Lavey v. Kroger

258 P.3d 1194, 350 Or. 559, 2011 Ore. LEXIS 643
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 28, 2011
DocketSC S059447
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 258 P.3d 1194 (Lavey v. Kroger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lavey v. Kroger, 258 P.3d 1194, 350 Or. 559, 2011 Ore. LEXIS 643 (Or. 2011).

Opinion

*561 LANDAU, J.

Petitioners seek review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 16 (2012), arguing that the ballot title does not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). See ORS 250.085(2) (specifying requirements for seeking review of certified ballot titles). We review a certified ballot title to determine whether it substantially complies with those statutory requirements. See ORS 250.085(5) (stating standard of review). For the reasons that follow, we refer the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification.

Initiative Petition 16, a copy of which is attached as an appendix to this opinion, would amend several statutory provisions under ORS chapters 815 and 818, regarding the use of studded tires on public roads. Currently, ORS 815.160 makes it a Class C traffic violation for a person to drive a vehicle equipped with studded tires on any Oregon highway. ORS 815.165 then lists 12 exemptions to that blanket prohibition, including exemptions for certain vehicles that serve a public function, like school buses, ORS 815.165(8), and emergency vehicles, ORS 815.165(9). Another exemption, ORS 815.165(7), provides that, between November 1 and April 1, a person may drive a vehicle equipped with studded tires. That subsection also gives the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) authority to shorten or lengthen the period of time for the permissible use of studded tires for any area of the state, if doing so would help to preserve the highway surfaces or enhance public safety. Yet another exemption, ORS 815.165(12), provides that a person may operate a vehicle equipped with “retractable” studded tires at any time during the year.

In addition to those statutory exemptions, ORS 818.200 allows “a road authority,” including ODOT, to issue a “variance permit” to any person if doing so would serve the public interest. Pursuant to that permit, a person could equip a vehicle with studded tires of any kind and at any time of the year without violating ORS 815.160.

Initiative Petition 16 would delete the two exemptions provided under ORS 815.165(7) and (12). It would also amend ORS 818.200 so that no road authority would be *562 allowed to issue a variance permit for the use of studded tires.

The Attorney General certified the following ballot title for Initiative Petition 16:

“Prohibits the use of studded tires, including retractable studded tires, at all times of year
“Result of ‘Yes’ Vote: Yes’ vote creates year-round ban on studded-tire use, violations of which are punishable by fines; prohibits issuance of permits allowing studded-tire use.
“Result of ‘No’ Vote: ‘No’ vote retains motorists’ option to use studded tires November to April, other times if authorized by ODOT/other road authority, or if studs retractable.
“Summary: Current Oregon law prohibits use of studded tires with specified exceptions; person committing unauthorized use of studded tires subject to fines, other penalties. One exception to the prohibition on studded-tire use allows motorists to use studded tires from November until April; ODOT has authority to shorten or lengthen the time period in which studded-tire use is permitted. Other exceptions allow use of retractable studded tires year round, and authorize ODOT/other road authorities to issue permits allowing studded-tire use at other times. Proposed measure eliminates these exceptions to studded-tire ban, resulting in year-round prohibition on use of studded tires, including retractable studded tires, and eliminating authority of ODOT/other road authorities to authorize studded-tire use by permit. Other provisions.”

(Boldface in original.)

Petitioners contend that the ballot title is deficient in a number of different respects pertaining to the caption, the “yes” vote result statement, the “no” vote result statement, and the summary. We reject most of petitioners’ arguments without discussion and write to address only one issue raised by petitioners that affects the caption and the “yes” vote result statement.

Petitioners argue that the caption for Initiative Petition 16 is defective because it “fails to identify the subject matter of the initiative.” That is so, they argue, because the *563 caption states that Initiative Petition 16 “[prohibits the use of studded tires * * * at all times of [the] year” when, in fact, such a ban already exists under ORS 815.160. Petitioners argue that the “major effect” of Initiative Petition 16 is the repeal of ORS 815.165(7) because repeal of that exemption would mean that Oregonians would no longer be allowed to use studded tires on public roads during winter months. Although petitioners acknowledge that repeal of ORS 815.165(7) creates, in effect, a year-round ban on the use of studded tires for general, daily use by most citizens, petitioners argue that the caption “obscures from voters the change the measure proposes.”

A ballot title caption is a statement of not more than 15 words that “reasonably identifies the subject matter” of the measure. ORS 250.035(2)(a). To comply with that statutory standard, case law requires that the caption “state or describe the proposed measure’s subject matter ‘accurately, and in terms that will not confuse or mislead potential petition signers and voters.’ ” Kain / Waller v. Myers, 337 Or 36, 40, 93 P3d 62 (2004) (quoting Greene v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 169, 174-75, 903 P2d 366 (1995)).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
258 P.3d 1194, 350 Or. 559, 2011 Ore. LEXIS 643, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lavey-v-kroger-or-2011.