Lavin v. Scarlett

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedOctober 25, 2024
Docket3:17-cv-00731
StatusUnknown

This text of Lavin v. Scarlett (Lavin v. Scarlett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lavin v. Scarlett, (D. Nev. 2024).

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5

6 CODY LAVIN, Case No. 3:17-cv-00731-MMD-CLB

7 Plaintiff, ORDER REOPENING CASE v. 8 SCARLETT, 9 Defendant. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Pro se Plaintiff Cody Lavin initiated this action in December 2017 by submitting a 13 civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 about events that took place while he was 14 incarcerated at Northern Nevada Correctional Center (“NNCC”). (ECF No. 1-1.) In 15 December 2018, the Court stayed the case for 90 days, permitted Plaintiff’s claim for 16 excessive force to proceed against Defendant Scarlett, and referred the case to the 17 Inmate Early Mediation Program. (ECF No. 8.) Shortly after the Court issued that order, 18 Plaintiff’s mail was returned as undeliverable. (ECF No. 9.) The Court issued an order 19 directing Plaintiff to file his updated address. (ECF No. 11.) After no response from 20 Plaintiff, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court closed 21 the case and entered judgment on January 14, 2019. (ECF Nos. 12, 13.) 22 Five and a half years later, on August 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to reinstate 23 his civil action. (ECF No. 16.) In his motion, Plaintiff states that, after his release from 24 custody from the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), he “experienced 25 substantial periods of homelessness and was inflicted with COVID-19 on [three] separate 26 occasions.” (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff asserts that it was never his intent to “not pursue” this case 27 1 and would like the Court to consider the impacts of chronic homelessness and the Covid- 2 19 pandemic when deciding whether to allow him to proceed with his case. (Id.) 3 Plaintiff is currently an inmate in the custody of the Utah Department of 4 Corrections. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff requests a new application to proceed in forma pauperis 5 because the Court denied his application as moot when it closed his case. (Id. at 2; see 6 ECF No. 11 at 1.) Plaintiff also asks the Court to assign him an attorney. (ECF No. 16 at 7 2.) 8 II. DISCUSSION 9 Plaintiff in essence is asking this Court to set aside its judgment dismissing this 10 action without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). This rule 11 provides that a court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, 12 order, or proceeding for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. 13 Civ. P. 60(b)(1). 14 In Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), 15 the Supreme Court interpreted “neglect” to encompass “both simple, faultless omissions 16 to act and, more commonly, omissions caused by carelessness.” Id. at 388. In assessing 17 whether a set-side is justified by a party’s excusable neglect, courts apply a four-part test: 18 (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its 19 potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it 20 was within the reasonable control of the movant; and (4) whether the movant acted in 21 good faith. Id. at 395. 22 A. Prejudice to the Defendant 23 To be prejudicial, the “standard is whether [Defendants’] ability to pursue [their 24 defenses] will be hindered.” Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984). The delay 25 must result in tangible harm such as loss of evidence, increased difficulties of discovery, 26 or greater opportunity for fraud or collusion. See TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 27 F.3d 691, 701 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. 1 Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001). The loss of a quick victory does not constitute prejudice. 2 See Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2000). 3 The Court acknowledges that the five-year delay in this case could potentially 4 prejudice the defendant based on loss of evidence and increased difficulty of discovery. 5 However, the Court also recognizes that this action was dismissed before the defendant 6 was ever served and that it is unclear whether the defendant would actually be prejudiced. 7 As such, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of setting aside the judgment. 8 B. Length of the Delay 9 Next, the Court considers whether Plaintiff’s neglect caused significant delay and 10 its impact on the proceedings. See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. 11 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s neglect did cause a significant delay in the 12 proceedings. This case was initiated in December 2017 and is not yet out of the screening 13 process. However, the Court also recognizes that there was no scheduled mediation and 14 the sole defendant had not been served before the Court dismissed this case. Thus, even 15 though the delay paused the case, the delay did not significantly impact the proceedings. 16 The Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of setting aside the judgment. 17 C. Reason for the Delay 18 When assessing the reason for the delay, the Supreme Court interprets 19 Congress’s intent as permitting courts “to accept late filings caused by inadvertence, 20 mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances beyond the party’s 21 control.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 388. Delays in filing resulting from “negligence and 22 carelessness,” not “deviousness or willfulness,” may be considered excusable neglect. 23 Bateman, 231 F.3d at 1225. 24 The Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated excusable neglect. Based on his 25 motion, Plaintiff was subjected to chronic homelessness after his release from NDOC 26 custody and then faced a global pandemic. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s delay was, in 27 part, due to intervening circumstances beyond his control. 1 D. Bad Faith 2 For the last factor, the Court examines whether Plaintiff acted in bad faith when he 3 failed to respond to the Court’s orders and meet its deadlines. While the Court cannot say 4 he acted in bad faith, the Court is also not persuaded that Plaintiff acted in good faith 5 when he failed to meet the Court’s deadlines. The Court recognizes that chronic 6 homelessness and a global pandemic could cause possible delays in meeting the Court’s 7 deadlines, but it is not convinced that filing a motion to reinstate five-plus years later is 8 acting in good faith either. 9 However, after considering all four of the Pioneer factors, the Court finds that the 10 factors weigh in favor of setting aside judgment. The Court grants the motion to reinstate 11 the civil action. (ECF No. 16.) 12 The Court will also: (1) reinstate Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis 13 (ECF No. 1) as an active, pending motion; and (2) refer this case once again to the Inmate 14 Early Mediation Program. 15 If Plaintiff seeks to move for an appointment of counsel, he will need to file a 16 separate motion for that request and explain what “exceptional circumstances” qualify 17 him for appointment counsel.1 18 III. CONCLUSION 19 It is therefore ordered that the motion to reinstate civil action (ECF No. 16) is 20 granted. 21 It is further ordered that the Clerk of the Court: (1) reopen this case; (2) reinstate 22 the application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) as an active, pending motion; 23 24

25 1A litigant does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in 42 U.S.C.

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Lavin v. Scarlett, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lavin-v-scarlett-nvd-2024.