J-A06007-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
WILLIAM LAVELLE AND LISA LAVELLE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellants : : : v. : : : ROBERT MARSHALL, INC. : No. 2532 EDA 2024 v. : : : FRANC ENVIRONMENTAL, INC. : v. : : : CHRIS MCKINNEY D/B/A NO DIG : PIPE REPAIR :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 19, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s): 2019-14162
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 28, 2025
Appellants, William and Lisa Lavelle, appeal from the consent judgment
entered in the court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County. After careful
review, we affirm.
Mrs. Lavelle entered a contract for plumbing services with Robert
Marshall, Inc. (“Marshall”) to remedy a plumbing emergency that transpired
at their home in December 2017. Mr. Lavelle was hospitalized at the time.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A06007-25
Once the work was completed, Mrs. Lavelle tested the plumbing and reviewed
and signed the bill presented by Marshall.
Six months after Marshall completed its work, Mr. Lavelle hired a
contractor, IT Landes, to run a camera through the sewer line “to put eyes on
the situation,” despite there being no reported plumbing problems. N.T.
William Lavelle Dep., 2/16/22, at 88. After reviewing the video footage, Mr.
Lavelle claimed to observe “delamination” on the cured-in-place pipe (“CIPP”)
installed by Marshall. Id. at 98. Appellants subsequently hired Zoom Drain to
replace their sewer line over two years after Marshall completed its work.
On May 28, 2019, Appellants filed a complaint initiating this matter.
Following preliminary objections, Appellants filed an amended complaint on
July 19, 2019, in which they alleged breach of contract, breach of the implied
warranty of workmanlike construction, breach of express warranty, and
violation of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law1 (“UTPCPL”).
Discovery was complete on March 31, 2023. Notably, Appellants did not
produce any expert reports. On June 23, 2023, Marshall filed a motion for
summary judgment, alleging that Appellants’ claims failed as a matter of law
for failure to produce any expert reports to substantiate their claims. In
response, Appellants produced a document from IT Landes, dated November
1 73 P.S. § 201-1-§ 201-10.
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18, 2018, detailing its observations inside the CIPP, and an unsigned invoice
from Zoom Drain, dated April 28, 2020, describing the remediation work it
performed to the septic line.
On June 9, 2023, Appellants filed a motion to amend, which included a
proposed second amended complaint that sought to add Marshall’s president
as a defendant and an additional cause of action for fraud based on Marshall’s
production of an allegedly fabricated document during discovery. Marshall filed
a response in opposition, maintaining that it would be severely prejudiced if
the court were to allow the second amended complaint. The trial court denied
Appellants’ motion on August 7, 2023.
On July 31, 2023, Appellants filed opposition to Marshall’s motion for
summary judgment, alleging the reports by IT Landes and Zoom Drain were
sufficient to guide the jury to find that Marshall breached its duties under the
contract, and witness testimony was sufficient to prove that Marshall had
engaged in deceptive conduct, thereby supporting their UTPCPL claim.
On November 2, 2023, the trial court held oral argument on the motion
for summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment and
included findings of fact in its order. See Summary Judgment Order,
12/6/2023, at 1-3. The court dismissed all Appellants’ claims except for the
breach of contract claim as it related to the interest charged by Marshall for
financing the work and remanded the matter to arbitration for determination
of that issue. See id., at 3-4. Following arbitration, an appeal to the trial level
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ensued, and on July 29, 2024, the trial court conducted a pre-trial conference.
However, on August 19, 2024, the parties filed, and the court entered, a
consent judgment that reads as follows:
WHEREAS, the Parties to this matter have agreed to enter into a consent judgment for the claims that remain in this matter currently;
WHEREAS, the Court entered an order on December 6, 2023 granting summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims except for the issue of whether Defendant Marshall [properly charged] interest to Plaintiffs;
WHEREAS, the [Plaintiffs] assert that the Court erred in granting summary judgment and wish to proceed with an appeal of the Court’s rulings in the most expedient manner possible while still preserving their right to appeal;
WHEREAS, the Parties have preliminarily agreed to move this matter toward an appeal;
NOW THEREFORE, upon the consent of Plaintiff and Defendants it is hereby Ordered Adjudged and Decreed that:
1. The Parties hereto agree that judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs on the remaining issue of whether Defendant Marshall properly charged interest.
2. The judgment shall be without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ rights or ability to appeal the Court’s prior rulings in this matter.
3. The entry of this judgment shall be considered a final order in this matter for purposes of appeal.
4. By applying their signatures below, counsel for the Parties signify their understanding of this Order and their agreement to abide by its terms unless it is modified or superseded by this Court.
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Consent Judgment Order, 8/17/24.2
On September 3, 2024, Appellants filed a notice of appeal of the consent
judgment, and on September 25, 2024, Appellants timely filed a court-ordered
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). In response, the trial court filed its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) on October 2, 2024.
Appellants present the following six issues for our review:
1. Did the Trial Court err in granting the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on faulty legal determination that Plaintiffs are required to present expert testimony to sustain an action negligence?
2. Did the Trial Court err in granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment where they made factual determinations in favor of the moving party which is prohibited by applicable case law?
3. Did the Trial Court err in determining that expert testimony was required to support the Plaintiffs’ claims in this case?
4. Did the Trial Court err in determining that Plaintiffs failed to meet the standard to overcome summary judgment where there was clear testimony and evidence that the work done by Defendants was faulty and required repair shortly after Defendants installed the pipe at issue?
5. Did the Trial Court err in denying the Plaintiffs ability to amend their Complaint to add claims discovered during the last deposition before the discovery deadline where the witness testified that discovery provided by Defendants was fraudulent ____________________________________________
2 We note that, although an order entered by consent of the parties is generally not appealable, see Prensky v. Talaat, 291 A.3d 25, 30 (Pa. Super. 2023), because the stipulated judgment here contemplates appellate review, this matter is properly before us, see Laird v. Clearfield & Mahoning Ry. Co., 916 A.2d 1091, 1094 (Pa. 2007).
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and fabricated [] given the liberal standard generally applied to motions to amend?
6. Did the Trial Court err in denying the Plaintiffs the ability to amend their Complaint where Plaintiffs promptly sought said amendment after discovering evidence providing a basis for the additional counts Plaintiffs sought to add?
Appellants’ Brief, at 6-7 (suggested answers omitted).
However, Appellants’ brief violates Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) by dividing the
argument into 3 rather than 6 parts. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument
shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and
shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively
displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion
and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). Therefore, for ease of
disposition, we arrange our analysis consistent with the 3 issues identified in
the argument section of Appellants’ brief: (1) the court erred in finding
Appellants were required to produce expert testimony to support their claims;
(2) the court erred in entering summary judgment; and (3) the court erred in
denying Appellants’ motion to amend. See id. at 15, 18, 26.
First, Appellants claim the trial court’s entry of summary judgment “was
based on the mistaken notion that Plaintiffs were required to produce expert
testimony in order to sustain their claims” where the subject matter at issue
concerns “nothing particularly specialized.” Appellants’ Brief, at 15, 18.
Appellants aver that expert testimony was not necessary because “the
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evidence in this case showed that the work done by [Marshall] failed almost
instantly and needed extensive repair.” Id. at 18.
The Pennsylvania Rules of evidence permit a witness who is qualified as
an expert to testify on matters concerning the expert’s specialized knowledge
to assist the trier of fact with understanding evidence or determining a fact in
issue. See Pa.R.E. 702. Accordingly, our courts have determined that expert
testimony may be required if the issues presented to the fact finder are
“beyond the scope of knowledge of the ordinary layperson.” Electron Energy
Corp. v. Short, 597 A.2d 175, 180 (Pa. Super. 1991). Only
[i]f all the primary facts can be accurately described to a jury and if the jury is capable of comprehending and understanding such facts and drawing conclusions from them as are witnesses possessed of special training, experience, or observation, then there is no need for the testimony of an expert.
Young v. Com., Dept. of Transp., 744 A.2d 1276, 1278 (Pa. 2000) (citation
omitted).
The trial court determined that the following allegations set forth in
Appellants’ amended complaint were relevant to summary judgment: Marshall
did not perform work properly; Marshall was supposed to install CIPP, which
involves lining the pipes with a substance to repair failures; Marshall’s
installation of CIPP was unnecessary and performed incorrectly, and
Appellants now need to pay someone to fix the pipe; per the agreement,
Marshall was to perform the work in a good and workmanlike manner;
Marshall provided Appellants with materials and work that were represented
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to be of a certain character and were instead of another; Marshall utterly failed
to meet even the most basic standards of construction. See Summary
Judgment Order, 12/6/2023, at 1-2. The trial court determined that expert
testimony in plumbing construction and plumbing related damages was
required to prove these allegations, as they concern matters unique to
plumbing and construction repair, which are beyond the understanding of a
lay person. See id. at 2 n.1. We agree.
The work at issue in this case involved repairs to a residential sewer
line, and specifically, the installation of CIPP. Contrary to Appellants’
assertions, we agree with the trial court that determining whether the CIPP at
issue was necessary to remedy the plumbing emergency, installed properly,
priced fairly, or whether it required remediation is not within the scope of
knowledge of the ordinary lay person. See Young, 744 A.2d at 1278.
Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that expert testimony in
plumbing construction and plumbing related damages were necessary to
prove Appellants’ allegations. See Electron Energy Corp., 597 A.2d at 180.
Next, Appellants maintain that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on their claims of breach of contract, breach of express and implied
warranties, and violation of the UTPCPL because there were genuine issues of
material fact which warranted a trial. See Appellants’ Brief, at 19.
The trial court noted that during oral argument on the motion for
summary judgment, Appellants’ position was not that expert testimony was
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unnecessary, but rather, that the documents from Zoom Drain and Lavelle
Septic Tank Supply Line constituted expert reports. See Summary Judgment
Order, 12/6/2023, at 3.3 The court determined these were not expert reports
capable of establishing the causes of action alleged. We agree.
We review an order granting summary judgment using the following
principles:
Our scope of review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary. We apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.
Motions for summary judgment implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [her] cause of action. Summary judgment is proper “if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury.” Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(2). In other words, “whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report,” Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(1), and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Thus, a record that supports summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are ____________________________________________
3 Appellants maintain this was a “mischaracterization” of their argument by
the trial court that is “simply factually wrong.” Appellants’ Brief, at 16. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1921, “it is an appellant’s duty to [ensure] that the certified record contains all documents necessary for appellate review, and when a necessary document is not included in the certified record, we may find the issue waived on appeal.” Century Indemnity Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 173 A.3d 784, 809 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Here, the certified record does not contain a transcript of testimony from oral argument on the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, we will not address this allegation further.
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undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or defense.
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law, but we may reach our own conclusions. We will disturb the trial court’s order only upon an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with the law on facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing and consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies the law, exercises its discretion in a manner lacking reason, or does not follow legal procedure.
Genell v. Fleetwood Bank, 326 A.3d 93, 102 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citations
and quotation marks omitted); see DiDomizio v. Jefferson Pulmonary
Assoc., 280 A.3d 1039, 1045 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“To survive a defense
motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must adduce sufficient evidence on
an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof such
that a jury could return a verdict in his favor.”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Young, 744 A.2d at 1277 (“A jury [cannot] be
allowed to reach a verdict merely on the basis of speculation or conjecture.”)
(citation omitted).
“[A] typical breach of contract action involves (1) the existence of a
contract, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract, and (3) damages.”
Zokaites Contracting Inc. v. Trant Corp., 968 A.2d 1282, 1287 (Pa. Super.
2009) (citation omitted).
Where one party to a contract, without any legal justification, breaches the contract, the other party is entitled to recover, unless the contract provided otherwise, whatever damages he suffered, provided (1) they were such as would naturally and ordinarily result from the breach, or (2) they were reasonably
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foreseeable and within the contemplation of the parties at the time they made the contract, and (3) they can be proved with reasonable certainty.
Helpin v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania, 10 A.3d 267, 270 (Pa.
2010) (citation omitted).
“The purpose of the UTPCPL is to protect the public from unfair or
deceptive business practices. Our Supreme Court has stated courts should
liberally construe the UTPCPL in order to [affect] the legislative goal of
consumer protection.” Bennett v. A.T. Masterpiece Homes at
Broadsprings, LLC, 40 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
“To bring a private cause of action under the UTPCPL, a plaintiff must show
that he justifiably relied on the defendant’s wrongful conduct or representation
and that he suffered harm as a result of that reliance.” Yocca v. Pittsburgh
Steelers Sports, Inc., 854 A.2d 425, 438-39 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted).
Notably, the UTPCPL contains a catchall provision that prohibits engaging in
“fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding.” 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi). Furthermore, this Court has
recognized that in the context of construction warranties, “[i]t is the failure
to honor the warranty, not necessarily the issuance of the warranty that
triggers liability and generates a UTPCPL claim.” Krishnan v. Cutler Group,
Inc., 171 A.3d 856, 886 (Pa. Super. 2017) (emphasis in original; citation
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As a preliminary matter, we observe Appellants’ contention that the trial
court erred in determining expert testimony was required to sustain their
negligence claim. However, the trial court determined Appellants’ amended
complaint was the operative document for establishing Appellants’ four causes
of action, and notably, Appellants did not include a count of negligence in their
amended complaint. See Summary Judgment Order, 12/6/2023, at 1; see
also Amended Complaint, at 4-8. Accordingly, we find Appellants’ contention
that the trial court abused its discretion regarding a negligence claim is
contrary to the record and therefore lacks merit.
Appellants argue the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
their breach of contract claim because they presented sufficient evidence to
show that Marshall breached its duties under the contract, which contained a
provision requiring Marshall to “perform the work in a good and workman like
manner.” See Appellants’ Brief, at 19. We disagree.
Neither party disputes the existence of a contract or that the terms of
the contract required the work to be performed in a good and workmanlike
manner. Rather, the parties dispute the elements of breach and damages.
Notably, this case does not involve a simple determination of whether a
specific contractual obligation was performed, but rather, it would require a
factfinder to determine whether the work was performed in accordance with
specific standards pertaining to plumbing construction and repair. Accordingly,
we agree that expert testimony would be necessary to establish that Marshall
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breached the duty imposed by the contract because determining whether the
CIPP was installed in a good and workmanlike manner requires specialized
knowledge beyond that of an ordinary lay person. See Electron Energy
Corp., 597 A.2d at 180.
Appellants’ reliance on the IT Landes report and the Zoom Drain invoice
to establish breach and damages is unavailing. See Appellants’ Brief, at 19-
20. The IT Landes report, which is not an expert report, merely describes
conditions observed within Appellants’ sewer line and proposes potential
causes, but it does not establish whether the work Marshall performed
breached any duty under the contract. Similarly, the Zoom Drain invoice
merely describes the work Zoom Drain performed and the cost associated with
its remediation, but it does not establish whether the additional work was
required because Marshall breached any contractual obligation. Further,
because Appellants failed to establish whether Marshall breached the contract,
Appellants also failed to establish damages. See Helpin, 10 A.3d at 270.
Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded Appellants’ breach of
contract claim fails as a matter of law due to Appellants’ failure to produce an
expert report to support their claim, and Marshall was entitled to summary
judgment on this count.
Similarly, Appellants claim the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on their breach of express and implied warranty claims on the basis
that expert testimony was required. Specifically, Appellants argue that the IT
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Landes report and Zoom Drain invoice “show Marshall’s failure to provide the
necessary materials and perform the work in a good and workmanlike manner
as set forth in the express warranty of the December 23, 2017 contract and
failure to meet the basic standards of construction under the implied warranty
of workmanlike construction[.]” See Appellants’ Brief, at 25. We disagree.
Appellants did not establish that either warranty was breached. Again,
expert testimony would be necessary to establish whether or how the work
performed by Marshall failed to meet the good and workmanlike manner
standard or the standards of construction for installing CIPP. Moreover,
without expert testimony on plumbing construction, repair, and pricing,
Appellants failed to establish that the work performed by Marshall required
remediation or that any subsequent repair costs were attributable to
Marshall’s alleged breach of either warranty.
Therefore, the trial court correctly determined Appellants’ breach of
warranty claims failed as a matter of law, and Marshall was entitled summary
judgment.
Next, Appellants claim that Marshall violated the UTPCPL because it
engaged in fraudulent and deceptive conduct when it (1) “quoted a price and
engaged in a project on the Property without having anyone with training or
expertise in its organization about the nature of the work that needed to be
done; nor, most importantly[,] [it] never disclosed to Appellants that [it] had
no experience in this area” and (2) “used deceptive up-sell methods to extract
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more money from [Appellants] than was necessary to fix the issues with the
property.” Appellants’ Brief, at 22-23.
The trial court acknowledged that, in their response to the motions for
summary judgment, Appellants alleged factually specific “deceptive business
practices” to support their UTPCPL claim, which would not require expert
testimony. See Summary Judgment Order, 12/6/2023, at 3. However, the
court determined that it could not consider “factual allegations in support of a
layperson understanding of ‘deceptive business practices’” because they were
not alleged in the amended complaint. Id. We agree.
Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading jurisdiction; as such, a complaint must provide notice of the nature of the plaintiff’s claims and also summarize the facts upon which the claims are based. Rule of Civil Procedure 1019(a) and (b) encapsulate this theory. Rule 1019(a) provides that in pleadings, “the material facts on which a cause of action or defense are based shall be stated in a concise and summary form. Rule 1019(b) requires that “averments of fraud or mistake shall be averred with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind may be averred generally.” The purpose of these rules is to require the pleader to disclose material facts sufficient to notify the adverse party of the claims it will have to defend against.
Commonwealth by Shapiro v. Golden Gate National Senior Care LLC,
194 A.3d 1010, 1029-30 (Pa. 2018) (brackets and citations omitted). In the
context of the UTPCPL, our Supreme Court has found that UTPCPL claims met
the specificity requirement of Rule 1019 and were not “baseless subterfuge”
where the complaint contained numerous allegations of specific incidents of
fraudulent or deceptive conduct, which were likely to cause confusion or
misunderstanding, and identified the precise provisions of the UTPCPL that
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were violated, because the pleaded allegations “adequately detail[ed] the
nature of the claims so as to permit the Appellees to prepare a defense.” Id.
Here, Appellants alleged the following to support their UTPCPL claim in
their amended complaint: Marshall specifically and purposely represented
certain work and repairs were needed; Mrs. Lavelle relied entirely on
Marshall’s expertise; Marshall’s actions and omissions amounted to fraudulent
and deceptive conduct which created a likelihood of confusion and
misunderstanding; Marshall failed to adhere to explicit warranties regarding
the work; Marshall represented certain work was needed when it was not;
Marshall provided materials and work that were represented to be of a certain
character and were instead of another. See Amended Complaint, 7/19/2019,
at 6. Although Appellants allege specific incidents of deceptive conduct on
appeal, none of the allegations raised in Appellants’ amended complaint
identify specific incidents of fraudulent or deceptive conduct that violate
specific provisions of the UTPCPL. See Commonwealth by Shapiro, 194
A.3d at 1029-30.
Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, expert testimony on
plumbing construction or repair would be necessary to show that Marshall
engaged in any wrongful conduct by installing CIPP because determining
whether its installation was appropriate or whether the materials used and the
work provided were adequate requires specialized knowledge beyond that of
a lay person. See Electron Energy Corp., 597 A.2d at 180.
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Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment
on Appellants’ UTPCPL claim.
Appellants claim the trial court erred in granting Appellees’ motions for
summary judgment because it impermissibly “made factual determinations in
favor of the moving party.” Appellants’ Brief, at 6. This issue does not merit
relief.
“It is well-settled that the failure to develop an adequate argument in
an appellate brief may result in waiver of the claim under Pa.R.A.P. 2119.”
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 590-91 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“When
issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, or when briefs are
wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a Court will not
consider the merits thereof.”) (citations omitted).
Appellants do not provide a discussion of this issue or allege which
factual inferences the trial court made in favor of Appellees. Moreover, our
review of the findings of fact made by the trial court revealed no finding that
would support this allegation. See Summary Judgment Order, 12/6/23, at 1-
3. Accordingly, we find this issue does not merit relief.
Finally, Appellants claim the trial court erred in denying their motion to
amend the complaint to plead a count of fraud for documents they allege
Marshall fabricated in discovery. See Appellants’ Brief, at 26-27. Appellants
argue that the trial court erred in concluding their amendment would be futile
for lack of expert testimony because expert testimony is not required to plead
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a count of fraud. See id. at 27. Additionally, Appellants argue that Marshall
would not be prejudiced by Appellants amending their complaint because the
evidence to establish the count of fraud is consistent with evidence that would
be admissible at trial under the current complaint, and Appellants sought to
amend their complaint when they first learned of the issue. See id. at 28-29.
A party may seek leave of court to amend a pleading. See Pa.R.C.P.
1033(a). “Leave to amend lies within the sound discretion of the trial court
and the right to amend should be liberally granted at any stage of the
proceedings unless there is an error of law or resulting prejudice to an adverse
party.” Ritz v. Ramsay, 305 A.3d 1056, 1064 (Pa Super. 2023) (citation
omitted). Additionally, “a trial court does not err in refusing to permit an
amendment where the amendment would be futile.” Id. (citation omitted);
see also Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Lab. &
Indus., 8 A.3d 866, 884 (Pa. 2010) (“a court is not required to permit
amendment of a pleading if a party is unable to state a claim on which relief
could be granted.”) (citation omitted).
A claim for fraud requires the plaintiff to prove the following: (1) a representation; (2) which is material to the transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or false; (4) with the intent of misleading another into relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6) the resulting injury was proximately caused by the reliance.
Marion v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co., 288 A.3d 76, 87 (Pa. 2023) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). The measure of damages in an action for
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fraud is actual loss. See GMH Assocs., Inc. v. Prudential Realty Grp., 752
A.2d 889, 905 (Pa. Super. 2000).
Appellants were unable to state a claim of fraud to the trial court. They
provided no discussion in their brief of the elements of fraud or explanation
as to how the alleged fraudulent conduct, i.e., the production of a fabricated
document during discovery, satisfied those elements. See Taylor, 277 A.3d
at 590-91. Furthermore, the certified record contains no evidence that
Appellants suffered an actual loss from the production of the allegedly
fraudulent document; consequently, they did not state a claim of fraud on
which relief could be granted. See Bayada Nurses, Inc., 8 A.3d at 884
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Appellants’ motion to amend their complaint.
Based upon our review of the certified record, we discern no abuse of
discretion. The trial court properly granted Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment, and we affirm.
Judgment affirmed.
Date: 3/28/2025
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