refuses to do it for me. I am requesting the courts to order Centurion to give me this surgery. Am. Compl., Dkt. 7. As explained in the Initial Review Order, the Eighth Amendment includes the right to adequate medical care in prison. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). To state a colorable Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment” and that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). A prison medical provider acts with deliberate indifference only if the defendant
“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health.” Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Cty.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
LAWRENCE EDMISTON, Case No. 1:25-cv-00051-DCN Plaintiff, SUCCESSIVE REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE
KYLE WAGNER,
Defendant.
Plaintiff Lawrence Edmiston is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action. The Court previously reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, determined that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and allowed Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Initial Review Order, Dkt. 6. Plaintiff has now filed an Amended Complaint. Dkt. 7. The Court retains its screening authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Having reviewed the Amended Complaint, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to remedy the deficiencies in the initial complaint, and the Court will dismiss this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. 1. Motion for Appointment of Counsel Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel. Dkt. 8. Unlike criminal defendants, prisoners and indigents in civil actions have no constitutional right to counsel unless their
physical liberty is at stake. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Whether a court appoints counsel for indigent litigants is within the court’s discretion. Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). In civil cases, counsel should be appointed only in “exceptional circumstances.” Id. To determine whether exceptional circumstances exist, the court should evaluate two
factors: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits of the case, and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to articulate the claims pro se in light of the complexity of legal issues involved. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). Neither factor is dispositive, and both must be evaluated together. Id. Further, an attorney cannot be forced to represent an indigent litigant in a civil case—rather, the attorney can only be “appointed” if she
voluntarily accepts the appointment. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989) (holding that the appointment of counsel provision in § 1915, formerly found in subsection (d), does not “authorize[] a federal court to require an unwilling attorney to represent an indigent litigant in a civil case”); Veenstra v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., Case No. 1:15-cv-00270-EJL (D. Idaho May 4, 2017) (“[The Court] does not
have inherent authority to compel an attorney to represent Plaintiffs pro bono.”). The legal issues in this matter are not complex, and Plaintiff has been able to file documents with the Court and protect Plaintiff’s interests to date. In addition, as explained below, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; therefore, Plaintiff does not have a likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 2. Screening Requirement and Pleading Standard
The Court must dismiss a prisoner or in forma pauperis complaint—or any portion thereof—that states a frivolous or malicious claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but a plaintiff must offer “more than … unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” the complaint has not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 3. Discussion
Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The entire factual basis of Plaintiff’s claims, as set forth in the Amended Complaint, is as follows: Kyle Wagner and Dr. Campbell of medical Centurion has [sic] unlawfully denied me the gender affirming surgery. I have in the past tried to remove my genitals in order to get rid of my penis since the state refuses to do it for me. I am requesting the courts to order Centurion to give me this surgery. Am. Compl., Dkt. 7. As explained in the Initial Review Order, the Eighth Amendment includes the right to adequate medical care in prison. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). To state a colorable Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment” and that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). A prison medical provider acts with deliberate indifference only if the defendant
“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health.” Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). “Under this standard, [the defendant] must not only be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, but [the defendant] must also
draw the inference.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant Wagner acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Plaintiff alleges only that he was denied gender affirming surgery. This is merely an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and is insufficient to support a plausible inference that Wagner violated the Eighth Amendment.
For the foregoing reasons, the Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 4. Conclusion Although pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially
pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Because Plaintiff has already been given the opportunity to amend and still has failed to state a plausible claim for relief, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice and without further leave to amend. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the
requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”).
ORDER IT IS ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. 8) is DENIED. 2. The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, for the reasons stated in this Order and the Initial Review Order (Dkt. 6), this entire case is DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 8§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1). DATED: November 12, 2025 RA) J ee David C. Nye < Chief U.S. District Court Judge
SUCCESSIVE REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 6