[Cite as Lawless v. Henderson, 2025-Ohio-588.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
FAYETTE COUNTY
WILLIAM JASON LAWLESS, : CASE NO. CA2024-07-018 Appellee, : OPINION : 2/24/2025 - vs - :
CODY RYAN HENDERSON, :
Appellant. :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM FAYETTE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CVH 20240165
Freeman, Mathis & Gary LLP, and Paul-Michael La Fayette, Ashley B. Hetzel, and Zachary T. Weigel, for appellee.
Cody Ryan Henderson, pro se.
POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Cory Ryan Henderson appeals the decision of the Fayette County Court of
Common Pleas denying his motion for a new trial after the court granted a civil protection
order ("CPO") in favor of William Jason Lawless. For the reasons stated below, we affirm
the decision of the trial court. Fayette CA2024-07-018
{¶ 2} On May 8, 2024, Lawless, the police chief for the Village of New Holland in
Pickaway County, Ohio, filed a petition for a CPO against Henderson in the Fayette
County Common Pleas Court. The trial court granted an ex parte CPO in Lawless' favor
the same day. A full hearing on the petition was scheduled for May 15, 2024. However,
the hearing was continued as Henderson had not been served with notice.
{¶ 3} On May 21, 2024, Henderson appeared in the Circleville Municipal Court
for another case when a Pickaway County deputy sheriff and other officers approached
Henderson to serve him with the petition and ex parte CPO. Police body camera footage
submitted by Henderson shows Henderson repeatedly attempt to walk away from the
officers as the papers were presented to him.1 Henderson can also be seen placing his
fingers in his ears in an apparent attempt to not listen to the sheriff and officers. After the
confrontation escalated, Henderson was placed into handcuffs and into a police vehicle.
The sheriff subsequently filed a return of service for the petition and CPO with the court.
{¶ 4} On June 4, 2024 a notice setting the full CPO hearing for June 17, 2024
was mailed to Henderson. Henderson did not appear for the hearing. After the hearing
had ended, Henderson called and spoke with a court clerk, advising the clerk he was
running late. Henderson confirms this phone call occurred in his appellate briefing.
{¶ 5} The trial court subsequently issued a CPO in Lawless' favor, and
Henderson filed a motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 59 the next day. By judgment entry,
the trial court denied Henderson's motion for a new trial, finding Henderson was properly
served despite attempting to "thwart" service from the sheriff and was aware of the
hearing as shown by his call to the court on the day of the hearing. Henderson now
appeals that judgment entry.
1. The footage submitted to the court did not have audio. -2- Fayette CA2024-07-018
{¶ 6} FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY
ACTING WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION, PARTIALITY, AND PREJUDICE.
{¶ 7} Henderson argues that he was not properly served with the ex parte CPO
on May 21, 2024 because he declined to "contract" with the sheriff and refused service. 2
Henderson asserts he did not have notice of the proceedings as a result and that it was
inappropriate for the trial court to consider his phone call to the court clerk when denying
his motion for a new trial. Finally, Henderson argues that the trial court exhibited partiality
and prejudice in denying his motion because "the [S]tate . . . has a vested interest in
thwarting" a lawsuit he filed against law enforcement in federal court.
{¶ 8} "It is well-established that it is the substance of a motion, not the caption,
that determines the nature of a motion." Patrick v. Ellman, 2021-Ohio-4354, ¶ 18 (12th).
Here, Henderson's motion for a new trial questioned, among other things, whether he was
properly served. Therefore, he does not need to meet any specific requirement under
Civ.R. 59 (new trials and other post-trial motions) as a trial court's ability to vacate a void
judgment due to lack of service arises "from an inherent power possessed by the courts
in this state." Id. at ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). We review a trial court's findings regarding proper
service for an abuse of discretion. Sears v. Sears, 2022-Ohio-2898, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.). An
abuse of discretion implies the trial court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶ 9} Pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(C)(2), initial service of the petition and an ex parte
CPO must be in accordance with Civ.R. 4.1 which authorizes several methods of
perfecting service, including personal service. Once personal service is made, "the
2. Henderson also appears to claim in the statement of facts in his appellate briefing that he was not served with the notice of the June 17, 2024 CPO hearing. However, Henderson's motion for a new trial and his appellate brief deal exclusively with his argument that the petition and ex parte CPO were not served upon him. As a result, we will limit our review to whether the petition and order were appropriately served. -3- Fayette CA2024-07-018
person serving process shall endorse that fact on the process and return it to the clerk,
who shall make the appropriate entry on the appearance docket." Ohio Civ. R.
4.1(B)(2)(a). When service is accomplished in accordance with Civ.R. 4.1, "a rebuttable
presumption of proper service arises." Hunt v. Arboretum Home Owners Assn., 2020-
Ohio-4947, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 10} Here, the Pickaway County Sheriff Office's return of service facially
complies with Civ.R. 4.1. As a result, there is a presumption that Henderson was properly
served with the petition and ex parte CPO. Put simply, he has failed to rebut this
presumption. Henderson's argument that he did not "contract" with the sheriff appears to
refer to his efforts to evade and otherwise not listen to the sheriff serving him before
Henderson was taken into custody. However, we are unconvinced, as was the trial court,
that such efforts stymied proper service in this case. "Where the evidence demonstrates
that a party has deliberately avoided service of process, that party should be deemed to
have been constructively served . . . at the time that he began evading service of process."
B-Dry Sys., Inc. v. Kronenthal, 1999 WL 961248, *8 (2nd Dist. Jun. 30, 1999). See also
Nicholas v. Deal, 2003-Ohio-7212, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 11} We recognize that B-Dry Sys., Inc.'s holding was stated to apply "at least
for purposes of the jurisdictional priority rule," but we see no reason to not apply it here
as well. Due process requires "notice and an opportunity to be heard." In re Thompkins,
2007-Ohio-5238, ¶ 13. To that end, a party must pursue service with reasonable
diligence, but "due process does not require that an interested party receive actual notice
. . . [or that] heroic efforts [are taken] to ensure the notice's delivery" (Cleaned up.) Id. at
¶ 14-16. Service of the petition and CPO by the sheriff under these circumstances was
clearly reasonable, and Henderson's efforts to sidestep law enforcement and literally put
his fingers in his ears to avoid being notified of the proceedings against him should not
-4- Fayette CA2024-07-018
be rewarded. To allow such behavior "would undermine the integrity of the judicial
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[Cite as Lawless v. Henderson, 2025-Ohio-588.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
FAYETTE COUNTY
WILLIAM JASON LAWLESS, : CASE NO. CA2024-07-018 Appellee, : OPINION : 2/24/2025 - vs - :
CODY RYAN HENDERSON, :
Appellant. :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM FAYETTE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CVH 20240165
Freeman, Mathis & Gary LLP, and Paul-Michael La Fayette, Ashley B. Hetzel, and Zachary T. Weigel, for appellee.
Cody Ryan Henderson, pro se.
POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Cory Ryan Henderson appeals the decision of the Fayette County Court of
Common Pleas denying his motion for a new trial after the court granted a civil protection
order ("CPO") in favor of William Jason Lawless. For the reasons stated below, we affirm
the decision of the trial court. Fayette CA2024-07-018
{¶ 2} On May 8, 2024, Lawless, the police chief for the Village of New Holland in
Pickaway County, Ohio, filed a petition for a CPO against Henderson in the Fayette
County Common Pleas Court. The trial court granted an ex parte CPO in Lawless' favor
the same day. A full hearing on the petition was scheduled for May 15, 2024. However,
the hearing was continued as Henderson had not been served with notice.
{¶ 3} On May 21, 2024, Henderson appeared in the Circleville Municipal Court
for another case when a Pickaway County deputy sheriff and other officers approached
Henderson to serve him with the petition and ex parte CPO. Police body camera footage
submitted by Henderson shows Henderson repeatedly attempt to walk away from the
officers as the papers were presented to him.1 Henderson can also be seen placing his
fingers in his ears in an apparent attempt to not listen to the sheriff and officers. After the
confrontation escalated, Henderson was placed into handcuffs and into a police vehicle.
The sheriff subsequently filed a return of service for the petition and CPO with the court.
{¶ 4} On June 4, 2024 a notice setting the full CPO hearing for June 17, 2024
was mailed to Henderson. Henderson did not appear for the hearing. After the hearing
had ended, Henderson called and spoke with a court clerk, advising the clerk he was
running late. Henderson confirms this phone call occurred in his appellate briefing.
{¶ 5} The trial court subsequently issued a CPO in Lawless' favor, and
Henderson filed a motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 59 the next day. By judgment entry,
the trial court denied Henderson's motion for a new trial, finding Henderson was properly
served despite attempting to "thwart" service from the sheriff and was aware of the
hearing as shown by his call to the court on the day of the hearing. Henderson now
appeals that judgment entry.
1. The footage submitted to the court did not have audio. -2- Fayette CA2024-07-018
{¶ 6} FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY
ACTING WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION, PARTIALITY, AND PREJUDICE.
{¶ 7} Henderson argues that he was not properly served with the ex parte CPO
on May 21, 2024 because he declined to "contract" with the sheriff and refused service. 2
Henderson asserts he did not have notice of the proceedings as a result and that it was
inappropriate for the trial court to consider his phone call to the court clerk when denying
his motion for a new trial. Finally, Henderson argues that the trial court exhibited partiality
and prejudice in denying his motion because "the [S]tate . . . has a vested interest in
thwarting" a lawsuit he filed against law enforcement in federal court.
{¶ 8} "It is well-established that it is the substance of a motion, not the caption,
that determines the nature of a motion." Patrick v. Ellman, 2021-Ohio-4354, ¶ 18 (12th).
Here, Henderson's motion for a new trial questioned, among other things, whether he was
properly served. Therefore, he does not need to meet any specific requirement under
Civ.R. 59 (new trials and other post-trial motions) as a trial court's ability to vacate a void
judgment due to lack of service arises "from an inherent power possessed by the courts
in this state." Id. at ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). We review a trial court's findings regarding proper
service for an abuse of discretion. Sears v. Sears, 2022-Ohio-2898, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.). An
abuse of discretion implies the trial court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶ 9} Pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(C)(2), initial service of the petition and an ex parte
CPO must be in accordance with Civ.R. 4.1 which authorizes several methods of
perfecting service, including personal service. Once personal service is made, "the
2. Henderson also appears to claim in the statement of facts in his appellate briefing that he was not served with the notice of the June 17, 2024 CPO hearing. However, Henderson's motion for a new trial and his appellate brief deal exclusively with his argument that the petition and ex parte CPO were not served upon him. As a result, we will limit our review to whether the petition and order were appropriately served. -3- Fayette CA2024-07-018
person serving process shall endorse that fact on the process and return it to the clerk,
who shall make the appropriate entry on the appearance docket." Ohio Civ. R.
4.1(B)(2)(a). When service is accomplished in accordance with Civ.R. 4.1, "a rebuttable
presumption of proper service arises." Hunt v. Arboretum Home Owners Assn., 2020-
Ohio-4947, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 10} Here, the Pickaway County Sheriff Office's return of service facially
complies with Civ.R. 4.1. As a result, there is a presumption that Henderson was properly
served with the petition and ex parte CPO. Put simply, he has failed to rebut this
presumption. Henderson's argument that he did not "contract" with the sheriff appears to
refer to his efforts to evade and otherwise not listen to the sheriff serving him before
Henderson was taken into custody. However, we are unconvinced, as was the trial court,
that such efforts stymied proper service in this case. "Where the evidence demonstrates
that a party has deliberately avoided service of process, that party should be deemed to
have been constructively served . . . at the time that he began evading service of process."
B-Dry Sys., Inc. v. Kronenthal, 1999 WL 961248, *8 (2nd Dist. Jun. 30, 1999). See also
Nicholas v. Deal, 2003-Ohio-7212, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 11} We recognize that B-Dry Sys., Inc.'s holding was stated to apply "at least
for purposes of the jurisdictional priority rule," but we see no reason to not apply it here
as well. Due process requires "notice and an opportunity to be heard." In re Thompkins,
2007-Ohio-5238, ¶ 13. To that end, a party must pursue service with reasonable
diligence, but "due process does not require that an interested party receive actual notice
. . . [or that] heroic efforts [are taken] to ensure the notice's delivery" (Cleaned up.) Id. at
¶ 14-16. Service of the petition and CPO by the sheriff under these circumstances was
clearly reasonable, and Henderson's efforts to sidestep law enforcement and literally put
his fingers in his ears to avoid being notified of the proceedings against him should not
-4- Fayette CA2024-07-018
be rewarded. To allow such behavior "would undermine the integrity of the judicial
process, and defeat the fair and efficient administration of justice." B-Dry Sys., Inc. at *8.
{¶ 12} As a result, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Henderson was served with the petition and CPO and that his actions
were a blatant attempt to avoid service of process. See Nicholas at ¶ 15.
{¶ 13} We also find that even if we were to assume the trial judge improperly
considered Henderson’s phone call to the court on June 17, 2024 when determining
Henderson had notice of the proceedings against him, such error would be harmless
because Henderson has judicially admitted in his brief to having made the call. Buchanan
v. Middletown, 1987 WL 16062, *4, fn. 1 (12th Dist. Aug. 24, 1987), citing State v. Conley,
1984 WL 8041, * 1 (3rd Dist. Jul. 6, 1984). Such a call can only be interpreted as
Henderson knowing of the hearing that day but failing to appear and defend against the
issuance of a CPO.
{¶ 14} Finally, Henderson's bald assertion that the trial court's decision was an
attempt to "thwart" his federal lawsuit is conclusory and unsupported by any legal
arguments or evidence. We have long held that "[i]t is not the duty of an appellate court
to search [caselaw or] the record for evidence to support an appellant's argument as to
any alleged error." State v. Watson, 126 Ohio App.3d 316, 321 (12th Dist.1998).
{¶ 15} Henderson's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 16} SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. TRIAL COURT ERRED BY
RULING CONTRARY TO THE LAW.
{¶ 17} Next, Henderson argues that because he was not properly served with the
CPO petition, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to issue a CPO against him.
Henderson also argues he was denied due process when the court's decision relied, at
least in part, on his telephone call to the court concerning his attendance (or lack thereof)
-5- Fayette CA2024-07-018
at the full CPO hearing. This assignment of error is moot as a result of our resolution to
the first assignment of error. Ohio App. R. 12(A)(1)(c).
Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON , P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.
-6-