Lavine v. LaFayette Cent. Sch. Dist.

Opinion

Lavine v LaFayette Cent. Sch. Dist.

2026 NY Slip Op 04651

July 24, 2026

Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

LAURA B. LAVINE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

v

LAFAYETTE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT AND BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE LAFAYETTE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

Decided on July 24, 2026

462 CA 25-00723

Present: Curran, J.P., Bannister, Montour, And Hannah, JJ.

KEVIN P. RYAN, SYRACUSE, FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

HANCOCK ESTABROOK, LLP, SYRACUSE (JANET D. CALLAHAN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Danielle M. Fogel, J.), entered October 30, 2024. The order granted the motion of defendants for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.

[*1]

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by reinstating the complaint to the extent that it seeks a declaration and granting judgment in favor of defendants as follows:

It is ADJUDGED and DECLARED that defendant LaFayette Central School District is not required under the parties' employment agreement to reimburse plaintiff for Medicare premiums for the remainder of plaintiff's and her qualified dependents' lives, and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff and defendants, LaFayette Central School District (District) and Board of Education of the LaFayette Central School District, entered into an employment agreement pursuant to which plaintiff was hired as the District's superintendent. Paragraph 20 of the employment agreement provided that plaintiff and her qualified dependents "shall be eligible, during retirement, for continuing health, dental and vision insurance coverages under the plan(s) available through the District. In such case, the District will pay one hundred percent (100%) of the premiums of such coverage." Upon her retirement in 2017, plaintiff obtained retiree health insurance through the District's plan. Several years later, plaintiff applied for Medicare Part B—an insurance plan not available through the District—and paid premiums for that coverage. Plaintiff then sought reimbursement from the District for the cost of those premiums. The District denied plaintiff's request for reimbursement on the ground that the District's plan did not allow individuals who received 100% of the retiree health coverage paid for by the District to receive reimbursement for Medicare Part B premiums. Plaintiff commenced this breach of contract and declaratory judgment action seeking reimbursement of Medicare premiums paid by plaintiff and a declaration that the District is required to reimburse plaintiff for Medicare premiums for the remainder of plaintiff's and her qualified dependents' lives. Supreme Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff appeals.

Initially, we reject plaintiff's contention that the motion was legally insufficient because it was supported only by an attorney affirmation and not by an affidavit of someone with personal knowledge. The fact that defendants' supporting proof "was placed before the court by way of an attorney's affirmation annexing deposition testimony and other proof, rather than affidavits of fact on personal knowledge, is not fatal to the motion" (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]; see Olan v Farrell Lines, 64 NY2d 1092, 1093 [1985]).

Next, we reject plaintiff's contention that the court erred in granting the motion. To be entitled to summary judgment, defendants were required to "establish that [their] construction of the agreement is the only construction which can fairly be placed thereon" (Lipari v Maines Paper & Food Serv., 245 AD2d 1085, 1085 [4th Dept 1997] [internal quotation marks omitted]). We conclude that defendants met their initial burden on the motion inasmuch as they submitted the employment agreement, plaintiff's deposition testimony, the District's policy documents, and its health plan documents (see generally Tapp Partners, LLC v Wall Sections Inc., 244 AD3d 1727, 1728 [4th Dept 2025]), all of which established that the employment agreement did not require the District to reimburse plaintiff for the premiums for Medicare Part B, which was not an insurance plan offered by the District. Pursuant to paragraph 20 of the employment agreement, plaintiff was entitled to "continuing health, dental and vision insurance coverages under the plan(s) available through the District." Inasmuch as plaintiff sought reimbursement for premiums under a Medicare plan not provided through the District, she was not entitled to reimbursement of the premiums for that coverage.

Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the court properly precluded consideration of extrinsic evidence of an ambiguity in the employment agreement when deciding the motion. "[E]xtrinsic evidence may not be considered unless the document itself is ambiguous" (Ames v County of Monroe, 162 AD3d 1724, 1726 [4th Dept 2018]). Moreover, ambiguity is determined by looking within the four corners of the document, not to outside sources (see Donohue v Cuomo, 38 NY3d 1, 12-13 [2022]). "Where the language chosen by the parties has a definite and precise meaning, there is no ambiguity" (Riverside S. Planning Corp. v CRP/Extell Riverside, L.P., 13 NY3d 398, 404 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Tallo v Tallo, 120 AD3d 945, 946 [4th Dept 2014]). Whether an agreement is ambiguous is a question of law for the courts to decide (see Donohue, 38 NY3d at 13). Here, we conclude that paragraph 20 of the employment agreement is unambiguous on its face. Thus, consideration of extrinsic evidence was not permissible (see Ames, 162 AD3d at 1726).

The court erred, however, in dismissing the complaint to the extent that it seeks a declaration and in failing to declare the rights of the parties (see LaFramboise Group Ltd. v Commercial Underwriters Ins. Co., 139 AD3d 1367, 1367 [4th Dept 2016]; Leo v New York Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 136 AD3d 1333, 1333 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 902 [2016]), and we therefore modify the order accordingly.

Entered: July 24, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court