STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
14-1107
LAURYN RUEBUSH
VERSUS
OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT & THE CARE CENTER OF DEQUINCY
**********
APPEAL FROM THE OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – DISTRICT 3 PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 11-05528 CHARLOTTE L. BUSHNELL, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE
MARC T. AMY JUDGE
Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, John D. Saunders, Marc T. Amy, John E. Conery, and David Kent Savoie, Judges.
AFFIRMED. ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED FOR WORK PERFORMED ON APPEAL.
Conery, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons. Savoie, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for the reasons assigned by Conery, J.
H. Douglas Hunter Guglielmo, Lopez, Tuttle, Hunter & Jarrell, L.L.P. Post Office Drawer 1329 Opelousas, LA 70571-1329 (337) 948-8201 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: The Care Center of DeQuincy Marcus Zimmerman 4216 Lake Street Lake Charles, LA 70605 (337) 474-1644 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE: Lauryn Ruebush AMY, Judge.
The claimant alleged that she sustained injury to her hand while working as
a nurse at the defendant nursing home. She resigned from her position following
the accident and alleged that the condition of her hand deteriorated, eventually
resulting in a diagnosis of complex regional pain syndrome. Although the
employer provided certain medical treatment, the claimant filed this matter seeking
medical care that had been denied, indemnity benefits, and penalties and attorney
fees. The workers’ compensation judge ruled in favor of the claimant. The
employer appeals. For the following reasons we affirm, and award additional
attorney fees to the claimant for work performed on appeal.
Factual and Procedural Background
At the time of the December 4, 2010 work-related accident now at issue, the
claimant, Lauryn Ruebush, was employed as a nurse at The Care Center of
Dequincy, a nursing home. The claimant explained that, on that date, she
approached an altercation between two patients and that an aluminum walker used
by one of the patients struck her left hand/wrist. The claimant testified that she
continued with her shift, but that she indicated to her supervisor that she was
resigning due to the stressful nature of the position.
Although the claimant explained that her condition initially improved and
she began working as a nurse at Deer Creek Hospital, she testified that her
condition began to worsen. Specifically, she began having trouble with swelling
and discoloration in her hand. The claimant explained that a physician at the
facility suggested that she could have developed reflex sympathetic dystrophy. Ms. Ruebush explained that her family physician referred her to Dr. Steven Hale,
an orthopedic surgeon.
Dr. Hale testified in his deposition that, although he found bruising,
―swelling . . . and tenderness near her fifth metacarpal head and decreased
sensation in the ulnar distribution of her hand[,]‖ x-rays were negative for obvious
fracture or dislocation. He explained that, following an EMG, he diagnosed Ms.
Ruebush as having an ulnar nerve injury and that she was beginning to have early
complex regional pain syndrome. Dr. Hale stated that a bone scan and MRI,
conducted in March 2011, were consistent with the complex regional pain
syndrome diagnosis.
On Dr. Hale’s order, Ms. Ruebush underwent a nerve block in June 2011
and also began seeing Dr. Robert LeBlanc, an orthopedic surgeon, for further
investigation of the condition. Ms. Ruebush ultimately reported that her pain did
not decrease following the nerve block. Dr. LeBlanc testified that the failure of the
block to improve the condition could have meant either that she did not have
complex regional pain syndrome or that she was outside of the time frame where it
would be effective. Similarly, as with the nerve block, an injection performed by
Dr. LeBlanc afforded no relief. Dr. LeBlanc offered the claimant an exploratory
arthroscopic surgery for diagnostic purposes. However, that surgery was not
performed.
During this time frame, the claimant’s family physician referred her to Dr.
Tarun Jolly, an anesthesiologist and pain management physician. Although the
employer denied her request to see Dr. Jolly, she began treating with him in
January 2012. He reported that, on this first visit, his diagnosis ―was qualified as
complex regional pain syndrome of Type 1 of the upper [left] limb, as well as
2 chronic pain due to trauma.‖ He explained in his deposition that objective findings
supported the diagnosis. By June 2012, and while under Dr. Jolly’s care, the
claimant had a spinal cord stimulator inserted. At the hearing, she responded
―[a]bsolutely‖ when asked whether she was ―capable of doing some sort of light
duty work‖ due to the success of that procedure. She explained that a revision
surgery to that implantation was required after her symptoms returned. The
claimant denied, however, that she could return to the physical demands of her
prior work as a charge nurse. A November 2013 Functional Capacity Evalution
also indicated that a return to light duty would be possible.
The disputed claim form instituting this matter was filed in July 2011 against
both the employer and Risk Management Services,1 by which the claimant sought
indemnity benefits, medical benefits, and penalties and attorney fees for the failure
to provide services. At the workers’ compensation hearing, the parties entered into
several stipulations, including: the occurrence of the work-related accident; the
fact that the employer had not paid indemnity benefits (but that some medical
expenses were paid); and the fact that the employer denied Dr. Jolly’s involvement
and any treatment emanating from him.
Following a hearing, the workers’ compensation judge ruled in favor of the
claimant. The ruling, and an amended ruling, awarded: temporary total disability
benefits for the period between January 24, 2012 through September 9, 2012 and
supplemental earnings benefits after September 10, 2012. The workers’
compensation judge also ordered the reimbursement of the claimant’s out-of-
pocket medical expenses, as well as a penalty of $2,000 for the failure to reimburse
1 The record indicates that the employer was self-insured and that this claim was administered by Risk Management Services.
3 sums expended in co-payments and $2,000 for failure to provide indemnity
benefits. The workers’ compensation judge awarded attorney fees in the amount of
$18,000 as well as litigation expenses and court costs.
The employer appeals, arguing that the workers’ compensation judge erred
in: 1) finding that the claimant proved that her condition arose as a result of a
workplace accident; 2) finding that the claimant is entitled to reimbursement of
out-of-pocket medical expenses; 3) finding that the claimant is entitled to
indemnity benefits; and 4) awarding penalties and attorney fees.
The claimant answers the appeal, seeking an increase in attorney fees and
asserting that the workers’ compensation judge erred in limiting reimbursement.
Discussion
Work-Related Injury
In its first assignment of error, the employer suggests that the workers’
compensation judge erred in the finding that the claimant suffers from complex
regional pain syndrome in her upper left extremity as a result of the work-related
accident. Chiefly, the employer suggests that the workers’ compensation judge
erred in relying upon the testimony of Dr. Jolly since he was not the claimant’s
initial choice of physician and it did not approve of a change of physician pursuant
to La.R.S. 23:1121(B). 2 In particular, the employer asserts that Dr. LeBlanc,
whose testing led him away from a complex regional pain syndrome diagnosis,
was claimant’s choice of physician for her hand injury. Had the workers’
2 Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1121(B)(1) provides, in part:
The employee shall have the right to select one treating physician in any field or specialty. . . . After his initial choice the employee shall obtain prior consent from the employer or his workers’ compensation carrier for a change of treating physician within that same field or specialty. The employee, however, is not required to obtain approval for change to a treating physician in another field or specialty.
4 compensation judge disregarded Dr. Jolly’s opinion, the employer argues, the
claimant would not have met her burden of proof.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1031(A) provides: ―If an employee not
otherwise eliminated from the benefits of [Chapter 23] receives personal injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the amounts, on the condition, and to the person or persons
hereinafter designated.‖ Thus, the statute requires that, in order to receive
workers’ compensation benefits, the employment must cause the accident, the
accident must cause the alleged injury, and the injury must cause the claimed
disability. Buxton v. Iowa Police Dep’t, 09-0520 (La. 10/20/09), 23 So.3d 275. A
claimant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
claimed disability is related to the alleged on-the-job injury. Id.
In this case, the occurrence of the work-related accident was established by
stipulation and is not now at issue. Rather, the employer questions the workers’
compensation judge’s reliance on Dr. Jolly’s opinion that the claimant suffers from
complex regional pain syndrome, the purportedly disabling condition. Challenging
that diagnosis, the employer noted at the hearing that Dr. LeBlanc ultimately
rejected the complex regional pain syndrome diagnosis. The employer also
referenced its choice of orthopedist, Dr. Joe Morgan, who examined the claimant
in December 2011 and who stated in his report that he ―did not identify any
orthopedic or neurologic abnormality in the left upper extremity[.]‖ Instead, Dr.
Morgan found the most appropriate diagnosis to be ―somatization disorder‖ and
concluded that the claimant could return to work without restriction.
On review, we find no manifest error in the workers’ compensation judge’s
conclusion that the claimant sustained her burden of proof. Consistent with the
5 workers’ compensation judge’s ruling, Dr. Jolly testified that, upon his initial
treatment of the claimant, he arrived at a complex regional pain syndrome
diagnosis and that this diagnosis continued throughout his treatment. He explained
that, through March 2012, the claimant’s pain continued and that she demonstrated
―very objective weakness in extension, flexion, pronation of that left upper
extremity[.]‖ He also noted a ―change in color‖ and that the hand ―was more
dusky‖ than the other. He identified these indications as consistent with his
diagnosis. Ultimately, the spinal cord stimulator was implanted which improved
the claimant’s condition. This success, Dr. Jolly opined, undercut the somatization
disorder diagnosis relied upon by the employer.
Neither do we find merit in the employer’s contention that the workers’
compensation judge erred in relying upon Dr. Jolly’s opinion as an unapproved
second choice of physician. The employer offers Dr. LeBlanc, an orthopedic
surgeon, as the claimant’s choice of hand specialist. Although the claimant treated
with Dr. LeBlanc, we do not find error in the workers’ compensation judge’s
consideration of Dr. Jolly’s treatment of the claimant.3 The claimant treated with
Dr. Jolly upon referral by her family physician after her condition did not improve.
Additionally, Dr. Jolly, who testified that he considers himself an expert in
complex regional pain syndrome, offered treatment from the perspective of a an
anesthesiologist and pain management physician. Noting that Dr. Jolly found the
claimant’s accident was the cause of her injuries, the workers’ compensation judge
found his treatment both ―reasonable and necessary[.]‖ We find no manifest error
in that determination.
3 We note here too that Dr. LeBlanc did not opine that the claimant suffered no injury. Instead, Dr. LeBlanc continued searching for nature of the claimant’s injury and, in fact, offered an arthroscopic surgery to investigate the nature of the complaint.
6 Medical Expenses
The workers’ compensation judge’s ruling in this case included an award of
out-of-pocket medical expenses. In a cursory assignment of error, the employer
questions that award to the extent it included reimbursement of five, $25 co-pays
that the claimant made to Dr. Hale before the employer assumed payment for the
treatment. The employer asserts that, after becoming aware of the incident, it
reimbursed Dr. Hale for all charges. The employer suggests that the claimant must
now ―seek reimbursement from Dr. Hale, as he was paid in full for the treatment.‖
We do not disturb the reimbursement award. Notwithstanding any evidence that
Dr. Hale was reimbursed for his charges, there is no evidence indicating that the
claimant was otherwise compensated for fees paid by her.
This assignment lacks merit.
Indemnity Benefits
As noted above, the workers’ compensation judge found the claimant
entitled to TTD benefits from January 24, 2012 through September 9, 2012 and
entitled to SEB benefits thereafter. The employer challenges those awards and
points out that the claimant was able to continue employment with Deer Creek
Hospital, was able to pursue further schooling in pursuit of a nursing degree in
2011, and that she then moved out of state.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221(1)(c) provides that TTD benefits ―shall
be awarded only if the employee proves by clear and convincing evidence, unaided
by any presumption of disability, that the employee is physically unable to engage
in any employment or self-employment, regardless of the nature or character of the
employment or self-employment[.]‖
7 Otherwise relevant to this claim, and pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1221(3), a
claimant is entitled to SEB benefits upon a showing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that a work-related injury resulted in his or her inability to earn ninety
percent of his pre-injury wages. Winford v. Conerly Corp., 04-1278 (La. 3/11/05),
897 So.2d 560. If the claimant meets this initial burden, the employer must prove,
by competent evidence: 1) the existence of a suitable job within the prescribed
physical capabilities and within the claimant’s community/reasonable geographic
region; 2) the amount of wages a similarly situated employee can be expected to
earn in the job; and 3) an actual position available for that particular job at the time
that the claimant received notification of the job’s existence. Banks v. Indus.
Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 96-2840 (La. 7/1/97), 696 So.2d 551.
In analysis of this assignment, it is important to consider that the indemnity
awards are for periods after the events cited by the employer. As found above, the
workers’ compensation judge was not manifestly erroneous in relying upon the
opinion of Dr. Jolly in preference to those favored by the employer. The period of
TTD benefits awarded reflects the first date on which Dr. Jolly treated the
claimant, January 24, 2012. In his deposition, Dr. Jolly explained that he
diagnosed the claimant with complex regional pain syndrome on that date and that
his opinion that she was totally disabled due to her condition. That opinion
continued until he felt that she was able to return to work in October 2012, due to
the success of an implanted spinal stimulator. Throughout his testimony, Dr. Jolly
confirmed that his diagnosis was supported by various objective findings of the
condition during exams. Given Dr. Jolly’s opinion regarding the claimant’s total
disability, we find no manifest error in the award of TTD benefits during the eight-
month period of 2012.
8 With regard to SEB benefits, the claimant testified at the January 2014
hearing in this matter that she could, in fact, return to work. She denied, however,
that she could perform at the level required of her previously as a charge nurse due
to weight and strength limitations associated with her condition. Indeed, Dr. Jolly
confirmed in his deposition that he would return the claimant to work, but would
do so at light duty. Dr. Jolly subsequently referred the claimant for a November
2013 FCE which indicated that the claimant’s ―present strength and functional
capacities meet guidelines for the SEDENTARY-LIGHT physical demand level
based on various ranges tested as evidenced by lifting and carrying between 10-20
lbs.‖ However, the claimant’s job description with the employer required that the
charge nurse ―[m]ust be able to push, pull, move, and/or lift a minimum of 50
pounds to a minimum height of 3 feet and be able to push, pull, move and/or carry
such weight a minimum distance of 4 feet.‖ No evidence was introduced regarding
the availability of a position that would fit within the specified light duty
parameters. While the Nurse Facility Administrator testified regarding the
possibility of modifying the charge nurse’s job description and suggested that some
responsibilities could be delegated, the workers’ compensation judge was not
manifestly erroneous in determining that this evidence did not satisfy the
employer’s burden of proof enunciated above. See Banks, 696 So.2d 551.
La.R.S. 23:1201(F)
The ruling in this case included penalties ($2,000 for failure to reimburse
out-of-pocket expenses to the claimant and $2,000 for failure to provide indemnity
benefits), attorney fees ($18,000), and litigation expenses ($2,716.00). The
employer, however, argues that the award was inappropriate under La.R.S.
9 23:1201(F). This provision provides for the payment of penalties and attorney fees
for failure to provide payment for compensation benefits unless the claim is
reasonably controverted or the failure to provide such benefits results from
conditions over which the employer had no control. On review, we note that a
workers’ compensation judge’s decision as to whether the employer is to be cast
with penalties and attorney fees is subject to the manifest error/clearly wrong
standard of review. See Sinegal v. Lafayette Par. Sheriff’s Office, 13-1437
(La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/14), 139 So.3d 630.
After review, we maintain the workers’ compensation judge’s award under
La.R.S. 23:1201(F). In ruling, the workers’ compensation judge determined that:
In the case at hand, the subsequent evidence of Dr. Jolly, a physician who has been treating the claimant for some time, overwhelmingly supports the claimant’s position. This medical evidence was ignored by the defendants. The defendant had an option to send the claimant back to their doctors and did not.
This finding of failure to further investigate is supported by the record. In addition
to Dr. Jolly’s opinion, various physicians also considered and/or investigated the
possibility of complex regional pain syndrome, including Dr. LeBlanc. While Dr.
Morgan dismissed that claim, other physicians pursued that diagnosis in response
to the claimant’s ongoing complaints, including those identified as objective by Dr.
Jolly. We do not conclude that the workers’ compensation judge was manifestly
erroneous in finding that the employer was unreasonable in its failure to further
consider and investigate the ongoing complaints.
Neither do we find manifest error in the award of penalties associated with
the failure to reimburse out-of-pocket expenses paid by the claimant to Dr. Hale.
Above, we found no merit in the claimant’s contention that its payment for Dr.
10 Hale’s treatment indicated that it had reimbursed her own expenses. That
reasoning extends to the instant penalty claim as well.
Answer
In answer to the appeal, the claimant initially sought a determination that the
workers’ compensation judge erred in limiting her reimbursement for out-of-
pocket expenses. As the claimant did not pursue that aspect of her answer in her
brief to this court, we do not address the assertion here. See Uniform Rules—
Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4). However, the claimant does maintain her
plea for additional attorney fees incurred for work performed on appeal. Finding
such an award appropriate in light of the award of attorney fees affirmed above, we
award $2,000 in that regard.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the workers’ compensation judge is
affirmed. An additional $2,000 in attorney fees is awarded for work performed on
appeal. Costs of this proceeding are assessed to the appellant, The Care Center of
DeQuincy.
AFFIRMED. ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED FOR WORK PERFORMED ON APPEAL.
11 NUMBER 14-1107 WCA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
V.
CONERY, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons.
I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the WCJ’s award of TTD and
SEB benefits, plus court costs in the trial court and on appeal. I respectfully
dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the WCJ’s award of penalties and
attorney fees and its award of additional attorney’s fees on appeal.
First, the analysis for consideration of the merits of the WCJ’s decision to
award TTD and SEB benefits is different from that of the analysis of the WCJ’s
decision to award penalties and attorney fees. The decision to award disability
benefits is guided by the overriding principle that workers’ compensation
legislation is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed to benefit the
injured employee. See Lumpkin v. A.B.E.L. Trucking of La. LLC, 10-54 (La.App. 3
Cir. 6/2/10), 40 So.3d 422, writ denied, 10-1543 (La. 10/1/10), 45 So.3d 1104.
The award of penalties and attorney fees, on the other hand, is punitive in
nature and must be strictly construed. See Brown v. Texas-LA Cartage, Inc., 98-
1063 (La. 12/1/98), 721 So.2d 885. It may well be then, that in a given case, the
same evidence used to justify an award of benefits may not be sufficient to justify
an award of penalties and attorney fees.
Page 1 of 5 Under La.R.S. 23:1201(F), the employer, in my view, put forth sufficient
evidence in this case to “reasonably controvert” the claim for penalties and
attorney fees. See Brown, 721 So.2d 885; Williams v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 11-59
(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/11), 68 So.3d 616, writs denied, 11-1793 and 11-1794 (La.
10/21/11), 73 So.3d 384; Dietz v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 14-401 (La.App. 3
Cir. 11/5/14), 151 So.3d 990; Sinegal v. Lafayette Parish Sherriff’s Office, 13-
1437 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/14), 139 So.3d 630. The WCJ failed to make specific
factual findings or cite legal authority to support such an award. Indeed, the only
portion of the opinion discussing penalties and attorney fees was completely
conclusory in nature and stated:
The claimant is classified as a part-time employee. She is entitled to reimbursement of out-of-pocket medical expenses. Based on the evidence presented, the defendants failed to reasonably controvert this claim; therefore, penalties are owed in the amount of $2,000 for their failure to reimburse the claimant $125, that would include five co-pays of $25 each for her visits to Dr. Steven Hale, and the defendant is responsible for $2,000 for their failure to initiate indemnity benefits. Further more, the claimant is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of $18,000 for prosecution of the claim. She is further entitled to reimbursement of litigation expenses in the amount of $2,716. The defendant shall pay costs with interest. Thus done this 6th day of June 2014.
The analysis for the decision to award benefits is equally deficient, and
contains few specific factual findings or credibility determinations:
In the case at hand, the subsequent evidence of Dr. Jolly, a physician who has been treating the claimant for some time, overwhelmingly supports the claimant’s position. This medical evidence was ignored by the defendants. The defendant had an option to send the claimant back to their doctors and did not. Based on the evidence, the Court finds for the claimant. Thus, after reviewing the medical evidence, the Court finds that based on the medical evidence the claimant has carried her burden of proof; therefore, she is entitled to temporary total disability benefits from June 24, 2011, to September 8, 2013. She is further entitled to supplemental earnings benefits from September 8, 2012.
Page 2 of 5 However, because of the liberal interpretation required as to the issue of the right
to receive benefits and the application of the manifest error rule, I am constrained
to agree that the decision to award TTD and SEB benefits must be affirmed.
Obviously, the WCJ was impressed with Dr. Jolly’s opinion and concluded,
without commenting upon the vast amount of medical and lay testimony to the
contrary, that Dr. Jolly’s opinion “overwhelming supports the claimant’s position.”
Further, that, “This medical evidence was ignored by the defendants.”
In my view, the defendant sufficiently explained, based on the facts of the
case and the many medical opinions of plaintiff’s original treating physicians, that
it had ample evidence upon which to base its decision to deny benefits. Dr. Jolly’s
opinion was not ignored.
The WCJ awarded an additional $2,000.00 penalty against defendants “for
their failure to initiate indemnity benefits” and a $2,000.00 penalty for failure to
timely reimburse plaintiff for medical expenses. Again, while the evidence based
on plaintiff’s and Dr. Jolly’s testimony and records may have been sufficient under
the manifest error rule to support the award of TTD and SEB benefits, there are no
factual findings, nor is there analysis of the evidence, to support the WCJ’s award
of penalties, $18,000.00 in attorney fees and $2,716.00 in litigation expenses for
failure to initiate benefits and reimburse medical bills.
As to the penalty claim for failure to pay medical expenses, likewise, under
the strict interpretation required of a penal statute, should the defendant be
penalized $2,000.00 plus attorney fees for a bill which it allegedly proved had
already been paid directly to Dr. Hale as required by law? The WCJ’s conclusory
statement that, “Based on the evidence presented, the defendants failed to
reasonably controvert this claim,” is belied by the evidence that Dr. Hale’s bill was
Page 3 of 5 paid directly to him and not the claimant, as required by statute.
A review of the WCJ’s opinion on the issue of penalties and attorney fees
clearly shows that the evidence and analysis put forth by the
employer/defendant/appellant as to whether the claim was “reasonably
controverted” was given short shrift by the WCJ. That evidence showed that Ms.
Ruebush, working as an LPN, timely reported an injury to her left hand that
occurred on December 4, 2010, while in defendant’s employ when she was struck
with an aluminum walker by one of the patients. She resigned the same day and
did not make a claim for workers’ compensation benefits until July 2011. In the
meantime, she worked for another company as a nurse, failed to note an injury on
her employment application for that job, completed almost all of her course
requirements to be a registered nurse, including extensive typing, reconciled with
her husband and moved out of state, all the while making no complaint for
disability benefits to defendant. The underlying facts and summary of her medical
treatment were thoroughly reviewed in defendant/appellant’s brief and support the
conclusion that the defendant reasonably controverted the claim and should not be
assessed with penalties and attorney’s fees.
In my view, defendant presented considerable evidence upon which to base
an opinion that this claim was reasonably controverted. Recognizing that the
manifest error rule applies to this issue, I would nevertheless find that because the
WCJ made no factual or credibility findings on the issue of penalties and attorney
fees, the defendant/appellant’s evidence supports the position that the claim was
reasonably controverted within the meaning of the La.R.S. 23:1201(F). The WCJ
was manifestly erroneous in concluding otherwise. An employer should not be
penalized for bringing a bona fide dispute on a close factual or legal issue to the
Page 4 of 5 court for resolution. Louisiana Constitution Article 1, § 22 states, “All courts shall
be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law
and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for
injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights.” See also
Williams, 68 So.3d 616; Dietz, 151 So.3d 990; Sinegal, 139 So.3d 630.
I would reverse the WCJ’s decision to award penalties and attorney fees and
dissent from the majority’s decision on that issue. I likewise dissent from the
majority’s decision to award attorney fees on appeal, but agree that defendant
should be cast with all court costs in the trial court and on appeal. I concur with
the majority’s decision in all other respects.
Page 5 of 5