LaVena M Norris v. Department of Commerce

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJanuary 30, 2025
DocketCH-1221-21-0178-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of LaVena M Norris v. Department of Commerce (LaVena M Norris v. Department of Commerce) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
LaVena M Norris v. Department of Commerce, (Miss. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LAVENA NORRIS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-1221-21-0178-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DATE: January 30, 2025 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

LaVena Norris , Chicago, Illinois, pro se.

Ryan Holguin , Esquire, Suitland, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman* Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member**

*The Board members voted on this decision before January 20, 2025. **Member Kerner recused himself and did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). In her petition for review, the appellant asserts confusion about the appeals system process and argues that the agency abused its authority in handling matters after her removal, including issues related to a demand for payment from the Department of the Treasury. Petition for Review File, Tab 1 at 4-11. Although we sympathize with the appellant, who was pro se, we find that the removal decision adequately notified her of her election of remedies and of the consequences of the election that she made. See Kazowski v. Department of the Air Force, 2023 MSPB 15, ¶¶ 5-7 (discussing the requirements for a notice issued under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.21(d)(1), informing an employee of her right to contest an adverse action). The petition for review does not challenge the findings in the initial decision and does not make any assertions related to the Board’s jurisdiction over the appellant’s IRA appeal. We agree with the administrative judge that four of the five allegations of protected activity post-dated the removal and therefore could not have been a contributing factor in the removal, and that the only remaining allegation of protected activity, a 2019 OIG complaint, was 3

not exhausted before OSC. Initial Appeal File, Tab 12, Initial Decision at 8-11. Accordingly, the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s IRA appeal. The outcome here is not inconsistent with the decision in the appellant’s earlier appeal. See Norris v. Department of Commerce, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-21-0066-I-1, Initial Decision (Feb. 22, 2021). There, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s filing with OSC, wherein she alleged that her removal was a prohibited personnel practice (PPP) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (6), (12), precluded her direct Board appeal, filed 2 days later, based on the election of remedy provisions contained in 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g). Id. at 5-7; see Giove v. Department of Transportation, 89 M.S.P.R. 560, ¶ 10 (2001) (stating that the election of remedy provisions contained in 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) apply to allegations that a personnel action violated 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2)-(11)), 2 aff’d, 50 F. App’x 421 (Fed. Cir. 2002). As set forth above, the appellant’s OSC complaint did not allege a whistleblower reprisal claim, which would have been appealable to the Board. We further find that this decision is consistent with Andreski v. Department of Justice, 2024 MSPB 10, ¶ 10, in which the Board held that the validity of an election to proceed before OSC is not contingent on whether the Board has jurisdiction over the appellant’s subsequent IRA appeal. Based on the foregoing, we deny the petition for review and affirm the initial decision.

2 At the time Giove was issued, the PPPs set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(12)-(14) did not yet exist under the law. However, under the plain language of the statute, the election of remedy provisions at 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) apply to those PPPs as well. See, e.g., Brookins v. Department of the Interior , 2023 MSPB 3, ¶¶ 7-8 (applying section 7121(g) to allegations of prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (2) and (12)). 4

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum. Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you should contact that forum for more information.

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Related

Giove v. Department of Transportation
50 F. App'x 421 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Karl Brookins v. Department of the Interior
2023 MSPB 3 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2023)
Michelle Kaszowski v. Department of the Air Force
2023 MSPB 15 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2023)
Christopher Andreski v. Department of Justice
2024 MSPB 10 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2024)

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Bluebook (online)
LaVena M Norris v. Department of Commerce, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lavena-m-norris-v-department-of-commerce-mspb-2025.