Lawitzka v. Board of County Commissioners

76 P.2d 880, 147 Kan. 405, 1938 Kan. LEXIS 65
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedMarch 5, 1938
DocketNo. 33,706
StatusPublished

This text of 76 P.2d 880 (Lawitzka v. Board of County Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lawitzka v. Board of County Commissioners, 76 P.2d 880, 147 Kan. 405, 1938 Kan. LEXIS 65 (kan 1938).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Smith, J.:

This case was started as a claim against the county commissioners of Allen county for the value of rock quarried on the farm of plaintiff and for damages to the real estate. The claim was denied by the county commissioners. On appeal to the district court judgment was given in favor of an interpleader and the board of county commissioners. Claimant appeals.

The issues are a little complicated and will be carefully noted. Claimant filed her claim with the board of county commissioners in the amount of $760.60. This claim was denied by the board. Claimant appealed to the district court, pursuant to G. S. 1935,19-223 and 19-224.

When this appeal was filed motions of the county commissioners that claimant be ordered to file a bill of particulars and that the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company be made a party to the action were sustained.

In her bill of particulars claimant pleaded that during the summer and autumn of 1934 she was the owner of the farm in question, subject to a mortgage-foreclosure action brought by the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, and was refinancing the loan secured by the mortgage. The bill of particulars further alleged that she told an agent for the county commissioners about the refinancing arrange[406]*406ments, and the agent told her that the county would give from two to eight cents a cubic yard for rock taken from the farm, and after the rock was taken the county would restore the land to a reasonably safe condition.

The bill of particulars further alleged that thereafter, on or about the first day of June, 1934, the county commissioners came on the land to take out the rock, and she told them that they had no contract with her, and that they must take nothing off the land unless they made a contract with her; that the county commissioners thereafter, without any legal right, removed 3,270 yards of rock from the farm; that the rock was crushed on the farm and the dust damaged claimant; that the rock was taken out over the pasture of claimant so that she was damaged in the amount of $375.

The bill of particulars alleged further that the quarry was left with perpendicular sides, and she was damaged $100 on that account; that she had been damaged $5 by removal of stock water, $20 on account of dust from the rock crusher, and the rock removed from the farm was worth $261.60. Claimant asked judgment in the amount of $760.60. The demurrer of the board of county commissioners to this bill of particulars was overruled.

The answer of the board of county commissioners alleged that in December, 1933, the board entered into a contract with the Penn Mutual wherein the board was given the right to enter upon the land in question for the purpose of removing rock; that it did remove 3,274 yards of rock, for which it agreed to pay two cents a cubic yard, or $65.40; that this entering and removing of the rock was by authority of a contract between the board and the Penn Mutual; that the board purchased from the tenant on the farm a right of way on through the pasture; that the board was. willing to pay either the Penn Mutual or claimant for the rock, whichever the court should decide. The board denied that it had damaged the pasture land or that claimant had the right of possession when the rock was removed. The board prayed that the court decide whether claimant or the Penn Mutual was entitled to the $65.40.

The answer of the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company first was a general denial. It then alleged that on the 10th day of December, 1932, by virtue of an action to foreclose a mortgage it received a deed from the sheriff for the real estate in question; that the deed was duly recorded; that from December 10, 1932, to February 28, 1934, it was in actual, open and full possession of the real estate [407]*407in question, free of all claims of claimant; that during all this time it was entitled to receive all the rents from the place.

The answer further alleged that in December, 1933, while the defendant was in possession of the real estate in question it entered into a contract in writing with the board of county commissioners for the removal of certain rock; that in accordance with the contract the board removed 3,274 yards of rock, and there was due the Penn Mutual $65.40, for which claim was made and filed with the board; that all of this rock was removed while the Penn Mutual was in possession and the owner of the property; that the $65.40 was due the Penn Mutual; that on February 28, 1934, the Penn Mutual conveyed the real estate in question to claimant by a warranty deed but that the deed did not convey to claimant by its terms any title or interest to any rock removed nor to any rents accruing during the ownership of the property by the Penn Mutual. The answer prayed that the Penn Mutual recover judgment for the $65.40.

To the answer of the Penn Mutual the claimant first filed a reply by way of a general denial. The reply then alleged that claimant was entitled to receive $115.50 for rentals for the real estate from the Penn Mutual and $25 for hedge posts, for the reason that on April 17,1934, the Penn Mutual entered into a creditor’s agreement for payment, a redemption sale to be financed by the Federal Land Bank of Wichita, in which the Penn Mutual agreed to accept $3,000 in bonds, with interest at the rate of five percent per annum from April 13,1934, to the date of the consummation of the contract, and agreed to accept no other consideration except the $3,000; that under this agreement all the rentals collected by the Penn Mutual, amounting to $115.50, and $25 for posts, and all right in the stone removed belonged to claimant. The reply prayed judgment against the Penn Mutual in the amount of $140.50 and against the board of county commissioners for the value of the rock sold.

Because so much stress is laid on the creditor’s agreement it will be referred to here. It appears tq be in the form first of a letter from the loan correspondent of the Federal Land Bank addressed to the Penn Mutual. The letter stated that the Penn Mutual held a foreclosed farm and asked the company to state the earliest date the indebtedness could be paid and what amount the company would accept. This inquiry was dated April 13, 1934. Apparently on the same paper the Penn Mutual stated in reply that the amount of the indebtedness referred to was $3,000 and that on payment to it of [408]*408$3,000 on or before May 1, 1934, or if paid thereafter by including interest at the rate of five percent per annum on $3,000 from May 1 to the date of payment, this sum would be accepted in full satisfaction of the claim. It was also agreed that the Penn Mutual would accept bonds and that no note, mortgage or other consideration would be received from the debtor.

By way of reply to the answer of the board of county commissioners the claimant filed a general denial and specially denied that the board had a contract with anyone authorizing them to remove any rock from the real estate in question. The reply prayed for a judgment against the county as asked for in her claim filed with the board.

At the beginning of the trial the county offered to confess judgment for $65.40.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
76 P.2d 880, 147 Kan. 405, 1938 Kan. LEXIS 65, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lawitzka-v-board-of-county-commissioners-kan-1938.