Lautsbaugh v. Seavers

24 Pa. D. & C. 101, 1935 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 386
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Cumberland County
DecidedJuly 11, 1935
Docketno. 150
StatusPublished

This text of 24 Pa. D. & C. 101 (Lautsbaugh v. Seavers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Cumberland County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lautsbaugh v. Seavers, 24 Pa. D. & C. 101, 1935 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 386 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1935).

Opinion

Reese, P. J.,

This is an appeal from the Workmen’s Compensation Board which affirmed the referee in disallowing an award to the claimant for the death of her husband. The facts found by the compensation authorities, which we feel were sustained by ample competent evidence, are substantially as follows:

On or about June 7,1933, the decedent, Charles Lauts[102]*102baugh, was employed by the defendant as a farm hand on the latter’s farm. For his services the decedent was to receive house rent, $12 per month in cash, fruit, vegetables, meats, etc., the value of which would not exceed the sum of $12 per week. The business of the defendant is that of farming and the deceased was hired for farm labor only. The defendant in connection with the operation of his farm produced milk which he sold to a milk company. For some time prior to the accident and death of the deceased, the defendant had been delivering the milk from his own and a few other farms in the immediate neighborhood on a truck owned by himself to the railroad station several miles from his farm. The milk was then shipped to Philadelphia and the defendant was paid at the rate of 20 cents per 100 pounds for delivery of the milk. He was paid by the milk company which deducted the amount from the checks due the farmers whose milk was collected by the defendant. This collection and delivery of milk was made once each day. About February 1,1934, the deceased started to collect and deliver the milk, and although he did not do so daily, he did so most of the time after that date. While delivering the milk on June 20, 1934, the truck crashed into a tree and the deceased was killed. This work was done by the deceased in addition to his general farm work and he received no extra pay for it. It was also found that the defendant was not a common carrier and that the arrangement between the farmers was of a cooperative nature and defendant did not assume the role of a general hauler or carrier.

On an appeal of this nature the court is limited to a determination of the questions whether there is evidence to support the findings of the compensation authorities and whether the law has been properly applied. Where the findings are supported by competent proof, they and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are as conclusive as' the verdict of a jury: Parkins v. Hillman Coal & Coke Co., 114 Pa. Superior Ct. 358.

[103]*103There was ample evidence to sustain the foregoing facts. Therefore we are concerned only with the legal conclusions reached by the referee and the board in disallowing the claim on the ground that the decedent at the time of his injury and death was engaged in agricultural work and that the Workmen’s Compensation Act of June 2,1915, P. L. 736, as amended by the Act of June 3,1915, P. L. 777, does not apply.

The foregoing amending act provides that the Workmen’s Compensation Act shall not “apply to or in any way affect any person who, at the time of injury, is engaged in domestic service or agriculture.” The question before us, therefore, is whether or not the deceased was engaged in agriculture at the time of his injury and death. The claimant strenuously contends that the collection and delivery of milk by the defendant was an outside industrial pursuit not a part of his farming operation and hence subject to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The referee and the board concluded that the collection and delivery of the milk did not constitute a separate outside industrial operation, but that it was part of the defendant’s regular business of farming. This conclusion, we believe, was a correct one.

The maintenance of a dairy and production of milk on the defendant’s own farm as an incident of ordinary farming was an agricultural pursuit: Beyer v. Decker et al., 159 Md. 289, 150 Atl. 804. Similarly, the hauling of milk from the defendant’s farm to the shipping point is an agricultural pursuit and an important incident of the defendant’s business of farming: Bucher v. American Fruit Growers Co., 107 Pa. Superior Ct. 399. Hence, if deceased had been killed while hauling the milk from the farm of the defendant alone, he would undoubtedly be held to have been engaged in agriculture at the time. The production of milk and hauling it to market on each of the other farms here involved was likewise an agricultural pursuit. If each farmer’s milk was hauled to market by his own employe, each employe would be engaged in agri[104]*104culture. If the defendant and his neighbors joined together and had their milk hauled to market by a common employe (not an independent contractor), the latter would be engaged in agriculture. In such an event, as stated by the board, “the delivery of the milk was therefore incidental to the operation of the several farms included in the arrangement and constituted agricultural work.” We think this conclusion can properly be reached on the present facts where through a common arrangement the milk of several neighboring farmers was hauled to market by the farm hand employe of one of them. A similar cooperative arrangement has led courts of other jurisdictions to declare that where several farmers combine in the purchase and operation of a threshing machine to thresh the wheat on their several farms, one who is injured while operating the machine is engaged in agriculture although the machine is occasionally used to thresh for outsiders: Jones et al. v. Industrial Commission of Utah et al., 55 Utah 489, 187 Pac. 833; Keefover v. Vasey et al., 112 Neb. 424, 199 N. W. 799.

The cases cited by claimant in support of her contention that the defendant in collecting and delivering milk was engaged in an outside industrial operation not connected with his farming do not convince us that what we have already said is wrong. In the first ease cited, Strunk v. Keller, 75 Pa. Superior Ct. 462, a farmer entered into a contract to perform a logging operation to cut logs to be sold. His employe was killed while cutting-logs. In Klein v. McCleary, 154 Minn. 498, 192 N. W. 106, a doctor owned a hunting and fishing camp and nearby owned a small farm. Plaintiff worked on both places and was injured while pulling stumps on the camp site. In Zumbrum v. Rudisill, 38 York 81, an employe was killed while cutting trees on defendant’s farm in furtherance of the latter’s business of cutting timber for sale on the market. In Warner v. Longstreth, 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 124, the defendant, a farmer, secured a contract to remove certain buildings from an adjoining farm and hired [105]*105three men to tear down the buildings. One of them, the plaintiff, was injured while so doing. In Hanna v. Matthews, 6 W. C. B. 313, the defendant owned a dairy and milk plant and the only grain raised was used to feed the cows. Claimant was injured at the plant while performing the work for which he was hired, sterilization and preparation of the milk for market. In Heyman v. Sloan, 13 W. C. B. 352, the defendant owned a farm on which he also worked a small mine. Claimant was injured while driving a team to haul stone to repair the road to the mine.

In each of these cases it clearly appears that the employe was injured or killed while engaged in an outside industrial operation not incidental in any way to the employer’s farming operations.

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Related

Beyer v. Decker
150 A. 804 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1930)
Bucher v. American Fruit Growers Co.
163 A. 33 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1932)
Warner v. Longstreth
164 A. 806 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1932)
Parkins v. Hillman C. & C. Co.
174 A. 784 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1934)
Claim of McAllister v. Cobb
237 A.D. 674 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1933)
Strunk v. Keller
75 Pa. Super. 462 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1921)
Klein v. McCleary
192 N.W. 106 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1923)
Keefover v. Vasey
199 N.W. 799 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1924)
Powell v. Industrial Commission
213 N.W. 651 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1927)
Jones v. Industrial Commission
187 P. 833 (Utah Supreme Court, 1920)

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Bluebook (online)
24 Pa. D. & C. 101, 1935 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 386, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lautsbaugh-v-seavers-pactcomplcumber-1935.